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ABSTRACT 
Since Burundi gained independence in 1962, this country has experienced periods of mass 
communal violence. Extensive scholarly research has focused on exploring the factors 
behind, and the nature of, the conflicts in Burundi from a socio-ethnic perspective. There has, 
however, been a persistent lack of attention paid to the inextricable relationship between 
environmental factors; particularly the scarcity of resources, coupled with rapid population 
growth; and Burundi‘s recent history of internal conflict. Noteworthy explanatory factors, 
which are often ignored in literature on the environment and conflict, have thus motivated 
this study. Burundi is an example of this reality because of a highly dependent agricultural 
economy and a constant growing population. This study used a descriptive analysis, as  
methodological tool; in order to gain an understanding of Burundi‘s land question - that is, 
how limited access to land and the constantly increasing population have led to 
environmental degradation, that served as motivational trigger factors for the violent political 
conflicts that occurred at various periods between 1965 and 1993 in this country. This study 
addresses this epistemological gap. In order to explore the nexus between environmental 
factors, land access, population growth and the political conflicts in Burundi, this study draws 
and builds upon Jared Diamond‘s (2005) five point framework of potential trigger factors to 
environmental collapse. Moreover, Diamond‘s (2005) ecocide theory argues that there are 
eight specific indicators to demonstrate how societies undermine themselves by damaging 
their own environment; thus resulting in an ecocide. This theory was applied to the two main 
environmental variables examined in this study. More specifically, this theoretical 
perspective provided a base for exploring how land issues, population growth, environmental 
degradation and political change can be understood as important precursors to the violent 
conflicts in Burundi. What may be surmised by this study; is that there is indeed a positive 
correlation between these forces, where the values of the independent variables (land access 
and population growth) are associated with the values of the dependent variable (violent 
conflict). This correlation, therefore, calls for an acknowledgement of the complexity of the 
Burundian conflicts and that ethnicity which has dominated contemporary conflict analysis is 
but one of several social rifts. 
Key terms: Burundi, political conflict, environmental scarcity, land access and population 
growth 
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OPSOMMING 
Sedert Burundi in 1962 onafhanklikheid verkry het, het hierdie land periodes van massa 
gewelddadige politieke konflik ervaar. Uitgebreide wetenskaplike navorsing het daarop 
gefokus om die faktore agter die gebeure, sowel as die aard van die konflik in Burundi vanuit 
‘n sosio-etniese perspektief, te ondersoek. Tog word daar steeds gebrekkige aandag geskenk 
aan die onlosmaaklike verhouding tussen omgewingsfaktore, veral gebrek aan hulpbronne, 
gepaardgaande met die voortgesette bevolkingsaanwas; asook Burundi se onlangse 
geskiedenis van interne konflik. Noemenswaardige gapings, wat dikwels in die verklarende 
literatuur geïgnoreer word, het dus hierdie studie gemotiveer. Burundi is ‘n  voorbeeld van 
hierdie werklikheid omdat die land baie afhanklik van landbou is; as gevolg van die 
kontstante bevolkingsaanwas in die land. Hierdie navorsing het beskrywende analise as ‘n 
metodologiese instrument gebruik om insig te kry oor Burundi se  grondkwessie – met ander 
woorde hoe die beperkte toegang tot grond en ‘n toenemende bevolkingsaanwas gelei het tot 
die agteruitgang van die omgewing. Bostaande faktore het as motiverende sneller faktore 
gedien, wat aanleiding gegee het tot die gewelddadige politieke konflik, wat gedurende 
verskillende periodes tussen 1965 en 1993 in hierdie land ontstaan het. Hierdie studie poog 
dus om hierdie epistomologiese gaping aan te spreek. Ten einde die verband (nexus) tussen 
omgewingsfaktore, grondbesit, bevolkingsaanwas en die politieke konflikte in Burundi te 
ondersoek, steun en bou hierdie studie voort op Jared Diamond (2005) se vyfpunt raamwerk 
van potensiële sneller faktore, wat lei tot omgewings ineenstorting. Verder beweer Diamond 
(2005) se omgewings uitwissing (ecocide) teorie dat daar agt spesifieke aanduidings is om te 
demonstreer hoe gemeenskappe hulself ondermyn deur hul eie omgewing te 
beskadig/vernietig: wat uitloop op omgewings uitwissing (ecocide). Hierdie teorie is 
aangewend in die twee hoof omgewings veranderlikes, wat in die studie/ navorsing 
ondersoek is. Hierdie teoretiese perspektief het ook spesifiek ‘n basis voorsien om te 
ondersoek hoe grondkwessies, bevolkingsaanwas, omgewings agteruitgang en politieke 
verandering verstaan kan word as belangrike aanwysers van die geweldadige konflik in 
Burundi. Deur middel van hierdie studie kan ‘n duidelike opsomming gemaak word dat daar 
inderdaad ‘n positiewe korrelasie tussen hierdie magte voorkom, waar die waardes van die 
onafhanklike veranderlike (toegang tot grond en bevolkingsgroei) geassosieer word met die 
waardes van die afhanklike veranderlike (geweldadige konflik). Hierdie korrelasie verg dus 
‘n beroep om erkenning te gee aan die kompleksiteit van konflik in Burundi. Hierdie etniese 
debat, wat tans die oorheersende konflik aanvuur, is maar net een van die verskeie 
interpretasies van sosiale breekpunte in Burundi is. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
“Nowhere else in Africa has so much violence killed so many people on so many occasions in 
so small a space as Burundi during the years following independence”.  
(Lemarchand, 2009:1) 
Since 1965, when thousands died in what turned out merely as a presentiment sign of even 
greater ‗horrors‘, the Burundian society has been torn by mass communal violence with acute 
conflicts in the years following its independence in 1962. Chronic political violence over 
unequal distribution of wealth and monopolisation of power between the Tutsi and the Hutu, 
and in turn growing tension along ethnic lines, is believed to be one of the dominant factors 
in the political issues prevalent in the Burundian society (Nindorera, 2007). At the centre of 
the conflicts, are the unjust policy structures instituted by the country‘s various administrators 
(Oketch and Polzer, 2002). In most accounts, Burundi‘s continual conflicts correspond to 
contemporary discourse of the failed neo-patrimonial state in which opportunistic elites 
mobilise ethnicity for economic gain (Daley, 2006).  
Group identity, political structure and the economy, were all radically transformed during the 
Belgian colonial era (Nindorera, 2007). It is argued that the colonial administration had five 
major influences on the Burundian society, which are known to be central elements of the 
conflicts (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Firstly, the disenfranchisement of Hutu‘s in relation to 
the fledgling state was intensified through the administrative reforms which shaped the 
structure of the state. Secondly, education was mainly directed towards Tutsi and the ganwa
1
, 
therefore increasing the ethnic differential opportunities and cementing and politicising ethnic 
identities. In addition, the Belgians structured the economy for primary product export. 
Lastly, the state administration developed as the central locus of patronage and source of 
                                                          
1
 Of royal blood and Tutsi origin, a ganwa is a prince who came to be seen as a separate ethnic group and during 
the pre-colonial era they were the main authorities (Lemarchand, 1994; Banderembako, 2006). 
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wealth as opposed to the royal court (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Significant for the colonial 
era was that the Belgian rule qualitatively changed the relationship between the social 
groupings in the Burundian society.       
In the post-colonial years, Burundi witnessed different politicisation of identities and their 
intersection with state formation. Ethnicity, Daley (2006) contends, has been the fundamental 
organising principle of the modern Burundian state with its successive policies of 
differentiation and exclusion
2
. Throughout its post-colonial history, the Burundian state has 
not been a fully functioning sovereign state along the lines of its western counterparts (Daley, 
2006). Yet, the citizens of Burundi, irrespective of their ethnic affiliation, have not contested 
its territorial integrity (Daley, 2006). According to Daley (2006), the conflicts reflect 
competing claims for enrichment, representation and security as expected from a model state. 
The on-going violence is attributed to the increasing division of political elites, based on 
multiple cleavages within the Burundian society who mobilise ethnicity in their struggle for 
control of the state and thus usher a widening social division between Burundians (Daley, 
2006). Moreover, the conflicts have been characterised as being an amalgamation of 
structural violence, extreme and increased poverty and the exclusion or marginalisation of the 
majority from the economic, political, social, human and cultural rights (SIDA, 2004). Recent 
peace negotiations
3
, aimed at correcting ethnic disparity through power sharing and reform of 
the institutions of governance have been put under question as there has been some debate 
regarding its incapacity to resolve the political crisis as they fail to move beyond a 
methodological pre-occupation of ethnic identities (Daley, 2006). Additionally, peace 
negotiations have failed to address the complex social reality of the Burundian society and to 
include the people of Burundi as part of a broader non-ethnic political community, which is 
regarded by some as a pre-requisite for a stable pluralistic democracy (Daley, 2006). 
Oketch and Polzer (2002:90) maintain that there is a complex web of factors that have 
contributed to the outbreak of actual violence in Burundi as well as the nature in which the 
violence has taken. These include proximate historical factors such as triggering events, 
regional and international influences. In addition to those factors listed above, are influences 
endogenous to a captured state: the lack of legitimate and effective domestic conflict 
                                                          
2
 See description of Lemarchand (2000) exclusion thesis under the sub-heading ‗Theoretical framework‘ within 
this chapter.  
3
 The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 2000 and 2004 aimed at institutionalising power-sharing 
between the Tutsi and Hutu (Falch, 2008). 
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resolution mechanisms and the role which has accrued to ethnicity over decades of 
colonialism and post-colonialism.   
Within this milieu, analytical shortcomings and the persistent lack of adequate literature 
concerning the violent conflicts in Burundi have thus encouraged further research to be 
explored and examined. The issue of how environmental factors have served as triggers for 
political conflicts in Burundi, have received increasing attention and gradually becoming 
more internationalised.
4
 Moyo (2008) argues that such international interest developed from 
the global financial world as global capital is gradually entwined in conflicts over natural 
resources, minerals and land in Africa. More importantly, the fundamental issue concerning 
access to land and population growth in Burundi has not sufficiently been explored. Although 
the land issue (limited access to land) has received a growing policy focus, the context in 
which Burundi‘s land and agrarian matters are investigated ignores the detailed nature of the 
land concern, the effects on development coupled with a population density which almost 
mirrors a ‗Malthusian trap‘.5  
The land concern in Burundi should therefore be understood in correlation with the nature of 
the struggles for access to land and its use. Population growth in Burundi amalgamated with 
access to land and land rights, are unfortunately, insufficiently explored. While the unequal 
patterns of land distribution may be more localised and occur on smaller scales than has been 
characteristic of land distribution debates elsewhere, they do amount to a socially significant 
phenomenon. Inadequate scholarship conceptualising Burundi‘s land question, conflict and 
population growth, has thus encouraged this research. This study therefore indicates that 
environmental factors
6
 can serve as important triggers when examining the conflicts in 
Burundi. Although Burundi‘s population is predominately rural, there is also a positive 
growth rate of the urban population and in the context of scarce non-agricultural employment 
                                                          
4
 This thesis acknowledges the scholarly research done by Kumar Rupesinghe, Tania Paffenholtz and Peter 
Wallensteen, on the issue of how environmental factors have contributed to political conflict in Burundi. 
5
 This term was founded by Thomas Robert Malthus (1798), who argued that population increase is limited by 
means of subsistence (for example, food production) and that when subsistence increases so does population 
concurrently. However, Malthus (1798) predicted that population growth would surpass the carrying capacity of 
the earth or certain countries, because food production grows arithmetically and population increase 
exponentially. As such, a population has the tendency to expand to consume all available food without leaving a 
surplus; hence, the rate at which a population grows is faster than the growth rate of food production, which in 
turn will lead to a number of challenges in the future (Malthus, 1798).  
6
 Environmental factors within the framework of this study are defined as access to land and population growth 
in Burundi. These terms will be used interchangeably throughout this study. More importantly, environmental 
factors defined within this thesis‘ framework are not to be confused with Diamond‘s (2005) concept of 
environmental factors. 
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in Burundi; there is still a great dependence on the socioeconomic reproduction on access to 
adequate land.  
Against this backdrop begs the fundamental exploration within this study, namely: to 
examine whether there is a complex and intractable picture of competition for resources in 
Burundi and whether a challenge exists between urban and rural development and investment 
policy priorities and industrial and agricultural demands. Moreover, this study investigates 
whether there is a glaring schism between the country‘s southern and northern regions, in 
addition, this study assesses whether this has had far-reaching implications for the conflicts 
that has prevailed in Burundi. The alleged ethnic debate has served to draw attention away 
from the concrete structural conflict of interests between the elite and the rural majority. In 
light of this, this study does not aim to determine the range of factors that explains the current 
incident of political conflicts (dependent variable), rather it examines if resource scarcity and 
human population growth (independent variables) have acted as trigger factors for the 
political conflicts in Burundi. 
1.1.1 Research Aim and Question 
The link between environment and conflict is a subject worth examining in the Burundian 
context. The interrelationship has, however, been established in various contexts within the 
developed world where questions concerning matters of natural resources are a critical facet 
of the quest for political and economic stability. This interrelationship has in addition, 
functioned as a searching tool for strategic goals around the world regarding this area. The 
role of environmental factors as triggers to the Burundian conflicts are examined with no 
attempt made to exhaustively define the nature of each conflict, therefore, the rationale of this 
study is to examine whether environmental factors need to be assessed for their impact.  
In particular, this study solicits: have population growth and limited access to land impacted 
the previous political conflicts in Burundi? Within this study, access to land and population 
growth are also addressed as environmental factors, for the broader term. The main research 
question is subsequently formulated against this backdrop. This study, therefore, seeks to 
answer the following questions:  
i. How have environmental factors, more specifically, population growth and (limited) 
access to land impacted the previous 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993 political conflicts 
in Burundi?  
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An expansion of the principal research question further advances into two sub-questions with 
the objective to:  
ii. Examine whether a nexus can be found between environmental factors and the 
political conflicts in Burundi?  
iii. To what extent has the latest Peace Accord (the Arusha Agreement of 2000) 
addressed these environmental factors?  
Objectives for this research are to develop an understanding of how population growth and 
land access functioned as trigger factors for the violent conflicts in Burundi. Furthermore, the 
research aim is also to contribute to the further development of conceptual tools for 
researching environmental variables, such as population growth and land access to conflict 
linkages. This study will attempt to connect the conflicts in Burundi to the above mentioned 
environmental factors. Central to this, is an attempt to contest matters that could prove 
valuable for sustainable environmental management initiatives and perhaps to assist in the 
development of conflict preventative measures through management of land and population 
structures, both pre- and post- conflict conditions in Burundi. This study will employ limited 
access to resources (land) and population growth in Burundi to investigate this matter. As 
such, matters pertaining to policies on natural resource scarcity and conflict, should, ideally, 
be seen as an integral part of both development and conflict prevention. 
1.2 THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
1.2.1 Introduction to the study 
 
In the 19
th
 century, the scramble for the African continent witnessed vast atrocities as 
European countries were battling over the African natural wealth. Followed by 
decolonization in the 20
th
 century, the continent seemed to move toward a prosperous 
promise of freedom at a political, economic and social level. However, in the 21
st
 century 
conflict is still a continuous feature of political life on the continent. In the years following 
independence, one of the countries, which emerged as one of the most hopeful candidates in 
light of a multiparty democracy, was the Republic of Burundi. The small central east African 
state is landlocked between Rwanda in the north, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
in the west, and the Republic of Tanzania in the east and south. Though promising at 
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independence, Burundi has become one of the most intractable and protracted cases on the 
continent, plagued by gruesome genocidal conflicts and political instability.   
The conflicts in Burundi, which erupted after its independence in 1962, are generally 
presented as merely ethnic in motivation; a conflict between the two main ethnicities in 
Burundi, the Tutsi and the Hutu (Banderembako, 2006). The population of Burundi consists 
of three ethnic groups
7
, Hutu (85 per cent), Tutsi (14 per cent) and Twa (1 per cent) (Ngaruko 
and Nkurunziza, 2000). Five major conflicts have been recognised in Burundi, the first 
conflict was in 1965, the second in 1972, the third in 1988, the fourth in 1991 and lastly, 1993 
until present (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000). There is no doubt amongst scholars that the 
conflicts have caused vast human and economic loss with the 1993 conflict being 
characterised as a fully-fledged civil war and highlighted as the longest and most detrimental 
in terms of its economic costs (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). According to Ngaruko and 
Nkurunziza (2000), Burundi has experienced one unstable and two stable equilibriums since 
its independence. The first stable equilibrium existed during the initial years of independence 
and the second stable equilibrium from 1972-1988. The first unstable equilibrium is dated 
back to 1965-1966 and is argued to be critical in terms of its impact on the future of the 
country (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000). The 1993 crisis is the second unstable equilibrium 
and viewed as a result of the break-up of the 1972-1988 equilibrium following political 
liberalisation that has taken place since 1988 (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000).  
Burundi has been mired in an unending cycle of conflict; successive waves of violence have 
increased ethnic and regional divisions, while deepening already extreme poverty. Brachet 
and Wolpe (2005) maintain that while the Burundians initially did not mobilize politically in 
relation to their ethnic identities, the recurring violence in the post-independence years 
brought a mass dimension to what is fundamentally an elite-driven and manipulated conflict. 
Repeated inter-communal massacres have made the population susceptible to ethnically 
framed political appeals (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005). In contrast to Rwanda where there was a 
strong focus on the division between the Hutu and Tutsi from the onset of the colonial era, 
the Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi were brought together by their common commitment to, and 
                                                          
7
 It is difficult in defining an ‗ethnic group‘ especially in the case of Burundi. The concept usually refers to 
different identities, with clear distinguishable traits, such as culture, language, geographical space or 
physiological features normally shared by members of the same group (Horowitz, 1985). A large amount of 
attention has been directed toward Burundi‘s ethnicity leaving it a contested topic, it is however important to 
note that the Burundian case is special. This study recognises that there are differences amongst Burundians; 
yet, there are also similarities, such as language and geographical space. The purpose here, then, is to draw 
attention to the (sometimes) ambiguous classification of these differences.   
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identification with, the monarchy (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005). The members of the ganwa 
aristocracy functioned as the provincial governors, ruling the various areas of Burundi in the 
name of the mwami (the King) (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005). It is apparent that during the years 
under Belgian rule, the Belgians themselves depended more on solidarities and divides within 
the clan system than the Hutu/Tutsi division, as was the case in Rwanda (Brachet and Wolpe 
2005: 2). The World Bank‘s Conflict Analysis Framework8, assert that ethnicity is only one 
in a number of factors present in the Burundian society. Furthermore, whereas the ethnic 
divide is understood to be more important ―because of four decades of manipulation of socio-
ethnic identities, there are however, significant clans, regional and class-based divides‖, it is 
argued that these divides were aggravated by the degree of difference with regard to social 
opportunities, a history of violence and impunity, poor economic performance, inequality and 
environmental stress, failed governance and institutions, and the spillover effects of regional 
conflict among Burundi‘s neighbours (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005: 1).  
With the shift from conservationist ecological approaches to more socio-cultural political 
ecology during the 1970s in the political world order, saw a significant rise of approaches 
surrounding the investigation of the connection between human and nature at a general level. 
What this signified was a step toward scrutinizing what Clover (2005:80) reports as: ―the 
relationship between the nature of marginal environments and comparisons of causative 
processes and relationships across those environments‖. The Brundtland Commission Report 
of 1987 on environment and development was formed against the backdrop of the book, 
Limits to Growth
9
 (Clover, 2005; Gleditsch and Theisen, 2010). Amongst other things, the 
Brundtland Commission Report of 1987 stated the importance of seeing development and the 
environment as intertwined and not simply as two independent factors (Brundtland et al., 
1987). Furthermore, the Brundtland Commission Report also stressed the importance of more 
managerial and systematic approaches to the problems faced on the African continent, more 
specifically, the environmental issues that are increasing with the consumption of resources, 
which Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999) refers to as resource scarcity. It has been twenty six 
years since the Brundtland Commission Report was published and matters concerning the 
environment have grown increasingly important in the socio-political world order. Suffice to 
                                                          
8
 Cited in Brachet and Wolpe (2005). 
9
 This book was written by Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jörgen Randers and William W. Behrens 
III in 1972. Limits to Growth looks at the nature of and limits to exponential growth. The authors examine how 
exponential growth interacts with finite resources.  
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say, this has produced a shift worth debating. This study, therefore, uses this knowledge as a 
starting point for further inquiry.  
While ethnicity, political and economic factors have been at the centre of assessing the 
conflicts in Burundi, the environmental issues and ecological interpretations have repeatedly 
been significant trigger factors in conflicts throughout the world and the case of Burundi is no 
different (Kok et al., 2009). The mounting climate crisis is perhaps one of the greatest long-
term challenges the global world is confronted with. Within this context, the control for 
natural renewable and non-renewable resources, such as land, water, cropland, forest, fish 
stocking, minerals and oil has been a principal issue in many of the prolonged conflicts and 
civil wars in Africa, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (De Soysa, 2002; Urdal, 2005; 
Binningsbø, 2006; Hendrix and Glaser, 2007; Kok et al., 2009). Broad academic research and 
scholarly literature reveal that there has been a significant deterioration of the environment 
within the Great Lakes region of which Burundi forms part of (André and Platteau, 1998; 
Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kameri-Mbote, 2005; Diamond, 2005; Banderembako, 2006; Raleigh 
and Urdal, 2006). One of the consequences has been the intensification of exposure to the 
degradation of the environment, thus fuelling people‘s vulnerability and reducing the carrying 
capacity to manage such perils. With the case of Burundi, the milieus of appropriating such 
carrying capacities are further intensified by the high rate of population growth (Kameri-
Mbote, 2005).  
In his analysis, Banderembako (2006) trace the link between land, environment, employment 
and conflict in Burundi. Banderembako (2006) explains that subsistence crop production has 
grown particularly slower than the population whilst export crop production has plunged. 
Moreover, Burundi‘s limited and unequal access to land coupled with low income, was and 
still is an intricate issue. In particular, the decline in coffee and tea production is mainly due 
to the declining yields from coffee and tea plants. Additionally, access to land also needs to 
be understood in the context of coffee and tea prices which were plummeting on the global 
market scene demanding more land in an attempt to benefit from the same income one had 
previously (Banderembako, 2006). Significant for his analysis is that the major structural 
constraint on agricultural production is low productivity which stems from the high density of 
the rural population in Burundi (Banderembako, 2006:2). Banderembako (2006) further 
argues that the economic effects of the lack of cultivable land in Burundi, presents a strong 
tendency toward a cause and effect relationship. In so doing, the author states that subsistence 
crop production and high population growth amongst the rural population, contribute to 
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environmental deterioration in Burundi (Banderembako, 2006). The so-called vicious cycle 
of land scarcity-environmental degradation-conflict in Burundi, Banderembako (2006) 
maintains that this has led to an altercation across the social, economic and physical 
spectrums. In addition, Banderembako (2006:2) advocates a strong opinion that although the 
conventional rationale explaining the political conflicts in Burundi is mainly ethnic, scant and 
poorly distributed resources lead to tiny elite appropriating public resources and cash crops, 
and the rural population struggling for subsistence land.   
Following Jared Diamond‘s (2005) argument on the subject of environmental problems, there 
seems to be a strongly authenticated argument that there are specific processes by which 
societies have undermined themselves by damaging their own environments. Diamond 
(2005:7) refers to this phenomenon as ‗ecocide‘. The ways in which societies undermine 
themselves fall into eight categories, namely: deforestation and habitat destruction, soil 
problems
10
, water management problems, overhunting, overfishing, the effects of introduced 
species on native species, human population growth and finally, increased per capita impact 
of people (Diamond, 2005). However, a society does not necessarily have to experience all of 
these conditions at once, these ‗ecocides‘ are somewhat portraying the environmental 
problems in which societies face and have been seen in relation with the most significant 
factor, society‘s response to its environmental issues (Diamond, 2005). Similar to the case of 
Rwanda is Burundi with its constant growing human population. Diamond (2005:21) explains 
that this growth poses a threat to the environment and can thus lead to a failed and collapsed 
state, in which the fight for resources and land scarcity has become the epitome for 
explaining the conflicts within the Great Lakes region.  
Burundi‘s repeated conflicts since 1962 have become tantamount with two significant 
matters; high human population growth and genocide (Diamond, 2005). The small 
mountainous country has an estimated population
11
 of 10 million people merely living over 
27, 834 km
2
 and an astounding growth rate of 3.4 per cent per annum, making Burundi one of 
the two most densely populated countries in Africa
12
 and among the most densely populated 
in the world (CIA Factbook, 2011). Over 90 per cent of the population depend on subsistence 
agriculture and overpopulation places increased demands on land, a resource which is very 
                                                          
10
 Such as erosion, salinization and soil fertility (Diamond, 2005:20). 
11
 Estimates for Burundi explicitly take into account the effects of excess mortality due to AIDS; this can result 
in lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality, higher death rates, lower population growth rates, and changes 
in the distribution of population by age and sex than would otherwise be expected (July 2011 est.) (CIA 
Factbook, 2011). 
12
 Currently, the most densely populated country in Africa is Rwanda (Accord, 2009). 
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much limited in Burundi (Kok et al., 2009). In a collaborative study conducted by the African 
Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Madariaga College of 
Europe Foundation, Kok et al., (2009:17) completed interviews and desktop research with 
representatives of civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations and 
international institutions. Amongst these representatives, ACCORD and Madariaga College 
asked for their reflections and perspectives on the role that natural resources and the 
environment can play in complex conflict conditions. Kok et al., (2009:17) underlined that 
land as a material of survival and a factor of production is of high importance in the case of 
Burundi and its violent conflicts. Considering Burundi‘s economic activity, agriculture is 
perhaps the most significant and vital form of income that also represents a level of security. 
Kok el al., (2009:17), therefore, highlight in their study that subsistence agriculture is critical 
to family security. Moreover, the study found that land is usually acquired through means of 
inheritance, purchase, gift, lease or individual and state expropriations (Kok et al., 2009:17). 
Similarly, the competition for access to arable land is also in high demand (Gahama et al., 
1994:94). In the past, this has degenerated into social tensions and has also been a triggering 
factor for violence within families and among neighbours wishing to expand their land in 
Burundi (Gahama et al., 1999:94). Besides the value of land in subsistence and small-scale 
agricultural production, it is also a fundamental element of stability, identity and belonging in 
Burundi (Kok et al., 2009:17). Within their research, the authors conducted several interviews 
with Burundians and found that most Burundians want to live on the land that once belonged 
to past generations of their respective families. However, this can and has been a 
controversial subject when internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees return to their 
communities and find that their land has been occupied or utilised by others. Likewise, the 
fact that the Burundian government have had to move groups of people from a piece of land 
in an attempt to implement development policies has further created tensions (Kok et al., 
2009).  
In spite of the high fundamental value that land holds, survival from subsistence agriculture 
by itself is becoming gradually less feasible in Burundi for a number of reasons. Oketch and 
Polzer (2002) maintain that land continues to operate as the principal capital for most 
households and so increases competition for land. Increased sub-division of land between 
sons, especially in the rural densely populated areas of Burundi, has also decreased the 
economies of scale accruing from larger fields (Oketch and Polzer, 2002; Diamond (2005). 
As a result, this has led to the surfeit and degradation of land, reduced productivity and 
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increases in food prices due to scarcity (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Burundians are also 
migrating to vulnerable, yet more fertile and uninhabited areas causing further erosion on the 
hillsides, hence urban migration – specifically to the capital, Bujumbura – is growing (Oketch 
and Polzer, 2002:122). As a result, individuals and family groups often have to part from 
their land in the rural areas. Corresponding to the land issue, Oketch and Polzer (2002), focus 
their study on coffee production, which accounts for 80 per cent of Burundi‘s foreign 
exchange receipts. The authors assert that over-reliance on a single cash-crop leaves this 
small country particularly susceptible to volatile global markets and also puts pressure on 
subsistence in conditions of land scarcity (Oketch and Polzer, 2002).  
 
Through a re-examination of the conflicts in Burundi and the conflict management initiatives, 
Oketch and Polzer‘s analysis (2002) point to the role of environmental and ecological factors 
in causing violence in Burundi. Their theme is focused on the predatory state-dominated 
systems in Burundi, where the authors attempt to link the production and marketing of coffee 
and tea to the country‘s long running civil war (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:5). Their sound and 
acclaimed argument share the same perspective as many other scholarly researchers on 
Burundi whom have emphasised the importance of competition for control of the state. 
Oketch and Polzer (2002) maintain that the state and the predatory activities of the elite who 
control it, is both the underlying driver of violent conflicts, and the connecting link between 
the exploitation and degradation of Burundi‘s natural resources and the conflicts. Hence, the 
control of the state is a powerful political tool which brings with it the power to decide the 
allocation of (all) Burundi‘s resources (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). For this reason, the 
concern, according to Oketch and Polzer (2002), lies within the role that the exploitation and 
control over the Burundi‘s agricultural produce played in fuelling the conflicts. Lastly, 
Oketch and Polzer (2002) assert that where there is violent appropriation of land, this takes 
place in the context of much wider structural violence, whose main target is the state, not the 
land itself. There are various definitions of structural violence; however, this study indicates 
that structural violence as form of violence where social structure or social institutions harm 
those who belong to a certain social order (Huggins and Clover, 2005).  
 
The fragile peace currently being enjoyed in Burundi could be undermined by inadequate 
preparation to deal with population growth and ineffective institutions for addressing land 
disputes. Central to this, is the Arusha Peace Accord signed in 2000, an agreement that 
remains a foundation in the peace process. The environmental resource base upon which all 
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economic activity eventually depends includes ecological systems that produce a wide variety 
of services (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). This resource base is finite. Furthermore, imprudent 
use of the environmental resource base may permanently decrease the (carrying) capacity for 
generating material production in the future (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). All of this implies 
that there are certain thresholds to the carrying capacity of Burundi. It is, of course, possible 
that improvements in the management of resource systems, accompanied by resource-
conserving structural changes in the economy, would enable economic and population growth 
to take place despite the limits of the environmental resource base, at least for some period of 
time (Goldstone, 2002). However, for that to even be conceivable, Kameri-Mbote (2005) 
propose that signals which effectively reflect and respond to increasing scarcities of the 
resource base need to be generated within the economic and political system, which puts the 
Arusha Agreement into question. If the peace negotiations are not continued with the 
necessary changes and progress in the short term, Burundi‘s future looks gloomy. The 
negotiations are crucial for success as their collapse could result in the parties turning to 
military means to resolve the problems in the country, leading to instability, and chaos 
(Goldstone, 2002).  
1.2.2 Theoretical framework 
The nature of the conflicts in Burundi is multi-dimensional and compounded by diverse 
sources of conflict. Given the nature and manifestation of the conflicts in Burundi, it is 
necessary to adopt a systems approach. While there has been emphasis from scholars on the 
debate about resource-rich countries
13
 and their resource-curse
14
, there is also common 
consent amongst scholars who are more concerned with ‗political ecology‘ and the discourse 
of environmentally related conflicts. As such, the emphasis is on the relationship between 
conflict and weak/weakened states with natural resources that are more directed towards 
conflict (Keen, 1998; Berdal and Malone, 2000; UN, 2001; Collier, 2004).  
Scarcity, the area under discussion in this study, is more concerned with and encompasses 
natural resources: land, fertile soils, fresh water and forests, to mention a few. The scarcity 
approach builds on Thomas Robert Malthus‘ school of thought – which introduced the 
concept known as the ‗Malthusian trap‘. This notion was developed as early as in 1798 and in 
his book An Essay on the Principle of Population, Malthus (1798) claimed that hunger was 
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 Countries that are rich in natural resources such as oil, minerals and diamonds. 
14
 Resource curse refer to resource-rich countries that perform poorly in terms of socioeconomic development     
and therefore their natural resources impede sustainable growth (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001). 
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predictable because the human population grows in a linear fashion for the reason that 
population growth proceeds exponentially, while food production only increases in a linear 
pattern. In essence, what the ‗Malthusian trap‘ denotes is that there is a fundamental 
difference between how population grows and how food production grows. Because when a 
population increase, the additional people added to the existing population also reproduce 
themselves, thus symbolising a vicious cycle whereby “interest itself draws interest” 
(Diamond, 2005:312). Food production, on the contrary, does not further increase yields; 
rather, it only grows arithmetically (Malthus, 1798). Consequently, Malthus (1798) stressed 
that the world‘s carrying capacity the point at which human population will outgrow the 
growth of food due to its growth pattern. Moreover, this study does not apply the ‗Malthusian 
trap‘ theory to the Burundian case study; its reference is merely used as a contextual starting 
point. Instead, the conceptual framework within this study will make use of Jared Diamond‘s 
(2005) five point framework of potential trigger factors to environmental collapse. 
Additionally, Diamond‘s (2005) ‗ecocide‘ theory, which argues that there are eight specific 
indicators as to how societies have undermined themselves by damaging their own 
environment
15
, is applied to the Burundian case.  
The main purpose of this section is to outline Diamond‘s (2005) five point framework and his 
‗ecocide‘ theory with brief associations to the Burundian case. The intention is merely to 
provide an insight into the five different factors and the eight indicators which leads to 
ecocide. However, in chapter four, a further elaboration of Diamond‘s (2005) claims will be 
applied when assessing the research question.   
1.2.2.1 The five-point framework 
Why are some societies more fragile than others? What is the obvious problem? The fact that 
societies collapse is a complex subject, but how to make sense out of the complexities of this 
subject? These key questions explored by Diamond (2005) formulate his five-point 
framework of potential contributing factors in trying to understand environmental collapse. 
Diamond (2005) employs his framework as a kind of checklist in trying to understand and 
analyse society‘s collapse. The main emphasis within the context of the five-point 
framework, will not be on all of these factors in this study, however, the main focus will be 
on society‘s (Burundi) response to its environmental problems thus on land and population 
growth, which is the last factor in Diamond‘s (2005) framework.  
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In the event of a society‘s collapse, there are always contributing factors, as Diamond 
(2005:11) asserts, ―environmental damage cannot be the sole factor‖. Diamond‘s first factor 
within his framework, deals with environmental damage that human and/or societies 
unintentionally impose upon their environment. Here, the emphasis lies on the properties of 
the environment and Diamond (2005) divides them into two categories; fragility 
(susceptibility to damage) and resilience (potential for recovery from damage), which in turn 
helps to understand why some societies choose to fail ―suffered environmental collapses 
involving either exceptional imprudence of their people, exceptional fragility of some aspects 
of their environment, or both‖ (Diamond, 2005:11). Connected to Burundi‘s land 
degradation, which presented worrying signs of land depletion as early as the mid-1960s, the 
land area in Burundi has revealed itself as fragile due to the overutilization of land as a result 
of demographic pressure. As the case of Burundi, more people thus create more demand.  
The second factor within the five-point framework is that of climate change. This is perhaps 
the most complex factor within Diamond‘s (2005) framework as the term climate change is 
itself ambiguous. Although some theories look at climate change as a result of global 
warming caused by humans, Diamond (2005:12) disputes this claim. He contends that 
climate change, in fact, has little or nothing to do with humans per se, but climate change is 
more the result of changes in natural forces that drive climate. In reference to this, Diamond 
(2005:12) exemplifies his argument by stating that ―such forces include changes in the heat 
put on the sun, volcanic eruptions that inject dust into the atmosphere, changes in the 
orientation of the Earth‘s axis with respect to its orbit, as well as changes in the distribution 
of land and ocean over the face of the Earth‖. Diamond (2005:12) further argues that in many 
historical cases, it was not the depletion of environmental resources itself that was the prime 
cause of a society‘s collapse, but a combination of the aforementioned and climate change. 
Put differently; if a society did not partly or wholly deplete its environmental resources, then 
that society may well have been capable of surviving the resource exhaustion caused by 
climate change (Diamond, 2005). What this means is that both factors complement each other 
and that neither one of them can be taken alone in order to prove or disprove to be fatal.  
The third possible contributing factor is hostile neighbours. Here the emphasis is on the fact 
that relations with neighbouring societies might have been close enough in order to have 
some interaction and that these relations might have been erratically hostile, if not constantly 
so (Diamond, 2005:13). Adding to this, Diamond (2005:13) asserts that a society has the 
possibility to ‗hold off‘ its enemies only on the basis of it being strong; otherwise a society 
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will capitulate when it becomes weakened for any reason, including environmental damage. 
Moreover, Diamond (2005:13) maintains that the proximate cause of any collapse in this 
regard, will then be military invasion and the definitive cause would have been the factor that 
caused the weakening. Consequently, collapses within societies that occur due to ecological 
reasons or other reasons are by and large masquerade as military defeats (Diamond, 2005).  
The fourth set of factors is (un)friendly trade partners, whereby the partner and the enemy 
could be one and the same neighbour –all but a few historical societies have had friendly 
trade partners in addition to neighbouring enemies (Diamond, 2005:14). The example given 
is the trade relations between ‗first world‘ and ‗third world‘ countries, where there is an 
increase in risk if the respective trade partners become weakened for any reason (like 
environmental damage) and are no longer able to supply the essential import or the cultural 
tie necessary, then the receiving society may also become weaker as a result. Here, Diamond 
(2005:14) refers to ‗first world‘ countries that depend on oil from ecologically fragile and 
politically troubled ‗third world‘ countries.  
Finally, the fifth factor in Diamond‘s (2005) framework is society‘s response to its 
environmental problems. An investigation of how the Burundian society‘s response to its 
environmental issues, which in this context is limited access to land coupled with population 
growth, has, if at all, been appropriated will be discussed in chapter four. According to 
Diamond (2005), it is important to acknowledge that the first four factors may or may not 
prove significant for a particular society, but the fifth factor, always proves to be significant 
and thus serves as the most prominent one, which corresponds with the broader outline of this 
study, namely to show how limited access to land and population growth can serve as trigger 
factors to the political conflicts in Burundi. In accordance with the fifth factor, this study also 
stresses the importance of understanding that environmental problems cannot be assessed as a 
single factor. While it is no secret that different societies respond differently to similar 
problems, the salient purpose, evidently, is that a society's, in this case Burundi, response to 
environmental problems is entirely within its control, which is not always true of the other 
factors. Put differently, as the authors subtitle denote, a society can "choose to fail or survive" 
(Diamond, 2005:13).  
1.2.2.2 Ecocide 
Another comprehensive argument put forward by Diamond is his ‗ecocide‘ hypothesis. 
‗Ecocide‘ is a process by which societies have undermined themselves by damaging their 
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environment. The author points to recent discoveries made by archaeologists, climatologists, 
historians, palaeontologists and palynologists
16, where unintentional ‗ecocide‘ has been 
confirmed. According to Diamond (2005:6), ‗ecocide‘ applies to triggering effects of 
ecological problems in which people unintentionally destroy the environmental resources on 
which their societies depend on.  
Eight categories are identified where their relative significance varies from case to case and 
that are ‗signals of doom‘; deforestation and habitat destruction; soil problems (such as 
erosion, salinisation and soil fertility losses); water management problems; overhunting; 
overfishing; effects of introduced species on native species; human population growth; and, 
finally, increased per capita impact of people. In addition to the abovementioned categories 
that undermined past societies, the environmental problems confronting societies today are 
understood with four additional categories: human-caused climate change; build-up of toxic 
chemicals in the environment; energy shortages, and lastly, full human utilisation of the 
earth‘s photosynthetic capacity (Diamond, 2005). Societal collapses like the ancient Anasazi, 
the Maya and the Greenland Norse, to name but a few, proved certain tendencies to follow 
parallel courses denoting variations on a theme (Diamond, 2005:6). For instance, the 
implementation of particular intense methods of agricultural production (for example, 
irrigation, terracing and double-cropping) was a result of population growth and thus forced 
people to adopt such means. Moreover, the expansion of farming from first the main land, 
into further marginal land with the purpose of feeding the increasing amount of hungry 
people (Diamond, 2005:6). Furthermore, unsustainable practices, Diamond (2005:6) states, 
resulted in environmental damage of one or more of the eight categories of ‗ecocide‘, 
consequently ensuing in agriculturally marginal lands having to be abandoned once more. 
The damage and effects for a society thus included; food shortages, starvation, and wars amid 
large numbers of people fighting for a small amount of resources as well as deposed 
governing elites by disillusioned masses (Diamond, 2005:6). The population of the society 
ultimately decreased owing to war, disease or starvation and thus society suffered the loss of 
some of the political, cultural and economic complexity that it had attained at its peak 
(Diamond, 2005).  
Diamond (2005:6) acknowledges that this grim trajectory is not one that all past societies 
followed consistently to the end; dissimilar societies collapsed at different degrees and in 
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relatively diverse ways, while many societies did not collapse at all. Somalia and more 
importantly, in this case, Burundi and Rwanda; is used as an example of a modern society 
where Diamond (2005:7) maintains that both the Burundian and Rwandese society have 
‗developed‘ into collapsed societies. Perhaps for the purposes of this study, Diamond‘s 
(2005:10) reflection on the controversies and complexities about past and present ecological 
collapse and his assertion that not all societies are doomed to collapse due to environmental 
damage, is the most important factor to consider. Maybe the real question is why only some 
societies illustrated fragility or resilience and what then distinguished those that collapsed 
from those that did not? The type of fragility referred to is the way(s) in which some societies 
are more susceptible to environmental damage than others. 
Within the context of this study, the case of Burundi can be understood using Diamond‘s 
(2005) framework, namely; the intersection of environmental damage and population growth 
as key contributors to conflict. This study chooses to use Diamond (2005) as the theoretical 
description when analysing the research question set out earlier in this chapter. Diamond 
(2005) highlights important factors and contributors which need to be explored when 
analysing violent conflicts, similarly, this thesis also investigates the Burundian conflicts 
within this framework. Another aspect where this study and Diamond‘s (2005) framework 
intersect is the emphasis on important factors regarding environmental damage and how this 
can lead to collapse and also provide as dynamite for violent conflict. Moreover, Diamond 
(2005) also underlines how such grim trajectories are prevalent to humanity, however, 
society‘s incidence of collapse and violent conflict intensifies with environmental 
degradation, population pressure. As such, the thread that connects this study to Diamond 
(2005) is the examination of environmental damage and the social effects merely serve as 
trigger factors of gruesome violence. 
1.3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
Within the specific research objectives, the purpose of this study is a descriptive analysis, 
where the prime focus is on secondary sources which are undertaken as the main data base to 
be used for this specific study. The methodology which is employed for this study includes 
literature study, review of scholarship and factual data sources. Moreover, the research 
method involves analysing existing data obtained from qualified literature on the topic of 
Burundi. The literature study also forms part of an overview of the theoretical methods of the 
conflicts in Burundi. The process by which the gathering of data has been carried out is an 
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extensive collection and examination of written material merely in English, specifically 
books and journal articles. In addition to this, relevant newspaper and magazine articles and 
various official reports have been utilised. Within this research, the proposed case study 
focuses on Burundi
17
, thus a single-state case study and will accordingly, form the crest of the 
study. Consequently, the unit of analysis will be the state of Burundi.  
This research design employs empirical and qualitative analysis to answer the research 
questions stated previously in this chapter. In addition, quantitative data is presented in order 
to substantiate the analysis. The timeframe of the study covers the period from the pre-
colonial era of Burundi until 2005. Rather than being a mere longitudinal study
18
, this study 
examines the events in a chronological order beginning in the pre-colonial era, circa 1300, 
until 2005 when the first National Assembly elections were held after the signing of the 
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in 2000. In 2005, the term of the Transitional 
Government of Burundi (TGoB) ended due to the aforementioned elections.  
1.4 OPERATIONALISATION OF KEY CONCEPTS   
Some of the ways to address certain research problems lie at the heart of conceptualising and 
operationalising key variables used in a study. The ways in one defines key concepts and 
variables in a study effects the success of the research. According to Babbie and Mouton 
(2008:136), many concepts in the social sciences have complex and varied meanings and it is 
therefore crucial to explicitly clarify what is meant by the concepts and how they will be 
measured in a study. Within this study, the following concepts will be defined against the 
backdrop of this study‘s purpose. 
The environment is the external surroundings in which humans live in a geographical place; 
environmental conflict is therefore measured as conflict that arises due to natural renewable 
and non-renewable resource degradation and scarcity. 
Population growth forms part of the environment, and will be measured in terms of the 
annual growth rate of the Burundian population from 1960 to 2012; this will also include 
returning refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs). 
Land refers to an area of ground especially in terms of its ownership and/or use.  
                                                          
17
 A case study is an intensive examination of a single unit (Babbie and Mouton, 2008). 
18
 According to Babbie and Mouton (2008:93), longitudinal study involves the collection of data at different 
points in time; observations are done over an extended period of time.  
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Land access refers to the right or opportunity to use, manage, and control land and its 
resources. It includes the ability to reach and make use of the resources for growing crops, 
running stock, hunting, access to water, gathering wild foods, fuel, building materials, 
medicinal herbs. 
Scarcity is a concept which entails the condition of something being deficient; it will be 
measured in terms of having an inadequate amount of something that has value and in this 
study it is the scarcity of land in Burundi.  
Resource(s) is an available source of wealth that has economic value, relates to access and 
control over territory, material, economic and natural resources. Resources are mainly 
divided into two groups; renewable resources (sources of livelihood such as land, fresh water, 
forests, fertile soils and fish stocking) and non-renewable such as oil, minerals and iron ore 
(ACCORD, 2009). Likewise, renewable sources may not be accessible to all people in a 
geographical area and may be corrupted by use or mismanagement. Land as a renewable 
resource, is the main variable used in this research.  
Resource scarcity is measured as deficient per capita availability of a renewable resource, in 
this case, land. Consequently, increasing scarcity is influenced by a declining resource base 
and/or increased demand and dependence for the resource, such as land, through a growing 
population pressure coupled with an increase in consumption.
19
 A good example of this is 
population growth, which can reduce a resource‘ per capita availability by dividing it among 
more and more people. 
Social identity refers to how individuals regard themselves in relation to a society, most 
commonly, a society in which they live. Social identity is measured by how behaviour and 
identity differ based on Burundians‘ flexible concepts of themselves as either individuals or 
as members of groups. 
Conflict is indicated as armed violent struggle between civilians, armed forces, and the state 
or rebel forces. Within this study it is measured as the violence amongst Burundians in which 
the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralise, injure, or eliminate rivals 
(Coser, 1956:8). There is no strict severity threshold measured in this study, conflict is 
however quantified as deadly violence between civilians, groups and/or the state. Moreover, 
conflict is quantified as an act that arises due to scarcity of natural renewable resources (land) 
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 Homer-Dixon (1999) refers to this as environmental scarcity. 
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in Burundi. In order to clarify the scope of this concept, this study will measure the four 
conflicts in Burundi; 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993. 
Violence is in essence, an act of aggression, an intentional expression of physical or verbal 
force against others. Violent conflict is therefore operationalised as a situation that occurs 
among individuals or groups. Behaviour intended to hurt damage or kill someone.   
1.5 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY   
There are some limitations to this research that are of significance. Firstly, limitations 
regarding this study have to delimit the data and material that will be included in this research 
due to the constraints that are obligatory both by time and space which do not allow an 
extended examination of the various aspects that apply to this subject. This further signifies 
that only the foremost issues relating to the research question shall be considered. 
Secondly, this study is limited by the fact that a specific case study is examined and that a 
comprehensive investigation of the entire (Great Lakes) region or continent therefore falls 
outside the boundary of this analysis.  
Thirdly, as the research in this study is mostly based on secondary sources, an independent 
examination has therefore not been executed in order to obtain primary research to 
supplement the secondary sources. It is for this reason that a thorough reflection of a wide 
range of sources is needed in order to draw on various viewpoints as is possible within the 
specific limitations of the study. Furthermore, Babbie and Mouton (2008: 150) hold that a 
case study has specific limitations due to the fact that the researcher may be ―blinded by 
personal bias‖.  
The discourse on conflict has seen the use of various conflict analyses as a method of 
assessment. Conflict analysis per se, however, usually involves the verification of whether 
one is dealing with a conflict; defining conflict system boundaries and using specific conflict 
analysis tools to determine and zoom in on any characteristics of the conflict together with 
organising significant information (Mason and Rychard, 2005). Within the context of the 
violent conflicts in Burundi, a broad academic and policy literature has been instructed 
accordingly. A wide range of theories and debates, such as the ‗Greed versus Grievance‘ 
debate, the ‗Ethnic‘ debate, the ‗Greenwar‘ thesis, to mention but a few have been used not 
only as a description, but also as an application to the conflicts in Burundi. With this in mind, 
the spectres for such theories are too complex and comprehensive for this study to explore; in 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
21 
any attempt possible given the unavoidable constraints due to time and space for this study- 
delimitation in such matters falls naturally. More importantly, the specific research question 
investigated in this study does not coincide with these theories and debates and have thus not 
been the focus or correlation to the specific research question within this study.  
Finally, in addition to the primary sources written in English, the researcher of this study has 
acknowledged that scholarly and policy work has been written in Kirundi and French – the 
two official languages in Burundi. Kirundi and French are widely spoken in Burundi along 
with English and Swahili. Materials in Kirundi and French have been inaccessible to the 
researcher of this study; and therefore a delimit to this study, however, this study holds that 
the English sources are sufficient in order to make this study viable.        
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
Figure 1: Outline of the remainder of the study 
 
CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
The main focus of chapter two is the history of Burundi from the pre-colonial era to the 2005 
political election. A historical exploration of the role and relationship between the monarchy 
and the colonial authority of both German and Belgian rule is highlighted. Furthermore, a 
brief outline of the 1965, 1972, 1988 and the 1993 conflicts which occurred in Burundi are 
discussed as well as the transition period and the 2005 election. 
CHAPTER 3: ANALYSES IN PERSPECTIVE 
Formed alongside chapter two, chapter three begins with an examination of the power-
sharing agreement signed in 2004 and the negotiated constitution. In order to further develop 
our understanding of this subject matter as a whole, this chapter looks at the key actors in the 
conflicts that this study deems important; namely, regional actors, the United Nations 
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Operation in Burundi and external economic aid. It will be useful to have an understanding of 
the various factors involved in the conflicts and its nature, therefore, this chapter illustrates to 
what extent these factors are of any significance. The central focus of this chapter sees the 
introduction of Jared Diamond, an examination of his book, Collapse and Diamond‘s (2005) 
interesting case study on Rwanda, which draws significant similarities to Burundi.  
CHAPTER 4: ASSESSING LAND AND POPULATION GROWTH 
This chapter illuminates important factors that retain fundamental to the impetus and history 
behind conflicts over land in Burundi coupled with population pressure. This chapter 
discusses the topographic landscape in Burundi and also the differences between the rural and 
urban provinces and how this has an effect on agricultural production due to the vast 
ecological differences. Moreover, the role of the state is briefly discussed and its function to 
land administration. In order to effectively grasp and evaluate the land question and rising 
population in Burundi, it is necessary to provide an overview of the complex and context-
specific nature of land distribution, land tenure, the demographic growth in Burundi and its 
threats within the historical framework form pre-colonial to the post-conflict era. Limited 
access to land, scarce resources in Burundi due to the intense dependence on agriculture and a 
constant growing population are thus be examined in this chapter. The return of Diamond and 
his environmental analysis will again assess Burundi‘s environmental variables. An 
evaluation of whether the Arusha Peace Accord addresses these environmental factors and 
what kind of (if any) legal framework has afforded such issues, will also be highlighted. 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
This final chapter will serve as the connection between the various aspects that have been 
observed throughout this study. The findings will be observed in unison, providing an overall 
conclusion as to the impact of population growth and land access on the political conflicts in 
Burundi. A general discussion of the limitations that the study incurred will be discussed 
followed by recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Colonialism may have planted the seeds for ethnic conflict but, as Mahmood Mamdani 
(2001) argues, blame must be partly attributed to the post-colonial state, which failed to 
promote a more inclusive vision of society that transcends external concepts of race and 
ethnicity. Acknowledging Burundi‘s heterogeneous population leads us to a more nuanced 
explanation for the persistence of conflict and the struggle over the state (Daley, 2006). 
Rivalries between clans, communes and families permeate the social structure and cut across 
ethnic boundaries. Because of the heterogeneity of the Tutsi group, its dynastic families, and 
the variety of social bases for inter-ethnic relations, observers such as Lemarchand (1994), 
have long challenged the simplification of social identities in the discourse about conflict in 
Burundi. Daley (2006) argues that in the post-colonial state, the Hutu/Tutsi binary has only 
limited explanatory value. One can identify five distinct cleavages around which conflict 
occurred in Burundi: intra-aristocracy, between the old guard and the young modernised elite, 
between Hutu and Tutsi, intra-Tutsi, between the military and the political elite, and lately 
intra-Hutu (Daley, 2006). The first civil conflict occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
with the rise of nationalist movements. As Mamdani (1996:20) writes: “The politics of 
Africanization was simultaneously unifying and fragmenting; unifying the victims of colonial 
racism [but dividing] the same majority along lines that reflected the actual process of 
redistribution: regional, ethnic, and at times just familial.” 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the historical events which took place in Burundi 
from the pre-colonial era, to the elections in 2005. The importance of including the historical 
account in Burundi is to better understand the kind of system that was present both pre and 
post-colonial rule. Cultural and political differences that brought with the shift from a 
hegemonic government to colonial rule are also discussed in this chapter. Moreover, an 
assessment of the four political conflicts that broke out in 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993, 
respectively are discussed and will thus form the backdrop of this study. 
 
  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
24 
2.2 PRE-COLONIAL BURUNDI (c1300-1890) 
The current ethnic differentiations in Burundi have their origin in patterns of human 
settlement which began to take shape in the 15
th
 century. Oral traditions and archaeological 
evidence suggest that the gradual advancement of eastern Bantu agriculturalists on the 
indigenous hunter-gatherer societies that originated in the Congo Basin (known as the Twa or 
Pygmies), derived from Mali and the Central African Republic in the 12
th
 century. The Bantu 
speakers also introduced animal husbandry namely, cattle, sheep and goats (Bentley and 
Southall, 2005:32-33). A patchwork of polities emerged after a while in the densely 
populated areas of the Great Lakes Region and by the end of the 18
th
 century these had been 
consolidated into six large kingdoms, four in Uganda and the kindred states, Rwanda and 
Burundi (Bentley and Southall, 2005:32). 
A highly structured hierarchy emerged in Burundi which was concentrated around a divine 
king (mwami) whose officials, drawn from royal princes (ganwa), created the ruling 
oligarchy that governed through large autonomous chiefdoms (Oketch and Polzer, 2002; 
Bentley and Southall, 2005). The chiefdoms themselves were overwhelmingly dominated by 
a wealthy cattle owning warrior elite who, together with the king and royal court officials, 
formed the Tutsi ruling class that comprised about 14 per cent (Bentley and Southall, 2005; 
Mthembu-Salter, 2008). The substantial majority of the population (85 per cent) were 
peasants engaged in agriculture and were called Hutu‘s, but there was also a small number of 
Twa (1 per cent) who were economically and socially marginalised (Mthembu-Salter, 
2008:152). Oketch and Polzer (2002) add that the social system in Burundi was divided 
between royals and commoners, specifically the ganwa-Tutsi on the one hand and the non-
royal Tutsi on the other. Hutu‘s were also categorised as commoners. The Twa however, 
were at that time treated as social outcasts, exactly as they are now (Oketch and Polzer, 
2002). Consequently, when Burundi entered recorded history in the mid-19
th
 century the 
kingdom was already a complex integrated social structure connected together by a collective 
loyalty to the monarchy. This was due to the extensive system of government and 
administration that had been developed in conjunction with the sophisticated bonds of 
personal client-patron relations that tied the people of various strata of society to one another 
(Bentley and Southall, 2005). What was of more significance was the fact that Burundians 
shared a common language, religion and ethno-political identity (Kimber, 1996).  
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Social identity, certain privileges and social obligations depended on a number of factors. 
These included lineage, cattle ownership and usage, occupation and standing in the complex 
social and political hierarchies that exercised executive and judicial power. In addition to this, 
these hierarchies controlled the distribution of land (Mthembu-Salter, 2008). The 
classifications Hutu, Tutsi and Twa came to refer primarily to lineage and occupation and 
these groups were stratified internally along lines of wealth and socio-political standing 
(Mthembu-Salter, 2008). According to Oketch and Polzer (2002) neither internal nor external 
identity boundaries were rigidly determined at birth and one could move upwards and 
downwards in class within these structures and even between them. In this manner, "Hutus 
could 'become' Tutsi by achieving certain levels of wealth in cattle or influence" and they 
"enjoyed significant positions of responsibility and authority and were accorded property 
rights" (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:91). This was further cemented by intermarriages between 
Tutsi‘s and Hutu‘s. 
In the second half of the 19
th
 century conflict within the ganwa between two competing royal 
lineages, the Bezi and the Batare led to Bezi ascendancy over their rivals and the Batare were 
displaced from positions of power; the rivalry between the two groups was later to be 
exploited by the colonial authorities (Bentley and Southall, 2005:36; Mthembu-Salter, 
2008:152). To effectively strengthen their monopolistic power, the Bezi centralised the 
administration of the kingdom resulting in the transformation of the client-patron 
relationships that had hitherto bound Burundian society together into feudal like structures of 
lordship and bondage with society. This rigidly divided Tutsi overlords and the Hutu‘s who 
had been reduced to serfdom, with both under the domination of the Bezi who now controlled 
access to land and cattle (Bentley and Southall, 2005:36; Oketch and Polzer, 2002:91-121). 
Technically all land belonged to the king and was dispensed by him; under the centralised 
polity, effective control of land was in the hands of the ganwa who used their power of 
distribution to cement their control over the Hutu peasants (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:122). In 
this way Tutsi and Hutu indemnities lost their fluidity and took on the features of a ridged 
caste system (Bentley and Southall, 2005:36). Banderembako (2006) explains that this search 
for political and social stability and integration took a different turn in the second half of the 
19
th
 century as land became increasingly scarce and population density grew. This led, on one 
hand, to centralisation and stronger government and, on the other hand, to the strengthening 
of trade relations and the growth and hardening of feudal-type relationships under the so-
called ubugabire and ubugererwa systems (Banderembako, 2006:19). 
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2.3 COLONIAL RULE  
2.3.1 German Colonialism (1890-1916)  
At the Berlin Conference in 1884 and 1885, the partition of Africa was victim of the 
European powers allocating the territories of modern Rwanda and Burundi to Germany 
(Bentley and Southall, 2005:32). In 1890 the kingdom of Urundi (now Burundi) and the 
neighbouring kingdom, Ruanda (now Rwanda) were formally incorporated into German East 
Africa, but it was only in 1896 that the first military presence was established in Usumbura 
(Bujumbura) (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2001). Moreover, in 1899 was Urundi-Ruanda constituted 
as a military-administrative district administered from German East Africa (Nzongola-
Ntalaja, 2001). The process of German occupation was facilitated by inter-dynastic power 
struggles within the royal family, between the Bezi and the Batare, which the Germans 
exploited by siding with the Bezi in exchange for their recognition of German rule (Bentley 
and Southall, 2005). 
Due to a lack of manpower and resources the Germans retained all existing social and 
political structures and rule was exercised through the monarchy and its existing state 
formations controlled by the Bezi lineage (Mthembu-Salter, 2008). This effectively 
modernised and centralised the existing state (Bentley and Southall, 2005). Alongside this, 
the Germans attempted to strengthen the power of the chiefdoms to counter the growing 
power of the monarchy by empowering the subordinate chiefdoms, thus further solidifying 
the caste system that had emerged over the previous half century, with a wealthy Tutsi 
minority dominating a dispossessed Hutu majority (Mthembu-Salter, 2008; Bentley and 
Southall, 2005). In line with late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century social Darwinian thinking, the 
Germans viewed Burundi's caste structure as reflecting a past in which the Tutsi ―were 
descended from superior and more advanced people who had migrated, variously, from 
Ethiopia, ancient Egypt, Melanesia or Asia Minor, or even the lost continent of Atlantis, and 
they had carried monarchical institutions with them and superimposed them upon the original 
Hutu and Twa inhabitants‖ (Bentley and Southall, 2005:33). The colonial beliefs regarding 
Hutu‘s and Tutsi‘s, merely brought more tension amongst the two ethnic groups. The German 
colonial approach to create such caste structure only provided an even more disconnect 
amongst Tutsi‘s and Hutu‘s. The effect of this pseudo-scientific discourse was to reconstruct 
castes as ethnic identities and to provide a racially prejudiced justification for relations of 
domination and subordination and of minority Tutsi control of wealth, privilege and power at 
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the expense of the majority Hutu‘s (Bentley and Southall, 2005; Oketch and Polzer, 2002). 
This creation of mutually exclusive ethnic identities, and their coupling with differentiated 
access to control of resources and opportunity, put into motion the forces of social conflict 
that would tear the Burundian polity apart (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). 
The introduction of a money-based economy had an unexpected disintegrative outcome on 
traditional social structures, since wealth accumulation and social status no longer depended 
primarily on the ownership and distribution of cattle (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). In cash 
economy, the distinction between Tutsi and Hutu that the Germans had sought to develop and 
enforce, were not merely irrelevant, they were ineffectively unsound (ISS, 2005). Coffee was 
of particular significance as a cash crop, which was introduced by missionaries and was 
promoted by the German authority as a means of generating revenue (Oketch and Polzer, 
2002:123). 
The short period of German rule was brought to an end with the outbreak of World War I and 
the following Belgian occupation of Burundi in 1916. However, the German system of 
indirect rule and their transmutation of socio-economic groups into ethnicities, were inherited 
and advanced by their Belgian successors (Bentley and Southall, 2005:37; Oketch and Polzer, 
2002:92). 
2.3.2 Belgian Colonial Rule (1916-1962) 
After the outbreak of World War I, the Belgians invaded and occupied Urundi-Ruanda, 
ejecting the Germans and callously controlling native resistance (ISS, 2005). The territory 
remained under military occupation until 1923 when, in terms of the Treaty of Versailles, it 
was allocated to Belgium as a mandate territory under the League of Nations (Bentley and 
Southall, 2005:32). The Belgians continued the German strategy of indirect rule, effectively 
governing Urundi and Ruanda as separate territories through the agency of their monarchies 
(Bentley and Southall, 2005:32). In Urundi the power of the ganwa and particularly that of 
the Bezi royal lineage, was consolidated and the dominance of Tutsi‘s over Hutu‘s was 
reinforced (Mthembu-Salter, 2008:152). To bolster the loyalty of the Tutsi‘s, the Belgians 
established the ethnic divisions created by the Germans by ensuring unequal access to 
educational opportunities, creating a class of literate, ‗westernised‘, aristocratic Tutsi‘s to rule 
over the illiterate, ‗traditional‘, peasant Hutu‘s (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:93). Tutsi‘s in 
general, and the Bezi in particular, had privileged access to mission schools, facilitating their 
rapid conversion to Catholicism, which provided them with the literacy required to enable 
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them to occupy the rungs of the colonial bureaucracy (Bentley and Southall, 2005:37; 
Mthembu-Salter, 2008:152). 
Largely excluded from education and the civil service, the Hutu‘s were strongly subordinated 
to the Tutsi elite and subject to ‖a draconian system of forced labour whereby mostly Hutu 
were drafted to work for the state without pay‖ and subjected to land expropriation often with 
inadequate compensation (Bentley and Southall, 2005:37). As soon as resistance had been 
broken the Belgians set about cementing administrative control and making the new 
territories pay their way (ISS, 2005). They imposed poll taxes and forced labour obligations 
which were brutally extracted, burdens which fell particularly heavy on the impoverished 
Hutu peasantry (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:124). They further used the German system of 
indirect rule to enforce the planting of cash crops, especially coffee, and the implementation 
of poll taxes in cash was designed to encourage coffee planting to raise cash to pay taxes, and 
to force those who could not do so to offer their labour on the mines of the Belgian Congo, as 
much as to raise revenue for the colonial administration (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:93-124). 
Belgian rule was thus a continuation of what the Germans had implemented years earlier. 
Over time direct intervention became more frequent and wide reaching and the extraction of 
wealth more naked and violent. Not surprising, were the peasant uprisings in the 1920s and 
1930s (Kimber, 1996). In the 1930s as Belgium intensified its rule more directly through its 
own structures and administrators, the power of the monarchy and traditional socio-political 
structures were henceforth undermined in terms of its powers. Similarly, a class colonial 
administration was generated largely drawn from the ganwa-Tutsi (Oketch and Polzer, 
2002:92). In 1933 the distinctions between Tutsi and Hutu were formalised and entrenched 
by the issue of ethnically based identity cards (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:93). 
In the period after World War II, specifically in the 1950s ―the arrival of a new generation of 
[Belgian] priests and administrators who were more open to egalitarian ideas and democracy 
did bring about a reorientation of attitudes towards the Hutus, who were now increasingly 
favoured by policies in church and state‖ (Bentley and Southall, 2005:40). As a reaction to 
the demands for independence amongst the Tutsi elite, the Belgians attempted to win the 
support of the Hutu‘s in their efforts to stay. The Belgians abolished the traditional feudal 
relations between Tutsi and Hutu and began to redistribute cattle, thus negating the basis of 
traditional caste distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi (ISS, 2005).  
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From 1959 onwards, with the decentralisation of legislative power to an indirectly elected 
legislative council, the new structures were modelled on those of Belgium, leading to the 
import of practices such as universal suffrage, party-based elections and the accountability of 
authorities to the electorate (Peterson, 2006). This was supplemented by the formation of a 
territorial guard, which was to become the basis of a national army recruited from Hutu‘s and 
Tutsi‘s. Elections, which had been conducted with open voting, were reformed to mandate 
secret ballot – in order to remove voting by Hutu‘s from public scrutiny and encouraging the 
growth of Hutu ethnic parties (Daley, 2006). These measures were seen by Tutsi‘s as a direct 
threat to their long-term rule over the majority of the population, and therefore to their 
wealth, power and physical security (Peterson, 2006). This sense of vulnerability was 
underpinned by massacres of Tutsi‘s in Rwanda and a flood of refugees southward in the 
wake of 1961 (Bentley and Southall, 2005).  
In Burundi, the politics of nationalism and the struggle for control of the state, initially 
divided the well-established, essentially Tutsi political class (Daley, 2006). At the same time, 
Hutu consciousness of their potential political power rose with the prospect of a majoritarian 
electoral democracy. Additionally, the struggle for self-determination occurred 
simultaneously as the global political restructuring of the Cold War created aftershocks 
locally as the superpowers vied for political leverage over newly independent territories 
(Daley, 2006). The old rivalries in the Tutsi aristocracy primarily between the two Baganwa 
clans, the Bezi and Batare re-surfaced in the two leading nationalist parties; the Bezi-led 
Unite pour le Progrès National (UPRONA) and the Batare-controlled Parti Démocratie 
Chrétien (PDC) (Daley, 2006). UPRONA was founded by members of the Bezi aristocracy, 
and unofficially headed by the eldest son of the mwami (King) Mwambutsa IV, Prince Louis 
Rwagasore. The formation of UPRONA in 1957 functioned as a vehicle to defend the 
privileges of the ruling Bezi, but the rapid deterioration of the situation in Rwanda led to the 
repositioning of UPRONA as a trans-ethnic nationalist party (Bentley and Southall, 2005:42). 
Additionally, the charismatic leadership of Prince Rwagasore and the loyalty that many 
Burundians still felt towards the monarchy, UPRONA was able to unite Hutu and Tutsi anti-
colonialists under the slogan ‗unity and progress‘ (Daley, 2006). Significant for UPRONA 
was its progressive nationalist rhetoric and opposition to colonial rule with a strong 
association to the monarchy. These aspects of UPRONA garnered widespread Hutu support 
and saw itself as a confident winner in the legislative elections of 1961 (Daley, 2006). 
Frightened by this wave of popularism, the colonial authorities branded UPRONA as 
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communist and threw their weight behind the rival PDC and promised a more Belgium- 
friendly government after independence (Bentley and Southall, 2005:42). Rwagasore‘s 
murder on the 13 October 1961, supposedly planned by the PDC leadership with the tacit 
approval of the Belgians, led to the termination of the PDC and left the Batare as a competing 
political force (Daley, 2006). The colonial state had to admit defeat momentarily, as 
UPRONA formed the independent government in 1962. As social mobility was largely 
dependent on political patronage, young Hutu‘s, without access to state elites, embraced the 
patronage of younger Belgian clerics, fresh from the Walloon/Flemish factionalism in their 
home country (Daley, 2006). Hutu‘s were schooled and politicised in such a way as to see the 
Tutsi, and not the colonial state, as their oppressors (Daley, 2006). Despite the support from 
the missionaries, Hutu parties such as Parti du Peuple (PP) lacked a traditional power base to 
mobilize and, therefore, could not compete with the Baganwa-backed parties (Daley, 2006). 
 
In order to get a thorough understanding of the period leading up to the political conflicts as 
well as why the violent political conflicts emerged - it is important to briefly mention the four 
major crises that contributed to the polarisation of ethnic sentiments in Burundi. At the peak 
of the change of government, a crisis of legitimacy rose concerning governmental institutions 
in relation to monarchical institutions. In November 1961, when the independence 
constitution was adopted, (but not implemented), King Mwambutsa IV gained extensive 
powers, while legislative power was shared by him with Parliament (Bentley and Southall, 
2005). However, it was only after its independence on the 1
st
 of July 1962 that Burundi 
changed from a kingdom to a constitutional monarchy under the King and subsequently his 
son; Ntare V (Mokoena, 2005). According to Lemarchand (1970:437) the disparity between 
monarchical and government institutions signifies the dominant feature of Burundian politics 
until the proclamation of the republic in 1966. Following his argument, Lemarchand (1970) 
maintains that this crisis of legitimacy was the first issue that led to the polarisation of ethnic 
reactions. Yet, within this period many Hutu‘s had a positive disposition towards the crown 
and they remained mostly part in support of UPRONA, a party associated with the monarchy 
(Lemarchand, 1970).  
 
Monarchists in opposition to republican legitimacy did not take place until after 
independence, and only came into power when the monarchy exhibited tendencies towards 
royal autocracy (Mokoena, 2005). Lemarchand (1970) notes that the position of the king was 
in essence, agreed to be that of a position in the political system, however, with the ongoing 
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ethnic tensions, the position of the king changed from that of ―an impartial arbiter to an active 
participant to the point of virtually eliminating all traces of government autonomy‖ 
(Lemarchand, 1970:353). The king kept control over an ever fractious country and his own 
divide-and-rule strategy, primarily aimed at balancing Hutu and Tutsi representation in the 
four successive governments he formed between 1963 and 1965, in actual fact exacerbated 
matters further, engendering fear amongst the Tutsi‘s and a sense of disappointed 
expectations amongst the Hutu‘s (Bentley and Southall, 2005:42). The result was a growing 
spiral of communal violence and a growing alienation of all the protagonists from the 
monarchy itself (ISS, 2005). The fact that the Burundian society, both Hutu and Tutsi, still 
associated themselves with the king, illustrate how the Burundian social order for many 
years, was formed along the monarchy. As such, it has been important to highlight the 
influence that the colonial rule played in creating artificial separations between the Hutu and 
Tutsi (Diamond, 2005).  
 
In January 1965 the King replaced a Tutsi with a Hutu prime minister only to see the new 
incumbent assassinated three days later and alarmed by the deteriorating situation, the King 
called new legislative elections in May 1965 (Bentley and Southall, 2005). Despite the fact 
that Hutu candidates won 23 of the 33 seats, King Mwambutsa IV appointed a Tutsi, Léopold 
Bihumugani as Prime Minister (Bentley and Southall, 2005:42). This decision led to an 
attempted coup by Hutu politicians, supported by Hutu soldiers and policemen, which was 
vigorously suppressed by troops led by the Tutsi head of the territorial guard, Captain Michel 
Micombero (Bentley and Southall, 2005:42). About 500 Tutsi civilians were massacred by 
Hutu‘s in retaliation, and Micombero unleashed a bloody purge of Hutu‘s from the security 
forces, the elimination by massacre of the small Hutu educated elite that was not able to flee 
into exile and widespread killings of Hutu peasants throughout the country (Daley, 2006). 
King Mwambutsa IV fled to Zaïre
20
 and dispatched his son to govern as regent, but in July 
1966 the latter abolished the Constitution, deposed his father, claimed the throne as Ntare V 
and appointed Captain Micombero as Prime Minister (Mthembu-Salter, 2008). However, in 
November 1966 Micombero brought the monarchy to an end, proclaimed Burundi a republic 
and declared himself president, Ntare V fled to West Germany (Bentley and Southall, 2005; 
Mthembu-Salter, 2008). The outcome of this was the domination of the Tutsi controlled 
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UPRONA as well as the military and through such organs, the control of Burundi (Oketch 
and Polzer, 2002).  
 
Louis Rwagasore was elected Prime Minister designate prior to the country‘s independence, 
he was, however, assassinated in October 1961 even before forming a government 
(Lemarchand, 1970). Not only did the assassination of Rwagasore represent one of the 
principal shocks that destabilised Burundi it also deprived the country of its most capable 
leader as well as the destruction of the nascent ethnic unity he had struggled so hard to 
achieve (Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 2000). As a charismatic leader of UPRONA and having 
strong relations to the crown, Rwagasore‘s death also conveyed a loss of leadership for 
UPRONA along Hutu-Tutsi lines (Lemarchand, 1970:294). It is argued that the murder of 
Rwagasore and the situation followed by his death was the second crisis that led to 
polarisation of ethnic sentiments (Lemarchand, 1970; Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 2000). 
Following Rwagasore‘s death, the struggle for the heart of UPRONA was the third crisis. The 
battle for UPRONA was mainly characterised by Paul Mirerenko, a Hutu leader of UPRONA 
against André Muhirwa
21
. The alleged leadership crisis took effect in August 1962 with 
Mirerenko accusing Muhirwa of ethnic favouritism and nepotism as well as holding Muhirwa 
accountable for being disloyal to Rwagasore‘s dream of independence (Lemarchand, 1970). 
The situation at the gathering reached uncomfortable heights and the then Minister of 
Defence, Zénon Nicayenzi, ordered the military force to arrest Mirerenko and to separate the 
gathering, only to find that about 80 people (mainly Hutu) rallied around Mirerenko 
(Lemarchand, 1970). UPRONA became polarised between the Hutu and Tutsi factions and in 
an attempt to diffuse the circumstances, however not at the gathering, Mwambutsa called for 
the election of a new executive committee of UPRONA. Joseph Bamina (Hutu) was elected 
President in September 1962 and with him were the three Vice-presidents: Mirerenko, 
Muhirwa and Thaddée Siryuyumunsi (Mokoena, 2005). It is believed that ethnic tensions had 
then spread to the parliamentary and administrative organs of state (Mokoena, 2005). 
Mokoena (2005:43) gives an example of how this tension was present, stating that the 
National Assembly ―was now divided in the middle between the Monrovia (Hutu) and 
Casablanca (Tutsi) groups‖. However, Monrovia, capital of Liberia and Casablanca, city in 
Morocco, did not have any association with the Burundian alignments of the 1960s, but with 
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the sole purpose to differentiate in terms of descriptions for Hutu and Tutsi (Lemarchand, 
1996:64).  
 
What appears to be the fourth crisis took place following the Rwandan Revolution between 
1959 and 1962 (Lemarchand, 1970; Mokoena, 2005). The effects of the Rwandan Revolution 
were the increase of ethnic solidarity and the ‗corrupted‘ effect of republican ideas 
(Mokoena, 2005). The effects of the republican ideas were particularly powerful with Hutu 
elites educated in Catholic missions whom also understood the advantages of democracy as 
demonstrated by the case of Rwanda. According to Lemarchand (1970), Tutsi personalities 
invited Tutsi refugees from Rwanda to Burundi to act as a guarantee against a possible Hutu 
insurrection. Furthermore, a militia group among these refugees arrived from DRC to 
Burundi in December 1965. This group, which was violently uprooted from Rwanda during 
the revolution, had strong anti-Hutu sentiments and planned for a triumphant return to 
Rwanda. This was to be a major aspect of conflict in Burundi in the period following 
independence (Lemarchand, 1970). In light of the aforementioned issues occurring in post-
independence Burundi, Lemarchand (1970:343) argues that the so-called ‗Hutu awakening‘, 
was a factor in the polarisation of ethnic sentiments which occurred in Burundi and that ―a 
sudden manifestation of ethnic hostility where none had seemed to exist previously‖. 
Mokoena (2005) further states that this polarisation of ethnicity can be explained by the 
characteristics of multi-ethnic societies that tend to experience a swift politicisation of 
residual ethnic ties at the approach of independence. Arguably, this is what occurred in 
Burundi.  
 
Mokoena (2005) argues that at a specific level, two distinct aspects can be highlighted; 
‗anticipated reactions‘ is the first concept which is used to explain the first element. With 
this, Mokoena (2005) argues that a specific experience and estimate of the Rwandese 
situation, in the coming to power of the Hutu majority, were projected into the context of 
Burundi politics. For instance, the former Belgian president became an active supporter of the 
pro-Hutu People‘s Party (PP) (Lemarchand, 1970). Nzongola-Ntalatja (2001:65) further 
argues that the Belgian ideologies that had created the illusion of total authority by Tutsi‘s, 
found it expedient to portray the Tutsi as an aristocracy of alien origins that should relinquish 
power to the oppressed Hutu indigenous majority. ‗Self-fulfilling prophesy‘ is the other 
concept used to describe the second element, according to Mokoena (2005). Hutu politicians 
attributed objectives that Burundian Tutsi at first did not have, but to which they eventually 
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gave credibility, executing malicious Hutu expectations of Tutsi (Lemarchand, 1970:344, 
384; Lemarchand, 1996:66). Motives such as the close association of Burundian Tutsi with 
Rwandan Tutsi refugees were included. Moreover, a deterioration of diplomatic relations was 
as much a symptom as a cause of worsening Hutu-Tutsi relations in Burundi (Lemarchand, 
1996:66). 
 
In preparation for independence elections were conducted in September 1961, in which 
UPRONA won 80 per cent of the vote and 58 of the 64 seats in the new National Assembly, 
as well as control of most of the communes (Mthembu-Salter, 2008:152). As previously 
discussed, the assassination of Prince Rwagasore in October 1961 saw UPRONA being 
weakened by ethnic driven factionalism (Bentley and Southall, 2005:42). On the 26
th
 of 
November 1961 a new Constitution was promulgated that gave wide powers to the King and 
under which Burundi attained independence on the 1
st
 of July 1962 (Banderembako, 2006). 
 
2.4 CHRONOLOGY OF THE POST INDEPENDENCE CONFLICTS  
2.4.1 1961-1966: and the 1965 Conflict 
The monarchy was to a certain degree the only remaining source of stability in the uncertain 
period post-independence, it was also a period characterised by a swing between hope for 
national unity and peace, and the beginning of the systematic exclusion and violence, which 
would continue to shape the post-independence history of Burundi. The first cycle of 
violence, according to Peterson (2006) was evident in this period, where the Tutsi elite 
excluded Hutu‘s from power, Hutu rebellion as well as extreme repression against educated 
and high-profiled Hutu by a Tutsi-controlled government. Increasing exclusion of Hutu‘s 
from powerful positions also took place after Rwagasore‘s death. Peterson (2006) state that 
one of the reasons it culminated in an attempted coup d‘état by Hutu politicians against the 
King and monarchy, was the fact that there was a systematic exclusion of Hutu‘s from public 
positions as well as the King‘s decision to not allow them to form a government. Hutu 
leaders, politicians
22
 and those who attempted the coup d‘état, were executed, which in turn 
furthered a massacre of 500 Tutsi civilians in the Muramvya province by Hutu‘s (Peterson, 
2006). This resulted in massive army repression against the Hutu‘s across Burundi as well as 
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a vacuum of Hutu leadership potential due to Hutu‘s fleeing the country (Oketch and Polzer, 
2002).   
As a result, UPRONA now became an ―exclusive domain of Tutsi‖ (Oketch and Polzer, 
2002:93). The effects of the first scale violence on the allocation of power had extensive 
consequences for the political progress of the country and for later conflicts. It is argued that 
the extermination and/or expulsion of nearly all educated, influential and wealthy Hutu led to 
a concentration of power, wealth and influence in Tutsi hands, and prevented competition for 
power for at least a generation (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Furthermore, this meant that the 
Tutsi, in essence had control over the national means of responding to future conflict. This 
was debated by scholars as resulting in negotiated politics or through violent repression, 
subsequently making all conflict resolution dependent on the interests of the ruling elite 
Tutsi‘s (Oketch and Polzer, 2002).    
On 8
th
 of July 1966, Ntare V acceded to the throne under the protection of the army (Oketch 
and Polzer, 2002). As previously discussed, with the dismissal of the Bihumugani‘s 
government the same year, Ntare V appointed Captain Micombero as the new Prime 
Minister. However, with the appointment of Captain Micombero yet another military coup 
was carried out to the defeat of Ntare V (Daley, 2006). With this, the first republic and 
principally Tutsi government, was declared in 1966. Subsequent to the coup emerged a 
‗republican-kinship‘ combined with ‗neo-patrimonial polity‘ which was formed around a 
group of personal, kinship and ethnic-ties (Daley, 2006). A new dimension of illegitimacy 
emerged  and so parliament was abolished and new institutions of government instituted with 
the principal being the 17 member National Revolutionary Council led by Micombero 
(Daley, 2006). Micombero also appointed himself as President and Prime Minister of 
Burundi, Minister of Defence and President of the now single-party UPRONA (Daley, 2006). 
The instability in the years after independence until 1966 was followed by a number of 
incidents. Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2000) state that the assassination of Hutu labour 
unionists in 1962 and Hutu prime minister, Pierre Ngendandumwe in 1965, remained 
unpunished and thus raised suspicions within the Hutu elite.  
These aforementioned events have been crucial shaping the more recent conflicts in Burundi. 
Not only have these events reflected conflicts between monarchists and republicans, but also 
the then growing conflict between Hutu and Tutsi. Moreover, these events which took place 
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within this period reveal the first military intervention in politics, which was to set the stage 
for the remaining conflicts of post-independence Burundi.  
2.4.2 1966-1972: and the 1972 Insurgency 
The period of government under Micombero, was marked by the accelerated purging of 
Hutu‘s from the army and the state and the consolidation of the Tutsi elite's dominance in the 
economy and higher education, and specifically domination by Tutsi‘s from the Bururi 
province (Mthembu-Salter, 2002; Bentley and Southall, 2005). In 1969 a bloody purge of 
remaining Hutu‘s from the military followed an alleged Hutu coup attempt (Bentley and 
Southall, 2005). This increasing marginalisation of Hutu‘s led to growing popular discontent. 
Similarly, another alleged coup attempt provided the opportunity to imprison rival Tutsi 
leaders from Muramvya province (ISS, 2005). 
Worse followed in April 1972, when a Hutu insurrection began near Bujumbura, in which 
2000 to 3000 Tutsi‘s lost their lives, followed by genocide reprisals instigated by the armed 
forces eliminating almost the entire educated Hutu population (Mthembu-Salter 2008). The 
consequence of this Hutu insurrection was the massacre of between 100 000 and 200 000 
Hutu‘s by Tutsi‘s with a further 150 000 Hutu‘s displaced to neighbouring countries, mostly 
the DRC (Boshoff et al., 2010). The little that remained of the Hutu intelligentsia had been 
killed or driven into exile, which had been done with the purpose of terrorising the Hutu 
majority into submission as well as preventing any repetition of Hutu victory as was the case 
in Rwanda (Boshoff et al., 2010). The 1972 insurgency has been classified as the most 
extreme violence carried out in post-independence Burundi due to the fact that it ushered fear 
of genocide amongst both ethnic groups, as seen in Rwanda (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). 
Parallel to the 1965 political conflict, the Burundian government and army killed with 
impunity. As Barnes (1999:711) observes: ―The fact that the government was able to 
complete what the UN Genocide Convention refers to as a 'genocide in part' without any 
sanctions, domestic or international, had significant implications for the future development 
of both politics and Hutu-Tutsi relations in Burundi and the region as a whole.‖ 
Micombero attempted to suppress opposition and create a show of national unity by imposing 
a one-party state
23
, under his centralised direction on Burundi. In reality, however, Burundi 
was effectively under military rule (Boshoff et al., 2010). This façade masked deep regional 
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divisions within the Tutsi ruling elite and the army, and especially among the ruling Bururi 
Tutsi‘s, as they struggled for control over state income and resources (Nkurunziza and 
Ngaruko, 2002). From independence onward, the Burundian economy had been in a 
downward spiral. The withdrawal of Belgian expertise and capital and the loss of access to 
markets in DRC and Rwanda decreased the commercial base of the economy, while growth 
and investment was strangled by social conflict and the use of the state by ruling factions as a 
means for private wealth accumulation (Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 2002:5). Moreover, 
Micombero presided over an unstable government that channelled resources into a growing 
but ineffectual and economic unproductive bureaucracy and military that was parasitic on the 
declining economy (Bentley and Southall, 2005). 
The expanding state bureaucracy and army not only consumed resources unproductively, but 
became sites of conflict over access to resources and patronage power between Tutsi‘s 
regional factions, specifically between the ascendance of the Hima clan from the southern 
Bururi province and the previously dominant Banyaruguru clan who were increasingly 
marginalised (Peterson, 2006). Micombero's violent, disruptive and incompetent rule 
provided the justification for a successful military coup in November 1976 led by Jean-
Baptiste Bagaza, who promised to end the military rule and to create a democracy sensitive to 
social justice (Mthembu-Salter, 2008:152). 
A further effect of the pogroms was that from 1972 onward there were large numbers of 
Hutu‘s from Burundi in refugee camps in Tanzania, Rwanda and the DRC. The Hutu 
refugees would play an important part in the later violent political conflicts in Burundi in 
addition to conflicts within the region. 
2.4.3 1972-1993: and the 1988 Insurrection 
With the 1972 massacre coming to an end, also referred to as Burundi‘s first civil war, this 
period began with a certain level of serenity. Noteworthy for this era was the increased 
international pressure together with an economically weakened government, which brought 
about political reform (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). However, despite the relative tranquillity, 
another round of violence followed in 1988, which will be addressed later in this section. 
Paradoxically, the political reform that bolstered hope for a democratic Burundi, generated an 
―extremist backlash, which led to the fighting that continues today‖ (Oketch and Polzer, 
2002:98).  
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On coming to power in November 1976, President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza attempted to defuse 
inter- and intra- ethnic tensions by a series of liberalisations. He returned Burundi to civilian 
rule in 1977 and Hutu‘s were incorporated into the government, an anti-corruption drive was 
launched and eventually a limited land reform programme was embarked upon (Bentley and 
Southall, 2005:43).  
Parliamentary elections were held on the 22
nd
 of October 1981
24
 and a new constitution was 
approved by a constitutional referendum in November 1981, yet Burundi remained a one-
party state under UPRONA (Mthembu-Salter, 2008:153). In terms of the constitution, 
National Assembly elections were held in October 1982 and Bagaza was elected President in 
1984 with 99 per cent of the votes in a one-man race (Bentley and Southall, 2005). The 
reforms were thus cosmetic in character, the state remained dominated by UPRONA and the 
army, and both continued to serve as the instruments of political and economic domination of 
Burundi by the Tutsi‘s.25 The Hutu majority, however, remained marginalised and 
disempowered (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu 
(PALIPEHUTU) was founded in 1980 in a refugee camp in Tanzania during the authoritarian 
years of Bagaza‘s rule (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:98). Though not recognised as significant at 
the time, PALIPEHUTU was formed by Hutu refugee rebels in order to organise resistance 
toward Tutsi domination amongst Hutu refugees in the DRC (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). 
Tutsi‘s continued to receive preferential access to education and to employment in the organs 
of state (Bentley and Southall, 2005). As the state centralised all decision making and 
information distribution it came into conflict with the Catholic Church. The church provided 
an alternative means for access to health-care, education and social mobilisation to that of the 
Tutsi controlled state, as a result of which it was ―accused of assisting Hutu resistance‖ 
(Bentley and Southall, 2005:45). This conflict culminated in the expulsion of missionaries 
and the nationalisation of catholic schools in 1985 (Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 2002). The 
failure to engage in meaningful political, economic and social reform and the persecution of 
the church by the state, led to increased dissent. This dissent was dealt with by even greater 
brutality from 1984 onwards, through arrests and torture of government opponents 
(Mthembu-Salter, 2008). 
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The early years of Bagaza's government were characterised by massive state investments 
financed through foreign loans. Since these investments were made to create new sources of 
income and patronage for the Bururi-Tutsi elite, and not to reach economic developmental 
goals, they had no long-term viability. They placed enormous demands on the country's 
balance of payments as it struggled to service foreign debt (Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 2002:6; 
Oketch and Polzer, 2002:98). The deteriorating human rights situation led to conflict with 
Burundi's major foreign donors, especially Belgium and France, who began to pressure the 
government for meaningful reform by withholding aid, which made up 50 per cent of 
government expenditure (Bentley and Southall, 2005:44; Oketch and Polzer, 2002:98). By 
1986 the economic situation had become untenable and Bagaza was forced to adopt a 
structural adjustment programme imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank that included massive cuts in military and state spending (Kimber, 1996; Oketch 
and Polzer, 2002:98). This proved to be Bagaza's undoing, for the Tutsi elite and the military 
would not countenance the loss of jobs, income and patronage power this entailed, and he 
was deposed in September 1987 in a military coup led by Major Pierre Buyoya (Kimber, 
1996). 
From the onset, the military regime led by Pierre Buyoya that came to power in September 
1987 articulated the intention to broaden the popular basis of the government by 
incorporating Hutu‘s into government (Daley, 2006). This created tension amongst Tutsi 
radicals and armed forces that feared this could instigate a course that would mirror the anti-
Tutsi genocide in Rwanda (Daley, 2006). Buyoya released hundreds of political prisoners and 
relaxed the persecution of the church (Mthembu-Salter 2008). Buyoya, however, failed to 
move quickly; his first attempt was the compromise to appease hard-liners within the ruling 
elite which only resulted in disappointment and frustration amongst Hutu‘s, thus exacerbating 
a new uprising in the north of the country in August 1988 (ISS, 2005). The Hutu uprising led 
to massacres of hundreds of Tutsi civilians and reprisals quickly followed as 20 000 Hutu‘s 
were killed by the army and it is believed that another 60 000 fled to Rwanda (ISS, 2005). In 
October 1988, the President responded by accommodating more Hutu‘s into government 
including the Prime Minister, Adrien Sibomana a member of the Hutu led party; Front pour la 
Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) that had been founded in 1986 (Daley, 2006). What 
distinguishes the 1988 crisis from previous outbreaks of violence, according to Oketch and 
Polzer (2002), is that the army could not carry out its brutal repression without its 
consequences.  
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After 1988, Burundi experienced regional and international attention, criticism as well as 
pressure on the government to introduce reforms with regard to democratisation and power 
sharing. As a result, the Buyoya regime incorporated the formation of a National Commission 
to study the question of National Unity. The Commission was, in addition, assigned to 
investigate the causes and perpetrators of the 1988 violence (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). 
Along with these reforms and in an effort to build national unity, the Commission was 
equally balanced with Hutu and Tutsi members as well as a substantial number of Hutu‘s 
who were given administrative positions in the institutions of the state. Moreover, entries for 
Hutu‘s into higher education were also relaxed. Hutu‘s were included into government unity 
and a timetable was set for a transition to civilian rule (Kimber, 1996; Bentley and Southall, 
2005:44). The government's cautious steps in the reform process provoked several coup 
attempts by Tutsi hardliners who feared that power was slipping from their hands (Bentley 
and Southall, 2005:44; Mthembu-Salter, 2008:153). Nevertheless, the reform process pressed 
on. During the first half of 1989 there were several attempted coups by Tutsi activists, 
hardliners and supporters of Bagaza. The Commission of National Unity published its report 
in April 1989 which was followed by intense public debate when Buyoya announced plans to 
fight discrimination against Hutu‘s in employment, education and in the armed forces. Civil 
unrest, however, did not abate either; there was significant violence and unrest in November 
1990, when inter-ethnic tensions and violent confrontation took place in Bujumbura, as well 
as north-west of the country. According to unofficial sources, there were more than 3000 
causalities, but the government of Burundi only gave evidence of 551 causalities (Mthembu-
Salter, 2008:153).  
Burundi witnessed yet another violent outbreak in April 1992 along the border with Rwanda. 
PALIPEHUTU were held responsible for this and authorities claimed that they had been 
trained and armed in Rwanda (Mthembu-Salter, 2008). In lieu of the violent outbreak, the 
issue of ethnic factionalism was openly debated and a draft charter by the Commission for 
National Unity was adopted in February 1991. Followed by a new Constitution
26
, which was 
endorsed in a national referendum in March 1992 where 90 per cent voted in support of the 
proposed new Constitution, though it was rejected by PALIPEHUTU and other opposition 
groups (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:99). The new constitution gave birth to free elections and a 
multiparty system.   
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Elections were held on the 1
st
 of June 1993 in terms of the new constitution and FRODEBU‘s 
leader Melchior Ndadaye defeated Buyoya in the presidential race, winning 65.7 per cent of 
the votes whilst Buyoya received 32.9 per cent (Basedau, 1999). Pierre-Claver Sendegeya of 
the monarchist Parti pour la Réconciliation du Peuple (PRP) came in third with 1.4 per cent 
of the votes (Daley, 2006). PALIPEHUTU remained banned but did take part in the election. 
FRODEBU also won the subsequent National Assembly elections on the 29
th
 of June taking 
65 of the 81 seats with 72.6 per cent of the vote, while Buyoya's UPRONA won the other 16 
with 19.8 per cent of the vote; the four other contesting parties failed to win the minimum 5 
per cent needed for representation (Daley, 2006). An UPRONA member, Sylvie Kinigi
27
, 
became Prime Minister and a multi-ethnic government of national unity was subsequently 
formed (Basedau, 1999). 
Oketch and Polzer (2002:99) maintain that this period was by and large known for enhancing 
and uplifting Hutu political participation, there was, nonetheless, no change of the Tutsi 
dominated army, leaving the minority with the monopoly of the armed forces. 
2.4.4 1993-2003: and the 1993 Resurgence of conflict 
With the new government in office, Ndadaye began bringing his supporters into the civil 
service through the recruitment of FRODEBU supporters; the new government also initiated 
drafting plans for an extensive army reform (Basedau, 2004:135). The prospects for the 
democratically elected Hutu President led to discontent amongst the army and unsuccessful 
coup attempts were carried out by military officers in late June and early July 1993 (Bentley 
and Southall, 2005). Significant for Ndadaye‘s presidency was the persuasion of a 
reconciliation policy of which Tutsi army officers were appointed to command key posts. 
Ndadaye also legalised PALIPEHUTU and established a Council of National Unity to advice 
on ethnic issues (Banderembako, 2006).  
According to Oketch and Polzer (2002:100), four specific reforms were made during the 
change of regime. Firstly, the Ndadaye government enabled small businessmen of who most 
were Hutu, to benefit from privatisation by reducing bid bonds by 80 per cent. Secondly, the 
government also probed the conditions under which the right to refine and export gold had 
been granted to a Belgian firm, just before the elections (Banderembako, 2006). Thirdly, 
there was also a significant return of Hutu refugees, whom had been living in exile since 
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1972 and attempts were made to regain their land and property (Banderembako, 2006). 
Lastly, the government replaced many Tutsi civil servants with Hutu‘s. Moreover, Ndadaye 
sought to engage with the economic crisis caused by the regime of President Bagaza by 
embarking on an IMF formulated Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) (Kimber, 1996). 
This however, required sudden price increases for basic goods, a depreciation of the currency 
and privatisation of parastatals which led to widespread hardship and thus alienated the Hutu 
masses at a time when Ndadaye most needed their support to check the army (Kimber, 1996). 
President Ndadaye‘s dream of a peaceful Burundi saw its end on October 21st 1993, when a 
coup attempt was launched by pro-Bagaza army members who assassinated the president and 
other high-ranking officials of FRODEBU (Boshoff et al., 2010:6). The assassination of the 
president sparked the longest and perhaps bloodiest conflict in Burundi. As remaining 
members of the government sought refuge abroad, the armed forces declared a state of 
emergency by closing the Bujumbura airport and national borders. There was however, 
immediate international condemnation of the coup and communication was restored on the 
27
th
 of October (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). Although the armed forces declared a state of 
emergency, the coup itself did not have the required support of key elements of the military, 
which in turn left the FRODEBU government in control (Boshoff et al., 2010). By now 
Hutu‘s had killed thousands of Tutsi‘s as an act of vengeance, including Hutu members of 
UPRONA and it is estimated that in the three months after the assassination of Ndadaye 
50 000 to 100 000 people were killed and one million had fled the country (Banderembako, 
2006). This exacerbated a backlash by the army and the violence that arose was not quelled 
for weeks.  
Meanwhile in the power vacuum, a ‗creeping coup‘ intensified (Boshoff et al., 2010). 
‗Creeping coup‘ is defined by Boshoff et al., (2010:6) as: ―the steady seizure of power by 
opposition Tutsi forces with the complicity of the military‖, which had four crucial 
components. The first component dealt with the army and local youths, who were employed 
to execute urban and rural violence to threaten members of FRODEBU, this prevented the 
government from effectuating its duties (Boshoff et al., 2010). Secondly, the opposition took 
advantage of a propaganda campaign in which the government, mainly FRODEBU, was 
accused of Tutsi genocide. The third element of the ‗creeping coup‘ in Burundi was that state 
institutions were weakened by manipulation of the Constitutional Court (Boshoff et al., 
2010:6). Lastly, the government was forced into granting more and more power to Tutsi 
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extremists. In essence, the ‗creeping coup‘ which occurred in Burundi allowed the Tutsi elite 
to be reinstated into power under a Hutu president (Boshoff et al., 2010:6).      
In November 1993, the Constitutional Court decided that presidential powers should pass to 
the Council of Ministers, acting in an intellectual capacity, awaiting new presidential election 
to be attained within three months (Mthembu-Salter, 2004:136). One man who rejected these 
proposals was the new leader of FRODEBU, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya
28
 who argued that 
elections should wait until internal security difficulties had been resolved (Mthembu-Salter, 
2004). After intense debates amongst Hutu and Tutsi militias as well as inter-party 
negotiations, FRODEBU deputies in the National Assembly amended the Constitution in 
early January 1994. With the amendment of the Constitution it was now possible that the 
republican President could be elected by the National Assembly (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). 
Ndadaye‘s minister of agriculture, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was elected President of Burundi by 
the National Assembly and assumed office on February 5
th
 1994 (Mthembu-Salter, 
2004:137). With regards to international force, the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
now African Union (AU) agreed to the deployment of a protection force, to comprise some 
180 civilian and military personnel for a period of six months. UPRONA as well as Tutsi 
opposition protested, claiming that Burundi‘s sovereignty and territorial integrity were being 
compromised. Endless political compromises, renewed communal violence and ethnic 
tension increased steadily after Ntaryamira came to power. This resulted in divisions within 
FRODEBU between those supporting Ntaryamira‘s policy of disarming all militias and those 
led by Léonard Nyangoma, whom opposed operations against Hutu militias without first 
removing Tutsi extremists from the army (Banderembako, 2006). In addition, Tutsi ministers 
now made up 40 per cent of the government. The violent invasion of armed Hutu militia from 
the DRC was a catalyst in the split within FRODEBU with Nyangoma establishing the 
Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD) and the birth of the military 
wing Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD) (Banderembako, 2006).    
A new power vacuum was developed following the death of President Ntaryamira and 
Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana in an airplane crash on the 6
th
 of April 1994 
(Mthembu -Salter, 2004:136). The aircraft was brought down by a rocket attack above Kigali 
airport and crashed on landing (Banderembako, 2006). Hutu‘s influence in Burundi was 
weakened due to the genocide in Rwanda, which unfolded in April the same year as a 
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response to the killing of Habyarimana (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:101). With the special 
agreement on a government of National Unity, which composed both of UPRONA and 
FRODEBU, Ntibantunganya was elected new President by the National Assembly in 
September 1994. The election of Ntibantunganya occurred despite the fact that the 
constitutional provisions were violated (Basedau, 1999). The FDD began to wage a guerrilla 
war against the army and the situation was intensified by an influx of 200 000 Hutu refugees 
from Rwanda
29
 in the second half of 1994 (Basedau, 1999:155). Mthembu-Salter (2004:136) 
holds that while Burundi managed to avoid a large scale civil war, ethnically motivated 
killings were carried out throughout the country, which also involved murders of prominent 
politicians and government officials.  
With the endemic violence occurring in Burundi due to the increased violence between Hutu 
rebels and Tutsi government forces, Ntibantunganya was forced to declare a state of 
emergency by mid-1995 (Basedau, 1999). According to Mthembu-Salter (2004), Burundi 
was on the edge of a full scale civil war by February 1996. Regional initiatives which were 
supported by the United Nations (UN) were unsuccessful in making improvements in the 
negotiations between the various parties or in reducing the violence in the country and so the 
security situation continued to deteriorate. Initial meetings were held in Mwanza, Tanzania in 
April and June 1996
30
 with FRODEBU and UPRONA (Boshoff et al., 2010). Arusha I, was 
an attempt from Tanzania‘s former President Julius Nyerere to pressurise the Burundian 
government to accept a regional peace keeping force (Boshoff et al., 2010). No success was 
made and the pressure rose to a point where yet another military coup was staged by Major 
Buyoya
31
. This meant a definite return to authoritarian rule and the consequences that 
followed were full economic sanctions by neighbouring countries, which demanded a return 
to a constitutional order (Basedau, 1999:155). With the international sanctions and lack of 
humanitarian aid due to the coups combined with the alleged civil war, Burundi‘s economy 
worsened. This led to a further threat on social development and political stability such as 
high population growth alongside technologically stagnant and agriculturally based 
subsistence economy (Bentley and Southall, 2005). It is precisely this threat on Burundi‘s 
social development that this study is examining, namely, how environmental factors have 
impacted violent political instability.  
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 Known as Arusha I: the road to peace negotiations (Boshoff et al., 2010). 
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Conflicts between Hutu militia and UPRONA continued and intensified under the rule of 
Buyoya where the major Hutu military organisations ranged against UPRONA government. 
The Tutsi controlled army consisted of the CNDD, the FDD, PALIPEHUTU with its armed 
wing, Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) and the Front pour la Libération Nationale 
(FROLINA) (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). These armed forces drew most of their recruits from 
the refugee camps in Tanzania and DRC and since it has been estimated that 700 000 people 
fled from Burundi, mainly Hutu, Oketch and Polzer (2002:102) maintain that the numbers of 
the guerrilla forces operating against the government were expanded. Although general 
disruption did occur due to the violence, the humanitarian situation in Burundi did not 
improve as the government implemented a policy to guard Hutu‘s from rebel attacks and 
counter-insurgency attacks by placing them in so-called protected camps (Oketch and Polzer, 
2002). These counter-insurgency tactics were created with the intention of cutting Hutu 
rebels off from their supply base in Burundi (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). These camps were 
occupied by Hutu‘s mostly from the rural areas and it is estimated that at one point up to 
800 000 people were staying at these camps, naturally, poor health conditions inside these 
camps were growing and also creating more concern (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). 
Withholdings of international financial aid coupled with regional sanctions led to the closing 
of the camps in 1998. In spite of this, the rising hunger threat was a remaining factor and 
Bundervoet (2009) maintains that in 1998 approximately 345 000 people were dependent on 
food aid. 
In addition to this, Burundi experienced a massive influx of Hutu refugees who had once fled 
the country, that were now returning back to Burundi due to the overthrow of Mobuto Sese 
Seko in the DRC (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). Moreover, the movement of Burundian refugees 
from Tanzanian refugee camps were also persistent during this time and disputes between the 
army and Hutu insurgents did occur. The government did, however, manage to resume 
control of 12 of the 17 provinces in Burundi, though the other five provinces, Bujumbura and 
Makamba in particular, remained a battle field between the government and its opponents 
(Mthembu-Salter, 2004:139). In an attempt to lift the economic sanctions and international 
pressure, Buyoya began talks with FRODEBU who initially had been driven out by 
UPRONA and these talks culminated in a new power sharing agreement in May 1998 
(Mthembu -Salter, 2004). Although an interim Constitution was implemented, and the 
National Assembly was further developed as well as the inclusion of FRODEBU members in 
government, the external wing of FRODEBU rejected the agreement of a three year transition 
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to civilian rule (Bentley and Southall, 2005). The external wing proceeded with their fight 
whilst conflict continued to rage and deaths increased.  
These measures, according to Bentley and Southall (2005), did not lead to a lifting of 
sanctions; Buyoya therefore accepted a peace process under the auspices of Julius Nyerere 
that began in Arusha in June 1998. Seventeen parties to the Burundian conflict were present 
at the first round of negotiations; the government of Burundi, the National Assembly, 
FRODEBU, UPRONA, CNDD, FROLINA, PALIPEHUTU, PRP, Parti pour le 
Redressement National (PARENA), Parti Libéral (PL), Parti Indépendant des Travailleurs 
(PIT), Parti Social Démocrate (PSD), Alliance Burundo-Africaine pour le Salut (ABASA), 
Mouvement Socialiste Panafricaniste (MSP-INKINZO), Alliances des Vaillants (AV-
INTWARI), Rassemblement du Peuple Burundais (RPB), as well as the Civil Society, which 
was represented by the Chamber of Commerce, women‘s and youth‘ organisations (ICG, 
1998:2). In 1999, a second phase of peace talks was arranged in Arusha by the Regional 
Peace Initiative (Boshoff et al., 2010). Five commissions were created to deal with various 
aspects of the negotiations and the government of Burundi agreed to a political partnership 
with parliament and to maintain talks with rebel groups (Boshoff et al., 2010). Due to the 
death of Nyerere in October 1999 former president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela
32
, 
assumed the role as mediator in the negotiations with the strong support of the United States 
(US) and the European Union (EU). In addition to the promising development established by 
Nyerere, Mandela proceeded with a forceful approach in order to bring the various parties to 
agreement (Bentley and Southall, 2005:71).  
Conflicting party interests continued which led to faction amongst the two principal armed 
opposition groups (Bentley and Southall, 2005). This meant that the FNL broke away from 
PALIPEHUTU in 1999 and formed the Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu-Forces 
Nationales de Libération (PALIPEHUTU-FNL), the FDD broke away from CNDD and 
formed the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la 
Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) under the leadership of Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye (Bentley 
and Southall, 2005). Nonetheless, these groups were excluded from the peace process and 
thus continued the hostilities (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). 
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On the 28
th
 of August 2000, the Arusha Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation was signed 
by 13 of the total 19 parties included (Peterson, 2006). The Accord drew a scheme for power-
sharing and the reform of key institutions, prescribing a 36-month transitional period that 
began on the 1
st
 of November 2001 (Peterson, 2006). The Accord however, failed to include 
the CNDD-FDD or the FNL and also failed to address the questions of who would lead the 
security-sector reform as well as the overall transition (Peterson, 2006:127). Once signatures 
were settled, Mandela managed to convince Burundians to allow UPRONA leader Buyoya an 
18-month term, after which the FRODEBU leader, Domitien Ndayizeye would take over the 
presidency for the remaining 18 months of the prescribed three-year transitional period 
(Peterson, 2006:127). The content of the agreement was organised in five committees, the 
arrangement of the themes were as follows: the first committee dealing with the nature of the 
conflict; the second committee on democracy and good governance; the third committee on 
peace and security; the fourth committee on reconstruction and economic development and 
the last committee dealing with the guarantees for implementation of the peace accord 
(Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Moreover, the Arusha agreement provided for balanced 
representation of Hutu and Tutsi in the government, the professionalisation of security and 
justice institutions, and the creation of a national police force. Although the agreement hinged 
on reform of the security forces, as mentioned above, two primary rebel groups were not 
signatories. The agreement also mandated that those inside and outside the armed forces who 
were found guilty of involvement in the coups or war crimes, as well as violations of the 
constitution and human rights, were to be excluded from the new security forces (Mthembu-
Salter, 2004). After the accord had been signed, the then South African Deputy President, 
Jacob Zuma took over an increasing amount of the Burundi mediation as Mandela considered 
his participation to be done since the agreement had been signed (Mthembu-Salter, 
2004:141).   
In spite of the Arusha Agreement, Mthembu-Salter (2004:157) argues that Burundi 
experienced: ―a periodic scale incursion in the south and massive counter-insurgency 
operations by the army continued throughout 1998 to 2001‖. Between 2000 and 2001, 
Burundi suffered a new wave of violence and the provinces bordering Tanzania were most 
affected, where the refugee camps served as catalysts for attacks in addition to bases for 
retreat (Mokoena, 2005). This resulted in yet another death toll of civilians and about 200 000 
civilians in the rural parts of Bujumbura were once again forcibly moved into ―protected 
camps‖ (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). The FNL continued military operations and in February 
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2001 they invaded the Kinama area of Bujumbura and managed to seize control for two 
weeks until the army were able to regain control of the whole capital (Bentley and Southall, 
2005). The government‘s support from within the military was also put to its test when a 
failed coup came from within the military in 2001 (Bentley and Southall, 2005:76). While 
there were ongoing attempts to bring the FNL and CNDD-FDD to sign the peace agreement, 
it was further hampered by the factionalism within the respective groups. There was once 
again a breakaway where the FNL split into two factions: one under the leadership of 
Agathon Rwasa (the larger of the two) and the other one under the leadership of Alain 
Mugabarabona (later known as FNL-ICANZO) (Bentley and Southall, 2005). The CNDD-
FDD also broke into two factions: the one headed by Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza (the larger of 
the two) and the other led by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye (which later became Kaze-FDD) 
(Bentley and Southall, 2005).  
2.4.5 2001-2005: Transitional Period: and the 2005 election 
The arrival of the South African troops
33
 in Burundi during the end of October 2001, the 
Transitional Constitution was laid out. What this signified was also the inauguration of 
UPRONA‘s Pierre Buyoya as the head of the multi-party transitional government with 
FRODEBU‘s Domitien Ndayizeye as Vice President. The inauguration of the two leaders on 
the 1
st
 of November 2001 marked the beginning of the Transitional Government of Burundi 
(TGoB) (Reyntjens, 2005). One of the challenges facing the TGoB was to bring the conflicts 
in Burundi to an end although conflicts continued to rage during this period and thus 
threatened to destroy the fragile transitional arrangements and disrupt the road to democracy 
(ISS, 2005). The period of the TGoB was dominated by quarrels over posts and positions 
such as reforming the Tutsi minority-dominated army in an attempt to make it more 
representative of the population, to curb its political power and subordinate it to the civil 
authorities and to bring the country‘s divided and quarrelsome political parties to agreement 
on a permanent democratic constitutional arrangement (Bentley and Southall, 2005). 
Moreover, the TGoB was confronted by the four Hutu rebel groups that were still active in 
military operations (Bentley and Southall, 2005). However, under the mediation of Zuma, the 
four rebel groups were engaged in a continuous effort to bring about negotiations that would 
in due course lead to their inclusion in the peace process. Peace talks only began in August 
2002 between the government, the two CNDD-FDD factions and the smaller FNL-ICANZO 
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(Bentley and Southall, 2005). With the commencement of the peace talks between the 
abovementioned parties a ceasefire agreement was formed between the FNL-INCANZO and 
Kaze-FDD, thus leaving the two larger and more active rebel groups still outside the peace 
process (Bentley and Southall, 205:93). Bentley and Southall (2005:93) also note that an 
attempted agreement in December 2002 between Nkurunziza‘s divisions of the CNDD-FDD 
was left in a helpless situation due to the hostilities which escalated between it and the army. 
In accordance with the provisions of the Arusha agreement, Ndayizeye was inaugurated 
President and Alfonse Kadege became Vice-President on the 1
st
 of May 2003 (Mthembu-
Salter, 2004). Continuous efforts were still made by regional leaders in an attempt to draw 
Nkurunziza‘s CNDD-FDD into the peace process in addition to engaging Rwasa‘s FNL in 
negotiations, however, these efforts were made difficult by military offences by both rebel 
groups: in particular Rwasa‘s more active forces (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). Shortly after the 
inauguration of Ndayizeye a delegation of the AU force, also known as the African Mission 
in Burundi (AMIB), began arriving in Burundi (Mthembu-Salter, 2004:142). In the 
meantime, the legislature adopted a bill providing for the formation of an international 
judicial commission of investigation into war crimes, such war crimes, which had been 
committed since end of 1962 (Mthembu-Salter, 2004:142). At long last, an agreement was 
reached between Ndayizeye and Nkurunziza in October 2003 and what followed was a 
ceasefire in December, which led to the CNDD-FDD inclusion into the government and its 
troops were eventually integrated into the national army (Bentley and Southall, 2005:103). 
Rwasa‘s FNL was nonetheless outside the peace process and it did not seem as if the faction 
intended to join the peace agreement with immediate effect as the FNL launched firearm 
attacks on Bujumbura and the military bases throughout Burundi (Bentley and Southall, 
2005). The Global Ceasefire Agreement between TGoB and CNDD-FDD was signed in Dar 
es Salaam on the 16
th
 of November 2003.  
Direct contact between Ndayizeye and Rwasa was unexpectedly established in January 2004, 
though, this initiated a lengthy process that only bore fruit in 2006 (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). 
An agreement was signed by the various parties in August 2004 which set out the principles 
that were ultimately incorporated into a final Constitution for the post- TGoB period and a 
month later the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was created (Mthembu-
Salter, 2004). Furthermore, the AMIB was deployed and they were further tasked with the 
implementation of the Arusha Agreement, and the ceasefire protocols as well as the 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme (Boshoff et al., 2010). 
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This was replaced by the Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi (ONUB) in June 2004 and 
preceded the October 2004 commencement of the Arusha Agreement, which ended the 
period of the transitional government and called for national elections (Peterson, 2006). The 
TGoB was extended to April 2005, and again to August 2005, as it became evident that 
elections would not take place as planned in October 2004 (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). Vice-
President Kadege was, in addition, fired and Frederic Ngenzebuhoro replaced his position in 
November 2004 (Mthembu-Salter, 2004). At the present time, it seemed as if Burundi was 
preparing for elections as the legislation established a new national army including all the 
rebel and government forces, was however, only put in place in January 2005 (ISS, 2005). In 
spite of the legal and administrative concerns being dealt with prior to the elections, Rwasa‘s 
FNL still remained as an outcast in the peace process, systematically carrying out military 
operations in the rural parts of Bujumbura (ISS, 2005). A national referendum approving a 
new Constitution was held in February 2005 with a 92 per cent voter turnout (Peterson, 
2006). The Constitution provided for power-sharing between the Tutsi and the Hutu: a 
President and two Vice-Presidents, government institutions would be 60 per cent Hutu and 40 
per cent Tutsi (of which 30 per cent of these would be women), except for the National 
Defence Forces and Senate where the ratio is to be fifty-fifty per cent (African Elections 
Database, 2004).   
National Assembly elections were held on the 4
th
 of July 2005 with CNDD-FDD winning 
majority of 58 per cent of the votes and 59 of the 100 seats, FRODEBU obtained 22 per cent 
of the votes with 25 seats and UPRONA received 7 per cent of the votes with 10 seats 
(African Elections Database, 2004). In accordance with the Constitution, the results achieved 
a fair balance in the National Assembly with 35 per cent Tutsi and 25 per cent women, the 
INEC co-opted an additional 18 Members of Parliament to create the ethnic and gender 
balance required as well as three Twa members (Reyntjens, 2006). In addition to this, the 
communal councillors elected the members of the Senate, which resulted in the election of 
thirty CNDD-FDD members, three FRODEBU members and one CNDD member 
(Reyntjens, 2006). On the 19
th
 of August 2005 the leader of CNDD-FDD, Pierre Nkurunziza 
was elected as President by a joint Parliamentary Congress, including members of the 
National Assembly and the Senate.  
In accordance with the Constitution, President Nkurunziza appointed a male Tutsi from 
UPRONA and a female Hutu from CNDD-FDD as Vice-Presidents, respectively (Reyntjens, 
2006). The new government consisted of 55 per cent Hutu and 45 per cent Tutsi with 35 per 
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cent of them being women, meeting the requirements that at the most, 60 per cent should be 
Hutu and 30 per cent women. However, the party representation did not conform to the 
constitution: leaving FRODEBU underrepresented and CNDD-FDD overrepresented – a 
situation UPRONA and FRODEBU accepted under protest (Reyntjens, 2006:130). On the 
26
th
 of August, the inauguration of President Nkurunziza marked the formal conclusion of the 
transitional process in Burundi. Along with this, Nkurunziza began to appoint CNDD-FDD to 
key positions in state institutions and set in motion the release of over 3000, mostly CNDD-
FDD, political prisoners (Reyntjens, 2006). 
At a summit of the Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi in Dar es Salaam on the 7
th
 of 
September 2005, a comprehensive ceasefire agreement was endorsed by regional leaders and 
signed by President Nkurunziza, on behalf of the Government of Burundi, and by Agathon 
Rwasa, on behalf of FNL (Peterson, 2006). On the 10
th
 of September 2005 the ceasefire 
entered into force, which provided for a cessation of all hostilities in addition to the 
integration of FNL combatants into the national security forces or their disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (Peterson, 2006).   
2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
“The blood that was shed during the civil war and that was shed in other conflicts in this 
country should serve as a lesson. Most importantly, we must discard the old methods of 
exclusion, favouritism and bad governance that led us to disaster”34          
While Burundi‘s democratic reconstruction is far from complete, the election on the 19th of 
August 2005 advocates that even the most violent and deeply divided societies can be 
restored, given sufficient political will and generous resources to support the process of 
negotiation and change. Most Burundians, Hutu and Tutsi alike, found themselves drained by 
the conflict and wishing it would end. Their appeals for peace grew steadily more insistent. 
Likewise, the international community, recognising the strategic importance for the entire 
Great Lakes region of ending the Burundian conflict, poured millions of dollars into the 
peace process, and frequently made high-level diplomatic interventions. It has repeatedly 
offered Burundi a range of inducements and reconstruction projects, including payment of 
salaries for virtually the entire civil service. In January 2004, donors pledged more than US$1 
billion for development assistance. But most critically, key factions within Burundi‘s political 
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elite had come slowly to realise that they would gain more through compromise and by 
ending the exploitation of largely artificial social divisions than by continuing to ratchet up 
their debilitating power struggles. Thus it is not merely elections that explain Burundi‘s 
achievement. Nor has it been purely a matter of the usual components of nation building such 
as constitutions, treaties, and renovated institutions, though all these were involved. At its 
core, the story of Burundi has been the tale of an entire nation gradually but steadily 
transforming its behaviour and mindset at both the popular and elite levels to steer away from 
bloody conflicts and toward some sort of mutual accommodation. While Hutu and Tutsi were 
distinct ethnic categories in pre-colonial and colonial Burundi, the mobilisation of 
Burundians on the basis of these identities is a fairly recent phenomenon born of elite 
competition for political and economic advantage. 
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Chapter 3 
ANALYSES IN PERSPECTIVE  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter has three purposes. Firstly, it begins with a brief examination of the outcomes of 
the 2004 Power-Sharing Agreement, including a reflection and evaluation of its significance 
on the peace process in Burundi. Next, the chapter turns to a discussion about the various key 
actors in addition to factors in the political and violent conflicts in Burundi. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, the last section of this chapter examines the opus of Jared 
Diamond‘s Collapse. These main ideas are consolidated in the reflection section, and these 
three points also form the crux of this chapter.  
3.2 THE NEGOTIATED CONSTITUTION: IN RETROSPECT 
3.2.1 Examining the 2004 Power-Sharing Agreement  
This section provides a brief assessment of the outcomes of the Power-Sharing Agreement 
which was signed in 2004 as part of the 2003 Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and 
Security Power Sharing in Burundi. Prior to the examination, a brief overview is discussed in 
order to better grasp the lessons learned from the 2004 Power-sharing Agreement.  
Power-sharing as a mode of governance in Burundi sprung out of three developments in the 
country‘s political history (Vandeginste, 2009). The first development was the reform process 
initiated under President Pierre Buyoya. The second development was the Constitution of the 
13
th
 of March 1992, in which the Constitution also introduced a multi-party system. The third 
development was the agreements that occurred between political parties as a consequence of 
the failed coup d‘état of 21 October 1993 (Vandeginste, 2009:65). As a result, these historical 
roots have in their own way influenced Burundi‘s current power-sharing regime 
(Vandeginste, 2009). In addition to the aforementioned, these three developments present 
crucial analytical insights and as a whole, these three developments within Burundi‘s political 
history demonstrate the country‘s struggle with the tensions between what has been referred 
to as ‗the three keystones‘ of Burundi‘s political liberalisation process namely: power-
sharing, democracy and elections (Vandeginste, 2009:65).  
In 1994, 2000 and 2004, three major agreements were signed in Burundi, which included 
provisions for power-sharing during Burundi‘s most conflicting times. None of these 
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agreements however, completely contributed to building peace and good governance that 
were initially envisioned for Burundi (Falch, 2008). The power-sharing agreements in 
Burundi were implemented with varying degrees of success. The first formal agreement was 
the 1994 Convention of Government, which was aimed at introducing power-sharing to the 
political structure in Burundi; it defined itself as a blueprint for new consensus-based 
governance. The Convention of Government was signed by twelve political parties in 1994. 
Nevertheless, this occurred at a time when the country was contending with a situation of an 
emerging civil war and it was therefore little elite consensus among the signatories 
(Vandeginste, 2009). In conjunction with this, there was also a very outspoken resistance to 
the power-sharing arrangement by increasingly extremist politicians on both sides 
(Vandeginste, 2009). The second attempt to a durable peace in Burundi was the 2000 Arusha 
Peace and Reconciliation Agreement which represented a historic compromise between the 
two prominent conflicting ethnic groups, the Hutu and Tutsi (Van Eck, 2004). According to 
Van Eck (2004:3) the peace process has made significant steps toward reducing the 
bloodshed, however, the root causes of violence between Hutu and Tutsi have yet to be 
attended to. While the fragility of the peace accord has necessitated the presence of 
international troops, this can neither remain constant, nor substitute the need for Burundians 
to reach a genuine national consensus (Van Eck, 2004:3). The last implementation of change 
was the 2004 Burundi Power-Sharing Agreement, which will be discussed in the subsequent 
paragraphs. While all the agreements were signed in the context of an on-going civil war, 
none included all the parties involved in the conflicts, thus provoking the emergence of 
spoilers and prolongation of armed conflict (Falch, 2008).  
The 2004 Burundi Power-Sharing Agreement reflected the spirit of the 2000 Arusha Peace 
Agreement. In addition, this agreement provided a framework that assured Burundi‘s ethnic 
groups a proportional share of the political power following the democratic elections in 2005. 
In spite of several positive developments which have taken place since the implementation of 
the power-sharing agreement, Falch (2008) maintains that the prospects for enduring peace 
and democracy in Burundi continue to remain uncertain. Falch (2008:3) points to a 2006 
termination of hostilities with the last remaining rebel group, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, which 
was eventually signed in May 2008 after violent confrontations between the government 
army and PALIPEHUTU-FNL a month earlier. Although the signing of the ceasefire 
illustrated hope for the peace process in Burundi, Falch (2008) argues that the consolidation 
of peace is dependent on a successful outcome of the still on-going negotiations between 
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PALIPEHUTU-FNL and the government.
35
 Moreover, Falch (2008) holds that a continued 
lack of political dialogue in conjunction with attempts by the ruling party to monopolise 
power have in turn, led to an unstable political situation in Burundi, which makes it highly 
intricate to measure the 2004 power-sharing agreement as a success.  
In reflection of the foregoing, what were the actual outcomes of the 2004 agreement? 
Vandeginste (2009) points to the power-sharing agreement as being instrumental in its short-
term objective of terminating the war, in which Vandeginste (2009) gives Burundi credit for. 
Following his perspective, the agreement has also ‗de-ethnicised‘ political competition and 
decreased the (possible) destabilising effect of elections Vandeginste (2009:63). However, 
when the agreement is measured against more bold state-building objectives, such as 
democracy, rule of law, accountable and effective governance; the agreement in Burundi has, 
hitherto, not met the desirable outcomes (Vandeginste, 2009:63). Lemarchand (2007) 
suggests that what is more important than the mechanics of power-sharing is the socio-
political context which connotes the difference between success and failure.  
 
Moreover, Lemarchand (2007) maintains that Burundi comes closest to institutionalising the 
consociationalism model when measured against countries such as Rwanda and the DRC. 
Consociationalism dates back to 1917 when it was first employed in The Netherlands. 
Lijphart (1991) further formulated and brought consociationalism under scholarly debate in 
the 1970‘s and defines consociationalism as more than just power-sharing and a form of 
government in which its focus is on involving guaranteed group representation. Lijphart 
(1991) also maintains that consociationalism essentially is the notion of group autonomy. In 
which Lijphart (1991) implies that while on matters of common interest decisions are made 
mutually by all members of the coalition cabinet, on all other issues, autonomy is the rule 
with each community free to attend to its own affairs as it wishes (Lemarchand, 2007:3). The 
second notion of consociationalism measures proportionality, and is described by 
Lemarchand (2007:3) as ―the basic standard of political representation, public service 
appointments and allocation of public funds‖ and by itself, proportionality acts as a guarantee 
for the fair representation of ethnic minorities. Minority veto is the third notion stressed by 
Lijphart (1991), again, explained by Lemarchand (2007:3) as ―the ultimate weapon that 
minorities need to protect their vital interests‖ and one which ―works best when it is not used 
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too often and only with regard to issues of fundamental importance‖ (Lemarchand, 2007:3). 
Burundi has proven to be a unique case in offering a more faithful image of the 
consociational polity (Lemarchand, 2007:3). Furthermore, Burundi exemplifies a highly 
promising effort of power-sharing among a large and diverse number of parties through 
consociationalism.  
 
Four points are noteworthy when assessing the 2004 power-sharing agreement. Firstly, the 
agreement was used as a tool to initiate political liberalisation after decades of one-party rule. 
Secondly, the agreement was utilised to provisionally preserve a minimum of institutional 
stability after democratic elections – the effects of which provoked a military coup 
(Vandeginste, 2009). The third point maintains that the agreement was used as a tool to 
address long-standing grievances of politically under-represented segments in society and 
lastly, to negotiate peace with rebel movements (Vandeginste, 2009:81). For each of these 
agreements, the objectives, dynamics, actors, driving forces and sources of resistance that 
shaped the reality of power-sharing varied considerably. An earlier experiment with power-
sharing inevitably shaped the expectations, perceptions and use of power-sharing in a later 
one. Vandeginste (2009) notes that the Burundian case clearly shows how complex realities 
have an overwhelming impact on the effects of power-sharing and how, contrariwise, 
drawing conclusions on the merits and limits of power-sharing is particularly hazardous when 
making an abstraction of the specific setting in which the notion is being implemented. 
Vandeginste (2009:81) further proposes that the toolbox of consociationalism is formed on 
the basis of successful attempts to organise stable power-sharing democracies in divided 
societies, such as Burundi. The country has been instrumental in ending violent conflict, but 
still, in preventing or reversing the trend towards increased electoral authoritarianism and the 
use of (although selective, relatively small scale and well-targeted) violence as a way of 
exercising political authority, Burundi has yet to attain (Vandeginste, 2009). Beyond the 
distinct Burundian case, this also asks the question whether – and, if so, under what 
circumstances – complex, trial and error based and gradually fine-tuned power-sharing 
arrangements can indeed offer a more sustainable method of conflict resolution than the more 
frequently used ‗emergency power-sharing‘ deals, such as the ones struck in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe in 2008 (Vandeginste, 2009).  
 
In sum, an important lesson learned from the 2004 power sharing agreement is the limited 
ability of inclusion. Moreover, the agreement failed to move beyond ethnic categorisation, 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
57 
with concessions granting the Tutsi community an exceptional degree of over-representation 
and a minority veto which has assisted ‗ethnic‘ grouping, but also encouraged the 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL to precede its battle for a political system that reflects the demographic 
representation of the different communities in a more comparative manner (Falch, 2008:3). 
Moreover, Falch (2008) argues that the power-sharing agreement of 2004 left the disputes 
that initially fuelled the violent conflicts in Burundi
36
 intact and consequently destabilised 
any attempts made to convey more inclusive democratic participatory politics. Even though 
constitutional conditions were meant to ensure power-sharing, it is not always enough to 
guarantee elite cooperation, albeit the 2005 constitution included several stipulations on this 
matter. Falch (2008) points out that loopholes in the system made it difficult for a weak and 
separated political opposition to control the executive. Suggestions have, therefore, been 
made to increase political will and commitment of the CNDD-FDD to initiate political 
dialogue and include other political parties in the decision-making process (Falch, 2008). 
Although international and regional actors‘ involvement in the peace process, has been 
instrumental in pushing the peace process forward, it has nonetheless, overshadowed the 
importance of finding home-grown solution to the conflicts.  
3.3 KEY ACTORS IN THE CONFLICTS 
This section examines the role of key actors in the conflicts in Burundi. Beginning with a 
brief outline of the regional actors and then proceeding to highlight the United Nations 
Operation in Burundi. Lastly, this section provides a brief outline of the kinds of economic 
relations and aid Burundi received during the conflicts. 
3.3.1 Regional Actors 
In addition to the peace negotiations initiated by Tanzania, the regional African neighbours 
also instigated a regional trust for peace in Burundi. The Great Lakes Regional Peace 
Initiative (GLRPI), which was mainly represented by Tanzania, Uganda and South Africa; 
Kenya and the DRC were also constituted as key regional states in the peace process. The 
regional actors served to resolve the conflicts in Burundi (Mokoena, 2005). Daley (2007:7) 
contends that there were two specific mechanisms in which the regional states sought to exert 
influence over the peace process in Burundi. Firstly, regional states proposed for the 
establishment of a regional peace-keeping force and secondly, regional sanctions in the form 
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of an economic embargo. Daley (2007:7) further notes that these initiatives were not as 
successful and effective as they were intended to be. However, the sanctions marked a 
significant step in the move by African neighbour states to find regional solution to their 
problems and, despite an almost international opposition, regional actors worked in a way 
that eventually brought the Burundian government to negotiations.  
Spearheaded by South Africa, the African Union‘s (AU) AMIB mandate consisted of 
supervision, observation, monitoring and verifying the implementation of the ceasefire 
agreement in order to consolidate the peace process in Burundi (Boshoff et al., 2010). The 
responsibility of the AMIB also included the Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration 
(DDR) of forces in Burundi (Boshoff et al., 2010:5). The achievements and challenges of the 
AMIB are extensive in detail and beyond the scope of this study; therefore, this study will 
only highlight the most significant achievements. The AMIB represented one of the most 
successful stories of the AU, in spite the lack of resources (Boshoff et al., 2010). As such, 
AMIB had ―internal capacity and willingness to do its best under difficult circumstances” 
(Boshoff et al., 2010:69). Additionally, one of AMIB‘s greatest achievements was being able 
to encourage Nkurunziza‘s party, CNDD-FDD to formally participate in the peace process. 
The unaccompanied presence of AMIB, created an environment which proved conducive to 
peace, stability and democracy (Boshoff et al., 2010). 
3.3.2 The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)
37
 
Due to the fact that the mandate of the AMIB did not include enforcement measures, the 
United Nations (UN) took over the peace mission in Burundi and the AMIB was 
subsequently transformed to the ONUB (Boshoff et al., 2010:5). Bentley and Southall 
(2005:28) assert that the official involvement of the UN in Burundi was represented in the 
reverberation of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda by means of the UN humanitarian relief 
organisation.  
The role of the ONUB involved passing various Security Council resolutions, sending 
observer missions to Burundi and has since June 2004 maintained a peace mission in Burundi 
(Mokoena, 2005:12). Some of ONUB‘s directives are of importance and will thus be 
highlighted. Firstly, the ONUB‘s mandate was to ensure respect of the ceasefire agreements 
by monitoring their implementation and investigating violations. Secondly, the ONUB‘s 
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mandate was to promote the re-establishment of confidence between the various Burundian 
forces by monitoring and providing security at their pre-disarmament assembly sites, and 
collecting and securing weapons and military material as appropriate (Boshoff et al., 
2010:75). Furthermore, ONUB also had the responsibility to carry out the disarmament and 
demobilisation of combatants as part of the national DDR programme (Boshoff et al., 
2010:76). Moreover, in relation to the Security Council resolution the ONUB had the 
authorisation to execute its mandate collaborating with the UN Organisation Mission in the 
DRC
38
 (Boshoff et al., 2010). The collaboration included the monitoring of illegal flow of 
arms across the borders between Burundi and the DRC. According to Mokoena (2005:70), 
this resolution gave another impetus to the peace process, especially relating to the 
proliferation of arms and the difficulties of providing security because of the porous borders, 
between Burundi and the DRC. However, the challenges concerning the mandate of ONUB 
and the peace mission in Burundi yet remain. 
The cooperation between the INEC, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
and the ONUB, had clear defined roles during the 2005 elections in order to avoid any 
potential conflicts. The ONUB assumed the overall leadership and provided political and 
logistical operation support, whilst the UNDP headed the area of financial support. 
3.3.3 External Economic Relations and Aid  
While economic relations in Burundi present during the violent conflicts in the country, the 
people who benefitted the most from these economic interactions were perhaps only the 
government and rebel forces (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Burundi‘s neighbouring countries 
alongside industrial countries are the two main significant external spheres, which both 
profoundly and structurally, contributed in shaping the conflict and prospects for peace 
(Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Burundi‘s main export commodities are coffee and tea, and with 
the economic sanctions imposed by the regional states, it was perhaps inevitable that normal 
economic relationships were replaced by illegal dealings and large-scale smuggling, 
including to rebel and military movements in Rwanda, Tanzania and DRC (Oketch and 
Polzer, 2002:108). Consequently, the economic sanctions which were imposed on Burundi in 
an attempt to pressurise the current regime
39
 to return to democratic rule, put a strain on the 
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Burundian economy, this was nevertheless damaged by the constructed smuggling methods 
already established (Oketch and Polzer, 2002). 
These economic sanctions had a devastating effect on the Burundian economy in conjunction 
with the international aid community; the rural poor were the ones who suffered the most 
(Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Statistical data presented by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) suggests that in 1995, Burundi experienced an overall positive balance of payments of 
US $ 1.1 million; however, a drop to a deficit of US $ 86.7 million in 1996 was a result of the 
alleged civil war taking place. Nevertheless, the heavy sanctions also played a crucial role in 
this regard. Whilst the sanctions, in essence were targeted at the elite and military, they 
managed to shirk the effects via smuggling networks with regional business groups, thus 
turning international aid and trade to their benefit by means of capturing the profits from 
international transactions (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:109). 
With regard to the country‘s economic development, the international financial assistance 
took various forms. Firstly, aid lowered encouragement to build up a competitive strategic 
export sector, which resulted in the fact that export promotion strategies became inefficient 
(Oketch and Polzer, 2002). Secondly, domestic savings remained wretched due to external 
assistance replaced by an effort to initiate internal resources. Consequently this aggravated an 
even minimal domestic capital accumulation (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:110). Finally, Oketch 
and Polzer (2002:110) note that donors and development partners chose to have a direct 
relationship with the government as opposed to the private sector and civil society 
associations. As the government administration benefited at the expense of the private sector, 
this further stifled competition and growth, consequently, the outcome of the interaction 
between aid and government in Burundi, only led to massive foreign debt and decreasing per 
capita income (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:110). Conversely, international aid also had success 
in pressurising for reform in the post 1988 violence, as political reforms were pushed through 
in fear of reduced aid (Oketch and Polzer, 2002).    
3.4 FACTORS IN THE CONFLICTS 
The nature of the conflicts in Burundi is incorporated into two clusters
40
. The first category 
includes tangible and intangible themes such as history, identity, conflict, security and social 
justice. The second cluster discusses the malicious and ‗genocidal‘ nature of the conflicts. For 
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matters of significance, an annotation with regard to the specific factors stressed in this 
section is of importance. This study has exclusively selected factors that are of relevance to 
the research topic thus forming and taking part in the background as well as discussions 
pertaining to the research question(s) set out in chapter one. Furthermore, this study 
acknowledges that several other factors have been, and still are, under scrutiny when 
examining the conflicts in Burundi.   
3.4.1 Tangible and intangible themes 
“Armed conflict is a product of motivation, opportunity, and identity”. 
 (Gleditsch and Theisen, 2010:1) 
According to Herisse (2002:2), the massacres of both Tutsi and Hutu people which occurred 
during the political transitions in Burundi, were increased by ethnic concepts and 
misconceptions. In this context, the matter of identity and history plays a crucial role.  
So called ‗mythico-histories‘ have been a point of reference when looking at the issue of 
identity in the Burundian conflicts. ‗Mythico-histories‘ have assisted in fuelling conflict 
between Hutu and Tutsi as such, myths merely pertain to a preordained social structure. 
Furthermore, a fallacy of the identity factor has also been exacerbated as the Europeans, more 
specifically Belgians, viewed the ‗brand‘ of humanity as something superior41 whilst Hutu 
perceived this ‗superior brand of humanity‘ as something associated with cruelty, conquest 
and oppression (Mokoena, 2005). Though ‗identity‘ has served as a factor in the violent 
conflicts in Burundi, this factor has not been proven to be the main instigator.  
For Kamungi et al., (2005), the nature of the Burundian society was established in the pre-
colonial era, as the patron (shebuja) and client (mugererwa) relationship was historically 
significant. Kamungi et al., (2005), stress the importance of a historically informed 
perspective of Burundi in order to understand the violent conflicts in a more holistic manner. 
The Burundian society has historically been dominated by the patron-client relationship, 
which was based on property ownership and service, primarily concerning access to land and 
livestock keeping (Kamungi et al., 2005:207). Such relationships occurred through a specific 
contractual system, ububagire or ubugererwa, where an individual, the client (typically Hutu) 
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would work for someone more privileged, the patron (typically a Tutsi or ganwa) (Kamungi 
et al., 2005:207). The manner in which such a relationship was set out came in the form of 
the client needing land, livestock or protection and the patron would therefore offer this in 
return for services in addition to offerings in kind (Kamungi et al., 2005:207). The 
authenticity of the patron-client relationship was, however, under scrutiny as exploitation and 
fairness of exchange was not always maintained. Moreover, property issues were also a factor 
as it was common that the client who lived on the particular land, often did not own the land 
per se, and prospects for such ownership were fairly low (Kamungi et al., 2005:207). This 
exacerbated certain ‗serfdom‘ in which the client (who lived on that particular property, 
usually a Hutu) would in most cases, never have the opportunity to acquire such land and 
consequently, the prospects for the client and his family were thus relatively high in terms of 
exclusion (Kamungi et al., 2005). On the contrary, such dependency relations were not 
categorical and did allow for Hutu‘s to economically and socially ‗become‘ a Tutsi in a 
manner known as kuhutura (Kamungi et al., 2005:207). Conversely, Lemarchand (1996:12) 
adds that such patron-client relations often functioned as a context for ―the institutionalisation 
of political ties‖, whereby ethnic identities inevitably did not draw parallels with the status of 
the patron and the client. Lemarchand (1996:12) further states that this fostered the 
legitimacy of the institution.      
Historically, the conflicts in Burundi have repeatedly been referred to as Hutu versus Tutsi, 
however, Kamungi et al., (2005:200) postulate that the national dynamics have in actual fact, 
been far more complex than that. The authors further assert that with the signing of the 
Arusha Peace Agreement and the formation of the 2001 transitional government has 
developed to become even more convoluted, pointing to the small minority rule and state 
control (Kamungi et al., 2005:200). Similarly, the authors probe certain pathways in the 
aftermath of the colonial legacy and draw compelling conclusions where the colonial 
government is held responsible for the ethnic and possibly negative connotation of the terms 
Hutu and Tutsi (Kamungi et al., 2005). Likewise, Kamungi et al., (2005:208) hypothesise that 
in the pre-colonial era, social and political roles offered certain value and unity to the 
membership and camaraderie within communities that had been wrecked during colonial rule.  
With regards to the history of Burundi, concurrences amongst researchers have not been 
corresponding as there have been difficulties in divorcing fact from fiction. In addition to 
this, question marks have been set concerning the issues of ethnic mobility and the degree of 
social unity between the two major groups; Hutu and Tutsi (Kamungi et al., 2005). 
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Remarkably, scholars contend that ethnic mobility was the exception rather than the rule in 
view of the fact that access to land, cattle, political and economic power as well as social 
influences, pivoted around the patronage of the royal court and was mediated through kinship 
relations and a political system based on the clan (Ndikumana, 2004). Researchers maintain 
that the system, initially designed to entrench the economic status quo, afforded social 
mobility only at the lineage level over a long term period, such that there was minimal 
opportunity for an individual to ‗change‘ his/her ethnicity (Kamungi et al., 2005). 
Consequently, academics have claimed that pre-colonial relationships, including land tenure 
patterns, bred resentment and crystallized ethnic polarisation. Additionally, Uvin (1999:254) 
states that, the prime difficulty, in reaching a consensus with regards to the historical aspects 
of Burundi, is possibly the contemporary political importance of such history, in particular, 
different analyses of history offer the basis of building collective identities and justifications 
of current behaviour. Mokoena (2005:59) further claims that such contemporaneous 
behaviour has thus been “pernicious and genocidal”. Lastly, Uvin (2009) asserts that there 
were neither wars nor conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi during these years. However, this 
does not mean that equality prevailed or that stereotypes were absent. Uvin (2009) points to 
traditional proverbs which signified that there were no conflicts between the Hutu and Tutsi, 
but that the system displayed a fair degree of legitimacy and was capable of addressing social 
conflicts, is true in the case of Burundi. Moreover, Lemarchand (1997:10) notes that it was 
status and not ethnic identity, which was the key determinant of rank and privilege in 
Burundi.  
3.4.2 The nature of the conflict in Burundi: Malicious and ‘Genocidal’ ? 
Since World War II there have been over two-hundred armed conflicts worldwide. Thirty-one 
conflicts in twenty-two countries were active in 2005 (Gleditsch and Theisen, 2010:222). 
These conflicts have claimed some ten million deaths in battle-related violence in the world. 
The average number of battle-related deaths per year shows a long-term decline since World 
War II, with strong short-term variations, and the number of on-going armed conflicts has 
declined since the early 1990s (Gleditsch and Theisen, 2010:222). In spite of the reduction of 
these two types of wars; armed conflict remains a crucial component of human insecurity. In 
addition to the direct loss of life in battle-related conflicts, armed conflicts claim the highest 
human costs in terms of disease, refugee flows, and the destruction of societal infrastructure, 
although these indirect effects are much harder to quantify precisely (Gleditsch and Theisen, 
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2010:222).
42
 Genocide and other related forms of killings of individuals who are not engaged 
in armed resistance – a form of violence that by far exceeded battle deaths in the twentieth 
century – is also frequently linked to armed conflict (Harbom et al., 2006). Although the 
work summarised in this chapter mainly deals directly with conflict between organised 
parties engaged in armed conflict, an assumption is made that it has direct relevance for other 
forms of human insecurity as well. In any event, reducing armed conflict will make a major 
contribution to improving human security.  
Within the contextual framework of the conflicts in Burundi, debates regarding its nature 
have been labelled as being malicious and ‗genocidal‘. The ‗genocidal‘ aspect is here referred 
to the structured violence and massacres that were carried out by both the Hutu and the Tutsi. 
Griggs (1997) maintains that Hutu‘s in Burundi have operated under ‗Hutuism‘, a concept 
which indicate “to kill every member of every Tutsi generation” (Griggs, 1997:8). ‗Hutuism‘ 
was developed with the perception that Tutsi‘s were European in their nature, thereby 
enslaving Hutu‘s and carrying out unjustified killings. Moreover, ‗genocidal‘ violence has 
also indoctrinated Tutsi‘s to eliminate Hutu‘s of special hierarchical order, such as; leaders, 
educated Hutu‘s and the elite (Griggs, 1997). Mokoena (2005:59) also gives reference to 
Rwanda, as an example of the 1994 genocide being malicious and ‗genocidal‘ in its nature.  
There are various complex dimensions to the violent conflicts in Burundi, which has led to 
certain ‗classifications‘ of the characteristics of the conflicts as malicious and ‗genocidal‘. 
Social and cultural divides in Burundi are both vertical and horizontal and are of various 
kinds. Additionally, a country which carries an intense history of mass political mobilisation 
for conflict has consequently presented itself as a case of structural violence. Moreover, the 
key ideas behind the notion of structural violence, particularly points to a certain discomfort 
of social structures which are viewed as preventable, that distribute vulnerability to harm 
violence unevenly, for example, discriminatory or unequally. Harmful social structures 
position individuals and groups in a way that diminishes the range of choices they have and 
erodes the quality of choices individuals and groups have. Moreover, in understanding the 
violent conflicts, the cultural aspect of violence is also significant in this context. Similar to 
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 The figures given in this paragraph are based on the Uppsala/PRIO conflict data, which include all armed 
conflicts with more than 25 battle-related deaths in a given year. See Gleditsch et al., (2002), Harbom et al., 
(2006), and www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict. The battle-death figures are from Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) 
and www.prio.no/cscw/cross/battledeaths. Indirect consequences of armed conflict are discussed in Collier et 
al., (2003) and Ghobarah, Huth & Russett (2003). 
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structural violence, the culture of violence is an ‗irrational factor‘ in the conflicts in Burundi, 
where individuals and communities who experience such violence, develop trauma and 
certain cultural traits as a historical process. As such, structural violence resonates with the 
cultural aspect of violence as it should be considered in its social context as a form of social 
interaction (Buckley-Zistel, 2003:125). 
Structural violence is arguably a form of injustice and dimensions of injustice are based on a 
person‘s position in the social structure, which determine their vulnerability to structural 
violence. Furthermore, an individual‘s position in the social structure is a function of: 
representation, such as a political institution, where entitlement comes in the form of rights. 
An individual‘s position within the social structure is also a function of symbolic status, such 
as group identity of which recognition is the ‗remedy‘. Material status, such as class identity 
also forms part of an individual‘s position within the social structure and redistribution is 
therefore the antidote. Dimensions of injustice in the social structure that diminish rights to 
representation, recognition and redistribution increase individuals‘ and groups‘ exposure to 
harmful practices, experiences and conditions. Ndikumana (2004) points out that although 
structural causes of the violent conflicts in Burundi have been subject to the ethnic discourse, 
unequal distribution of economic resources and political power are conditions Burundi has 
found itself subject to. Consequently, such results in relative deprivation and differential 
access to life chances and choices
43
 and are more appropriate explanations to the structural 
violence in Burundi. Such conditions have mobilised and manipulated culture along ethnic 
lines, and other identifying factors, in order to motivate support locally and to further 
consolidate their hold on power (Kamungi et.al, 2005).  
Moreover, the Burundian conflicts have also shown tendencies of being prolonged and 
difficult in its nature. As various authors note, the Burundian conflicts have characteristics 
which are both tangible and invisible, thus presenting a challenging case with regards to 
conflict analysis. Symbolic values as well as the state‘s failure to manage the crises in 
Burundi are pertinent to the characteristics of the conflicts.    
3.5 ANALYSIS OF JARED DIAMOND’S COLLAPSE44 
3.5.1 Collapse  
                                                          
43
This includes education, subsistence, security, leadership and participation (Ndikumana, 2004). 
44
 Full title of the book, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (Diamond, 2005). 
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―Why did these ancient civilizations abandon their cities after building them with such great 
effort? Why these ancient collapses? This question is not just a romantic mystery. It is also a 
challenging intellectual problem. Why is it that some societies collapsed while others did not 
collapse? But even more, this question is relevant to the environmental problems that we face 
today — what if anything, can the past teach us about why some societies are more unstable 
than others, and about how some societies have managed to overcome their environmental 
problems. Can we extract from the past any useful guidance that will help us in the coming 
decades?‖ These are some of the questions Jared Diamond (2005:5) poses in his book, 
Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed.  
The fundamental message that Diamond (2005) seeks to convey throughout his book, is that 
our very persistence as a sophisticated society may depend upon well-led efforts to reduce the 
negative impact of our economic processes upon nature. This is an essential issue in 
Collapse, because Diamond‘s goal in illuminating our understanding of the relationship 
between a society's development and its environment is to prove that the two impulses are not 
negating. Collapse is partly a response to the dominant environmental discourse in the United 
States (US) today, which holds that environmental concerns are secondary to economic and 
security matters (Diamond, 2005). Environmental concerns are at least equal in importance 
and inextricably linked to all other aspects of a society's success (Diamond, 2005). Poor 
environmental management leads to violent conflict and the brink of collapse. Moreover, 
Diamond (2005) tries to amalgamate a theory in order to explain why some societies fail or 
succeed. The notion of values also forms part of Diamond‘s (2005) theory and one of the 
central themes in Collapse, is an attempt to stress the importance of evaluating the 
environmental impact of countries and/or societies values, whatever they are, and do 
something regarding the ones that do not work. ―Perhaps the crux of success or failure of a 
society is to know which core values to hold onto, and which ones to discard and replace with 
new values‖ (Diamond, 2005:11).  
Though Diamond‘s (2005) definitions of collapse and society are vague in his book, they do 
encompass and point reference to the authors‘ case studies presented in his book, but not 
beyond. The definition of collapse is explored through a historical review of various countries 
and time periods. The concept‘s use stretches from the complete extinction (the Pitcairn 
Island), population crash (the Easter Island), resettlement (the Vikings), civil war (Rwanda), 
anarchy (Somalia and Haiti) and even the fall of a political ideology (such as the collapse of 
the Soviet Union). Furthermore, his definition of society is broad in scope and refers a variety 
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of society forms such as a settlement (for example, various Viking communities), a nation 
(reaching from Rwanda and Haiti, two of the smaller countries in the world, to China, one of 
the largest), a state (such as Montana in the US), and an island (the Easter). 
The first general theme throughout Collapse is that most often a society collapses after its 
peak and secondly, there are often many subtle environmental factors that make some 
societies more fragile than others, and many of those factors are not well understood. 
Diamond (2005) subsequently asks; perhaps then, the crucial question: how could societies 
not perceive their impacts on the environments and stop in time? Why they fail to perceive 
the problems, or if they perceive them, why they fail to tackle them? And finally, if they fail 
to tackle them, why do they fail to succeed in solving them? These essential questions serve 
as precursors to the book‘s theme. Additionally, a hierarchical set of factors about why 
societies fail to solve their problems is developed by Diamond (2005) and illustrated in the 
book.  
Diamond (2005) touches upon two generalisations in this area: firstly, where there is a 
conflict of interest between short-term interests of the decision-making elites; and secondly, 
the long-term interests of the society as whole, especially if the elites are able to insulate 
themselves from the consequences of their actions. According to Diamond (2005), where 
what is good in the short term for the elite is bad for the society as a whole, there is a real risk 
of the elite executing matters that would bring the society down in the long term. Diamond 
(2005) gives an example of the Greenland Norse, a competitive-rank in the society. What the 
chiefs of the Greenland Norse initially desired was more followers and more sheep and more 
resources to exceed the neighbouring chiefs. And that, Diamond (2005) argues, led the chiefs 
to do what is known as ‗flogging‘ the land: overstocking the land hence forcing tenant 
farmers into dependency. As a result, this made the chiefs powerful in the short term, but led 
to the society‘s collapse in the long run (Diamond, 2005). It is precisely those same issues of 
conflicts of interest that are acute in the modern US, especially because the decision makers 
in the US are frequently able to insulate themselves from consequences for instance by living 
in gated compounds, by drinking bottled water and so forth, reports Diamond (2005:520). 
Within the last couple of years, it has been apparent that the elite in the business world 
correctly perceive that they can advance their short-term interest by doing things that are 
convenient in their interest although bad for society as a whole, such as draining a few billion 
dollars out of Enron and other businesses. Diamond‘s general conclusions about why 
societies make bad decisions are rooted in the principle of conflict of interest. To reiterate the 
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principle of conflict of interest, it is those matters that are good in the short term, is however, 
bad for society in the long term.  
The other generalisation that Diamond (2005:246) stresses is that it is particularly hard for a 
society to make ―good decisions when there is a conflict involving strongly-held values that 
are good in many circumstances but are poor in other circumstances‖. Again, Diamond 
(2005) uses the Greenland Norse as an example of commitment. The author states that the 
Greenland Norse held together for four and a half centuries by their shared commitment to 
religion and by their strong social cohesion. However, in this difficult environment those two 
things—commitment to religion and strong social cohesion—also made it difficult for the 
Greenland Norse to change at the end and to learn from the Inuit (Diamond, 2005:246). 
Compared to the modern-day world, Diamond (2005) highlights how Australia managed to 
survive in the remote outpost of European civilisation for 250 years was largely due to their 
British identity. Diamond (2005:390) mentions that ―just as the Norse settlers of Iceland and 
Greenland brought over the cultural values of their Norwegian homeland, so too did the 
British settlers of Australia carry British cultural values‖. In contrast to the present day, the 
Australian commitment to a British identity is serving Australians poorly in their need to 
adapt to their (new) situation in Asia (Diamond, 2005:390). It is thus, particularly difficult to 
change course when the things that inconvenience you or society, are the matters that are also 
the source of one‘s or society‘s strength (Diamond, 2005).  
Diamond (2005) poses the following question; what (then) is going to be the outcome today? 
Firstly, the dozen sorts of ‗ticking time bombs‘ occurring in the modern world are of 
importance. These alleged ‗time bombs‘ have fuses of a few decades to –all of them, not 
more than fifty years, and any one of which can, do us in. Whilst these ‗time bombs‘ none of 
them has a fuse beyond fifty years, and most of them have fuses of a few decades – some of 
them in some places have much shorter fuses. At the rate at which humans are going now, 
Diamond (2005:12) contends that the Philippines will lose all its accessible forests within 
five years. Furthermore, the Solomon Islands are only one year away from losing their 
forests, which is the country‘s major export. And that is going to be spectacular for the 
economy of the Solomon Islands. Diamond (2005) therefore asks: what is the most important 
thing we need to do concerning our environmental problems? The most crucial point is to 
disregard environmental factors as a single factor, but instead there are dozen factors, any one 
of which could do us in and we have got to get them all right. Diamond (2005) further argues 
that this is because if we solve eleven and we fail to solve the twelfth, we are in trouble. For 
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example, if we solve our problems of water, soil and population, but don‘t solve our problems 
of toxics, this inevitably leads to a dilemma (Diamond, 2005). The actuality is that our 
present course is a non-sustainable course, meaning that by definition, it does not have the 
capability to be sustained. Moreover, the outcome is going to be resolved within a few 
decades that means that those living today who are less than fifty or sixty years old will see 
how these paradoxes are resolved, and those who are over fifty or sixty years old may not see 
the resolution but their children and grandchildren certainly will (Diamond, 2005). The 
resolution is going to achieve either of two forms: either modern societies will resolve these 
unsustainable time fuses in pleasant ways of our own choice by taking remedial action, or 
else these conflicts are going to be settled in unpleasant ways not of our choice, namely, by 
war, disease or starvation (Diamond, 2005). But what is certain is that our unsustainable 
course will get resolved in one way or the other in a few decades.  
For Diamond (2005), one of the most crucial aspects is the notion of choices. Does that mean 
that we should get pessimistic and overwhelmed? Diamond (2005) draws a reverse 
conclusion; the big problems facing the world today are not at all matters beyond our control. 
Diamond (2005), however becomes too figurative and ambiguous in his reasoning when he 
states that our biggest threat is not an asteroid about to crash into us, something we can do 
nothing about. Furthermore, the author goes on to say that: instead all the major threats facing 
us today are problems entirely of our own making. And since we made the problems, 
Diamond (2005:435) argues, we are obliged to solve them, which then means that it is 
entirely in our power to deal with these problems. Specifically, what can all of us do? 
Diamond‘s concluding remarks read as follows: there is a lot that we don‘t understand, and 
that we need to understand. And there is a lot that we already do understand, but aren‘t doing, 
and that we need to be doing. 
3.5.2 Explaining Rwanda’s Genocide from Diamond’s perspective 
It is clear that the central aim of Diamond‘s book was to demonstrate how some societies, 
both past and present, “choose to fail or succeed”. Diamond (2005) maintains that when 
populations rise, some societies overuse resources which, in turn, leads to environmental 
degradation and, ultimately, social collapse.  One of the cases he explores in his book is the 
1994 genocide in Rwanda, which he calls a modern day Malthusian crisis.  
Based on the work of Malthus (1798) and the link from resource scarcity via overpopulation, 
to violent conflicts, has popularly been investigated by scholars (Diamond, 2005; 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
70 
Yanagizawa, 2006). Diamond (2005:312) uses Malthus‘ highly contested argument that 
human population growth would be inclined to exceed the growth of food production. 
Supporting this argument, it has been argued that this is due to the fact that population 
growths increase exponentially; while food production increases only arithmetically 
(Diamond, 2005:312). In short, the Malthusian dilemma constitutes as follows: more food in 
addition to more people, therefore no improvement in food per person (Diamond, 2005). 
Diamond (2005:312) asserts; ―population growth itself is halted by famine, war or disease or 
else by people making preventive choices
45‖. Following Malthus‘ argument; the idea that we 
can promote human happiness purely by rapidly growing food production and concurrently 
lacking to moderate population growth, is destined to end in frustration (Diamond, 2005). 
Likewise, Diamond (2005), contends that this notion is still widespread in today‘s societies, 
such as the case of Rwanda.  
3.5.3 Background to the Genocide’s course 
The Rwandese case study presented in Collapse, draw strong similarities to the Burundian 
case study examined in this thesis and therefore bring interesting viewpoints in relation to the 
violent conflicts, which occurred in both countries.
46
 Before conducting this analysis, it is 
important (for the reader) to be informed about the complexity of the historical, social, 
economic and political mechanisms leading up to the genocide in Rwanda.  
This section is aimed at giving a rather brief historical background of the genocide in 
Rwanda, in order to understand the analysis provided by Diamond (2005) more profoundly. 
Albeit the genocide was a conflict of ethnic character, the division and hostility between the 
Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority had not always been the same in scope and nature, but 
had rather evolved during decades of racial mythologizing, colonial divide-and-rule, and the 
use of ethnic propaganda for political purposes (Yanagizawa, 2006). As with Burundi, 
Rwanda‘s population is usually described as consisting of two major groups; approximately 
85 per cent Hutu and 15 per cent Tutsi, along with Twa consisting of 1 per cent 
47(Yanagizawa, 2006). While it is not certain which of the group‘s first settled in Rwanda, it 
is believed that the Twa was the first to arrive between 2000 BC and 1000 AD, while the 
agricultural Hutu immigrated around 1000 to 1500 AD, followed by the Nilotic pastoral 
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 Diamond (2005:312) suggests that this can be done through the use of contraception or delaying of marriage. 
46
 While Rwanda‘s genocide is not something to be mistaken for Burundi‘s civil war, though similar in their 
‗ethnic‘ matter, the countries differ. 
47
 The figure was roughly the same in 2006 as in the years before the genocide in 1994. 
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Tutsi‘s between 1500 and 1800 AD and apparently established themselves as overlords over 
the Hutu‘s (Diamond, 2005). During the colonial rule of Germany in 1897 and perhaps more 
under Belgian rule, Rwanda moved from an organised kingdom with a centralised rule 
exclusive to Tutsi‘s to a feudal-like society in the 19th century with policies that exacerbated 
the already existing ethnic cleavages (Diamond, 2005; Yanagizawa, 2006:16). Throughout 
the Belgian rule, it became obligatory to carry identity cards in order to classify themselves as 
either Hutu or Tutsi and the Tutsi‘s were also seen as a superior ethnic group for their 
seemingly Nilo-Hamatic appearance, which resembled that of a ‗European‘ (Prunier, 1995; 
Diamond, 2005; Yanagizawa, 2006). In addition, this further intensified the racist ideologies.   
During the period of 1959 and 1961 significant changes occurred as the monarchy was 
abolished, which was supported by the Belgians and the supposed ‗Hutu Revolution‘ began 
as Hutu‘s in both Burundi and Rwanda, tried to overthrow the dominant Tutsi rule (Diamond, 
2005; Yanagizawa, 2006). What followed was a series of killings of Tutsi, which in turn led 
to approximately 120,000 Tutsi‘s fleeing to neighbouring countries (Diamond, 2005). As 
independence took place in 1962, the Hutu had managed to gain power in Rwanda and in 
Burundi; it was the rule of the minority Tutsi which presided (Diamond, 2005). In the two 
decades following independence in Rwanda, approximately one million Rwandans, 
especially Tutsi‘s went into exile in neighbouring countries, however Tutsi‘s continued to 
invade Rwanda which again invoked “retaliatory killings of Tutsi by Hutu” (Diamond, 
2005:314). In the midst of violence and instability, the military leader Juvénal Habyarimana 
came to power by means of a coup d‘état in July 1973 (Diamond, 2005; Yanagizawa, 2006). 
In spite of his Hutu belonging, Habyarimana decided to unite the country by welcoming back 
the Tutsi and calling for a standstill of the violence against Tutsi‘s. Although Habyarimana 
introduced a one-party state, Rwanda‘s economy and social system prospered for nearly 15 
years, with improvement in health, education as well as the economic sector (Diamond, 
2005:315). However, the succession of development came to an end by drought and rising 
environmental matters and the situation did not improve as the world prices for coffee and 
tea
48
 declined in 1989 (Diamond, 2005:315). Moreover, Habyarimana‘s relatively relaxed 
behaviour towards Tutsi‘s saw the awakening of extremist Hutu‘s who feared the loss of 
power as another Tutsi invasion occurred in 1990, however with no success (Diamond, 2005; 
Yanagizawa 2006). A transitional multi-party government was set up in 1992 leading to the 
signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in 1993 which called for a power-sharing agreement 
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 Rwanda‘s main export commodity (Oketch and Polzer, 2002; Diamond, 2005). 
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(Diamond, 2005; Yanagizawa, 2006). With the completion of the peace agreement, tension 
rose as trained militias began preparing to kill Tutsi‘s (Yanagizawa, 2006).    
Tensions escalated and the killings ultimately broke out as the plane carrying Habyarimana 
and Burundi‘s new provisional president was shot down on the 6th of April 1994 (Diamond, 
2005; Yanagizawa, 2006). It became apparent that this had been organised and prepared by 
Hutu extremist, whom set out to kill Habyarimana, and other less extreme members of the 
government branches and Tutsi‘s (Diamond, 2005). With the outbreak of the killings initiated 
by the Hutu army extremists, they also efficiently and successfully managed to recruit Hutu 
civilians and by doing so, they systematically killed any identified Tutsi (Diamond, 
2005:316). The killings, which more resembled massacres at this point, had within six weeks 
exterminated an estimated 800,000 Tutsi which is tantamount to 11 per cent of Rwanda‘s 
total population (Diamond, 2005:317). The termination of the genocide came in July 1994, 
when the Tutsi-led rebel army Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) claimed victory after setting up 
a new government under the dictum of national reconciliation and unity in addition to calling 
upon the people of Rwandan to ―think of themselves as Rwandans rather than as Hutu or 
Tutsi‖ (Diamond, 2005:317). An estimated 130,000 Rwandans were charged for being 
culpable of the genocide; however it is argued that around 800,000 people were involved in 
the massacres (Yanagizawa, 2006). While the scars are still healing and peace in Rwanda has 
been restored, Diamond (2005:317) states that after the RPF‘s victory, roughly 2,000,000, 
mostly Hutu Rwandese have fled to neighbouring Tanzania and DRC and about 750,000 
previous expatriates, mostly Tutsi have returned to Rwanda. According to André and Platteau 
(1998), it was apparent that property issues, such as land, and appropriation during the 
genocide were a highly present factor. There are also micro-studies that confirm that the issue 
of land property was a significant factor in both who were killed (Yanagizawa, 2006).  
3.5.4 Collapse in context: Rwanda  
Diamond (2005:3) defines collapse as ―a drastic decrease in human population size and/or 
political/economic/social complexity, over a considerable area, for an extended time‖. As 
previously discussed, Diamond (2005) views the 1994 genocide in Rwanda as a modern 
example of a society collapsing tragically and dramatically. The genocide has similarly, 
received the questioning title of being the fastest in the 20
th
 century as roughly 800,000 
people were massacred in merely 100 days. Millions of Rwandese people were evidently 
displaced in addition to the destruction of property and infrastructure and an economy which 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
73 
contracted by 50 per cent (Diamond, 2005). Evidence, according to Diamond (2005), 
suggests that the Rwandese society unquestionably encountered a collapse. In Diamond‘s 
(2005) own lingo, why did Rwandans ‗choose‘ to fail? Diamond (2005:319) argues that the 
genocide can partly be understood as a society-wide response to high fertility rates coupled 
with land scarcity. Diamond (2005) hypothesize that too many people and limited fertile land 
were significant variables in interpreting the calamity. Diamond (2005) has however, 
received critique, which is worth mentioning.
49
  
Hintjens (1999:247), reports that although Diamond (2005) identifies that Rwanda‘s mass 
violence was both driven and encouraged by Hutu elites who were desirous to keep the reins 
of political control firmly within their hold, Hintjens (1999) also believes that land scarcity 
coupled with low agricultural productivity in fact drove people to murder. Before moving 
forward in this analysis, Diamond (2005) maintains that one of the crucial factors in his 
assessment is the fact that Rwanda
50
 was already one of Africa‘s most densely populated 
countries in the 19
th
 century. One of the reasons for its rapid population growth was due to 
the country‘s advantage ―of moderate rainfall and an altitude too high for malaria and the 
tsetse fly‖ (Diamond, 2005:319). Moreover, the population grew at an average rate of over 
three per cent per annum due to new world crops, public health and medicine (Diamond, 
2005:319). Low agricultural activity in Rwanda is represented by it being inefficient due to 
manual labour; farmers were depended on picks and machetes, in conjunction with this, most 
Rwandans had to remain as a farmer which resulted in small production and surplus 
(Diamond, 2005:319). Interestingly, the country‘s population increased after independence, 
but the agricultural means were still very much traditional and failing to modernize 
simultaneously with population growth. The Malthusian dilemma is clearly present within 
this context: instead of incorporating a variety of productive crop and perhaps increasing its 
agricultural exports or establishing effective family planning, Rwandans resorted to ―clearing 
forests and draining marshes to gain new farmland, thus shortening fallow period, and trying 
to extract as much as two or three consecutive crops from a field within one year‖ (Diamond, 
                                                          
49
 Diamond has received critique from is Karol Boudreaux (2009), who argues that the difficulty with 
Diamonds‘ argument is not that it is impossible, but rather the fact that it overlooks the underlying causes of 
land conflict in Rwanda in addition to the political economy factors that drove the Habyarimana government to 
repress its citizens and demonize opponents (Boudreaux, 2009:9). According to Boudreaux (2009:9), the 
examination of Rwanda presented by Diamond (2005) falls short on one account; the mere fact that an analytical 
comprehension of the role that Rwandan institutions and policies took part in shaping a predominantly 
authoritarian, inflexible, and anti-urban society, is not present in Diamond‘s (2005) analysis. Moreover, 
Boudreaux (2009:9) maintains that it is such institutional and policy components that help explain why 
Belgium, for instance, with its high population and scarce land is peaceful and wealthy while Rwanda is not.  
50
 Burundi is also mentioned as the other most densely populated country in Africa (Diamond, 2005:319). 
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2005:319). Additionally, Hutu farmers began cultivating all arable land excluding national 
parks, as a number of Tutsi‘s had fled the country and thus more land was available. 
Consequently, environmental problems such as over farming and soil erosion were present 
and continued to rise.   
Diamond (2005:315) maintains that population pressure and the environmental degradation 
that may be associated with a rise in population are important catalysts for social change as 
seen in the case of Rwanda even prior to 1994. Diamond (2005:320) draws heavily on the 
study presented by André and Platteau (1998), in which he asserts that (even) ordinary 
citizens participated in the violence because they were desperate and lured by property. The 
case study presented by André and Platteau (1998), focuses on the northwestern commune in 
Rwanda, Kanama. As André and Platteau‘s (1998) study is thoroughly scrutinized and 
perhaps requires a more extensive and elaborate presentation, this study merely highlights the 
key points due to obvious limitations within this study. What has been highlighted above with 
regard to population pressure and environmental degradation is present in the case of 
Kanama. However, what is distinct for Kanama is that it was only occupied by Hutu‘s 
(Diamond, 2005). Diamond (2005:320) notes that Rwandan farmers in Kanama were not able 
to boost agricultural productivity in proportion with population increases and Kanama‘s 
extremely fertile volcanic soil, constituted a decrease in farm size from a median farm size of 
only 0.89 acre in 1988, to a further decline in 1993 with 0.72 acres (Diamond, 2005:321). 
This had an effect on the younger people living in Kanama as they had no real chance of 
establishing a life independent from their parents, which in turn caused what Diamond 
(2005:321) explains as ―lethal family tensions that exploded in 1994…with more young 
people staying at home, the average number of people per farm household increased between 
1998 and 1993, from 4.9 to 5.3, respectively‖. Naturally, the population of Kanama struggled 
to feed themselves on such little land. Repeated serious conflicts became common in Kanama 
as people were impoverished and hungry thus causing desperation and land disputes were the 
root cause of most conflicts. Such incidents whereby family and relatives sabotaged and 
killed each other turned into a competition for land and bitter enemies. This backdrop of 
chronic and escalating conflict as well as killings forms the background of the mass 
slaughtering which exploded in 1994 (Diamond, 2005:324). According to evidence presented 
by André and Platteau (1998), 5.4 per cent of the people that they attempted to trace down 
post 1994, found that were reported dead as a result of the war. Moreover, Diamond 
(2005:325), contends that the ―death rate in an area where the population consisted almost 
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entirely of Hutu‘s was at least half of the death rate in areas where Hutu killing Tutsi plus 
other‖.  
The fundamental nature of Diamond‘s (2005:8) statement “how some societies choose to fail 
or succeed” is that societies who make prudent decisions about resource use and population 
control flourish, whilst those societies that are negligent in terms of their choices fail and 
often do so spectacularly. In essence, the proximate cause of the gruesome violence in most 
areas in Rwanda was ethnic hatred whipped by politicians cynically concerned with keeping 
themselves in power (Diamond, 2005:326). Diamond (2005:516) argues that just as in the 
past, countries in the present day that are environmentally stressed, overpopulated, or both, 
become at risk of getting politically stressed, and of their governments collapsing. He further 
contends that it is when people are desperate, undernourished, and without hope, that they 
blame their governments, which they hold accountable for or unable to solve their problems. 
As a result, they attempt to emigrate at any cost, they fight each other over land, and they kill 
each other and ignite civil wars. And thus, becoming a terrorist, supporter or a person who 
tolerates terrorism, is further quantified by “we have nothing to lose” (Diamond, 2005:516). 
Such transparent connections result in genocides, civil wars or revolutions, akin to the ones 
that already ruptured in Bangladesh, Burundi, Rwanda and Indonesia, to mention a few 
(Diamond, 2005).  
3.6 CONCLUDING COMMENT 
This chapter served to provide analyses in perspective, by introducing Diamond‘s analysis of 
why societies collapse within an ecological framework. The Power-Sharing Agreement was 
introduced, which highlights its limited ability of inclusion, for this agreement did not 
account for factors that this study deems important, namely environmental dynamics. 
Moreover, this chapter stressed key actors and factors in the political conflicts in Burundi. 
Diamond‘s (2005) framework explained in this chapter provides a foundation for the analysis 
of this study in the subsequent chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
ASSESSING LAND AND POPULATION GROWTH 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
“Mu nda harara inzara, hakazonduka inzigo”.51  
 - Burundian Proverb 
This chapter uses the contextual and historical background provided in the previous chapters 
to investigate the research question; how have population growth and limited access to land 
impacted on the previous political conflicts in Burundi? This chapter signifies the most 
complex and detailed chapter in terms of analyses and findings. Furthermore, this chapter is 
structured in such a manner that the clustering of arguments are logical and consecutive in 
nature in order to address and assess the quintessence of this study, namely to examine how 
land access and population growth have, to a certain degree, impacted on the political 
conflicts in Burundi. Also, the extent to which a nexus between the aforementioned variables 
and the conflicts in Burundi can be found – forms part of the first sub-research question and 
will thus be addressed. An exploratory journey leads to the second sub-research question of 
whether the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Accord addressed the importance of these two 
environmental factors in the Burundian conflict context. The intention set out for this chapter 
is mainly to illustrate that Burundi‘s land question is indeed multi-faceted and that through an 
exploration of the various indicators, consequently, this study, in a context specific 
framework, illustrates how limited land access and rapid population growth can serve as 
conditions for the political conflicts in Burundi. 
The scholarly discourse on conflict has seen the use of various conflict analyses as a method 
of assessment. Conflict analysis per se, however, usually involves the verification of whether 
one is dealing with a conflict; defining conflict system boundaries, this can and does change, 
so a certain level of amendment occurs; and using specific conflict analysis tools to determine 
and zoom in on any characteristics of the conflict as well as organise information, which 
serves as significant (Mason and Rychard, 2005). Within the context of the political conflicts 
in Burundi, a broad academic and policy literature has has been recommended. There is no 
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The Burundian proverb is translated as: ―If you fall asleep with an empty belly, you awake in the morning with 
a hatred-filled heart‖ (Food and Agriculture Organisation, 2011). 
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particular structure or framework of how a conflict develops, conflicts are dynamic systems. 
Interestingly, conflict is about positions and interests, according to Mason and Rychard 
(2005), it is a matter of what people want and why they say they want it, which therefore 
leads to conflict of interests at a more individual level. Within the field of political 
philosophy and conflict dynamics, there are numerous ways to analyse conflicts and the 
impacts that it has on both the political structure and the socio-economic aspects. This study 
recognises the importance of the use and management of land and the rising population 
growth in Burundi and the influence it can have on conflicts. However, it is equally important 
to measure such conditions for conflicts with a critical eye and when immersing into such an 
extensive field, as ambiguities do occur and also have a considerable presence which 
deserves acknowledgement, thus noted in this study.  
4.2 THE SOUTH-NORTH DISPARITY 
What will follow from this section and emerge in section 4.4, is an additional reference to the 
topographical characteristics and the ecological differences relating to the rural and urban 
areas in Burundi, have also influenced the land issues and furthered conditions for violence. 
As such, this study attempts to illustrate the importance of how these ecological differences 
exacerbate the land issue in Burundi in line with, but not exclusive to, Diamond‘s (2005) 
analysis of environmental damage. 
4.2.1 Topographical Outline 
This outline is useful for this study in that it provides a background to better understand how 
Burundi‘s northern and southern parts differ in terms of their topography. Moreover, this 
outline will also highlight the importance of how regional differences have influenced the 
land issues when assessing the rural and urban discrepancies due to Burundi‘s high rural 
population and this has also affected the agricultural aspect of the urban areas.  
The ecological landscape of Burundi is rather special due to the vast topographical 
differences that stretch across the country, making Burundi a unique case. Furthermore, 
Burundi has eleven natural regions, which are fragmented into five climatic ecological zones, 
namely; the western lowlands of Imbo which is occupied by Hyphaene-Acacia woodland in 
the Ruzizi plain and Bracystegia woodlands along the lakeshore; the mountainous Congo-
Nile divide, the central highlands, the eastern Kumoso depression, and lastly, the north-
eastern Bugesera depression (Hendrix and Glaser, 2007; Beck et al., 2010; BTI, 2012). Such 
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variation presents great diversification for ecological conditions, which awards a natural eco-
system, plant and animal species in the respective eco-regions. Likewise, such eco-system 
areas has and can in the future afford Burundians with services such as medicinal plants, food 
crops, drinking water, irrigation, and timber, to name a few (Beck et al., 2010).  
The country‘s significant landscape with its green hillsides and dense forests are perhaps 
some of the more common characteristics Burundi is known for. In spite of the destruction of 
some of Burundi‘s natural habitat due to the violent conflicts that took place in the years 
following independence, the small country has some noteworthy eco-systems in the Rift 
Valley. The Great Rift of east Africa gave the formation of the majestic Lake Tanganyika, 
one of the largest lakes in the world and also significant for Burundi at both a political and 
socio-economic level (Beck et al., 2010). Factored in the Afromontane
52
 forests of the region 
are one of the main conservation areas in Burundi, the Kibira National Park, which discloses 
itself as the last absolute stretch yet to remain in Burundi. The Albertine Rift Mountains are 
not only part of the Afromontane eco-regions, but it is also one of the largest areas in this 
region covering parts of Burundi, along with the Democratic Republic of Congo, United 
Republic of Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda (Beck et al., 2010). Bird species are indigenous 
and distinctive for Burundi‘s biodiversity and the famous Northern Aquatic Landscape (Lacs 
du Nord) plays a key role for migrating species in terms of bird habitat. In the north-eastern 
part of Burundi is the Ruvubu National Park, which hosts‘ special woodlands, savannah and 
fauna – but is also the second main conservation area in the country (Beck et al., 2010:1).53  
The western side of Burundi is predominantly mountainous with extended ridges, some even 
above 2,500 meters, significant for this mountain range is that it continues on to Rwanda as 
well as extending from the north to the south of Burundi. The land on the western side also 
makes a sharp descend to 1,500 metres to join with Lake Tanganyika in the south (Beck et 
al., 2010). Afromontane communities do not only cover the western part, but with transitional 
rainforest, they also cover the western mountain slopes overlooking the Ruzizi river and Lake 
Tanganyika. The lowland regions, Bwery and Bugesera lie in the furthest north of Burundi 
wedged by Lacs du Nord, which comprise of Cohoha and Rweru (Beck et al., 2010). Also in 
the north is the Kibira National Park, which adjoins the Nyungwe Forest in Rwanda, and is 
                                                          
52
 Afromontane represents the Afrotropic sub-region, its plant and animal species common to the mountains of 
Africa and the southern Arabian Peninsula. Moreover, the Afromontane regions of Africa are discontinuous, 
separated from each other by lowlands, and are sometimes referred to as the Afromontane archipelago, as their 
distribution is analogous to a series of sky islands (Beck et al., 2010).   
53
 The third main conservation area is the Ruzizi National Park situated north-west of Bujumbura (Hendrix and 
Glaser, 2007). 
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also surrounded by major montane forest. The Ruzizi river also forms part of the north-
western part of the country and forms the international frontier with DRC. The Ruvubu river 
which rises in the northern part of Burundi is the southernmost source of the Nile; the 
northern region also hosts the Kanyaru and Ruhwa rivers, in the extreme north and northwest 
respectively (Beck et al., 2010).  
Most of southern Burundi is formed by the Malagarasi river and a smaller patch of low 
altitude enclosed forest, which lives beside the banks of Lake Tanganyika. Natural 
vegetation, such as East African evergreen bush land and wooded grassland, dominates the 
eastern and south-eastern part of Burundi. Following the mountains eastward, the land makes 
a steady drop to around 1,400 meters in the direction of the south-eastern and southern border 
(Beck et al., 2010). The heart of Burundi mainly consists of a central plateau that covers the 
whole of the centre of the country and slants from north to south and west to east, with an 
average elevation of the central plateau ranging from 1,450 meters to 2,000 meters (Kameri-
Mbote, 2007; Hendrix and Glaser, 2007). Along with the green hillsides, the steep slopes on 
the plateau are frequently eroded due to intense agricultural development, according to Beck 
et al., (2010). Contiguous with this are the valley bottoms that are often marshy. The central 
plateau is significantly defined by one area of higher ground, which falls steeply south-
eastwards to the Kumoso depression. 
As the southernmost country within the Great Lakes region and located near the equator, 
Burundi receives abundant rain during normal seasons coupled with tropical highland and 
tropical equatorial climates. As previously mentioned, each region in the country is featured 
by hills, plateaus, lakes, and mountains, all of which complements to a unique climate of 
temperature, humidity and rainfall and the varying climatic conditions due to the five 
different climatic regions. Beck et al., (2010) also report that very warm temperatures and 
tropical climate do occur in areas around Lake Tanganyika and the Ruzizi river. The regions 
in the vicinity of such lakes or rivers are more prone to experiencing a warmer environment 
made up of plain terrains (Kok et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2010).  
The considerable variations in topography, soil and climate are responsible for the large 
number of vegetation types. However, agricultural pressure is leading to the rapid 
disappearance of the country‘s natural vegetation. Levels of plant endemism are unknown but 
given the transitional nature of the vegetation are unlikely to be high. Burundi possesses 
extensive wetlands. The total area of marshland is more than 120,000 ha, almost 5 per cent of 
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the area of the country. However, a large part of these marshlands has already been drained 
for agriculture. There are also a number of small lakes in the mountains as well as four 
substantial ones, including Lake Tanganyika, about 8 per cent of the surface of which 
constitutes part of Burundi.  
Influenced by the altitude which varies from 772 meters measured at Lake Tanganyika and 
the highest point at 2,670 meters at Mount Heha, there is no surprise that the country oscillate 
between dry and rainy seasons (Banderembako, 2006). Temperatures are cooler in most parts 
of the western and northern regions of Burundi mainly due to the elevated lands with most 
average temperatures at 17°C. The mountainous parts of the country naturally experience 
tropical highland climate. The capital city, Bujumbura, reports average humidity levels at 71 
per cent annually and temperatures are known to be relatively stable with an average of 24°C 
(Banderembako, 2006). Some researchers even claim that Bujumbura mirrors the climatic 
particulars of the entire Burundi, with unstable rainfalls peaking in April and dropping in July 
(Uvin, 2009; Beck et al., 2010).   
Burundi‘s climate is tropical and humid in its nature due to the mountainous landscape and 
plateau in the central part of Burundi. In essence, Burundi constitutes an equatorial climate, 
resulting in various elements of weather across the country such as humidity, rainfall, 
sunshine; wind, to mention a few. Thus, the climate has a natural rain season consisting of 
two wet seasons and two dry seasons (Diamond, 2005). These four different seasons can be 
divided and distinguished into the following: the first short dry season from December to 
January, the long wet spell from February to May, followed by the long dry spell from June 
to August, and finally the short wet season from September to November (CIA Factbook, 
2012). The temperatures, therefore, fluctuate from region to region, mainly due to the 
difference in altitude. According to Cochet (2004), the average temperature in the central 
plateau is 20 °C, whereas Bujumbura‘s average is estimated at 23°C annually. The majestic 
Lake Tanganyika and the Ruzizi River Plain receives slightly warmer, albeit the amount of 
expected rainfall annually (Cochet, 2004). The mountainous and hilly areas are moderately 
cooler than elsewhere in Burundi, averaging around 16°C (CIA Factbook, 2012). The 
northwestern parts of Burundi received most of the rain, it is estimated that the entire country 
annually receives somewhere between 1,300 and 1,600 mm of rainfall (CIA Factbook, 2012).  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
81 
4.2.2 Ecological (dis) advantages/ Urban versus Rural   
The purpose of this section is to highlight the differences amongst the urban and rural 
population and the environmental concerns with regard to land. This is discussed with 
reference to the major damage and degradation of marginal land areas in the rural areas as a 
result of the pressing population growth since the first political conflict broke out in 1965 in 
Burundi. In addition to the aforementioned, the intention with this section is to address how 
limited access to agricultural land, predominantly in the rural areas, led to a migration from 
rural to urban areas in an attempt to find means of sustainable livelihood and how rural and 
urban differences have also impacted the land disputes in Burundi since the 1960s. 
The organisational division of provinces, communes and collines
54
 in Burundi originates 
from the legacy of the pre-colonial structures, which were customized under colonisation 
(Uvin, 2009). Burundi consists of seventeen provinces each named after their respective 
provincial capital: Bubanza, Bujumbura Mairie, Bujumbura Rural, Bururi, Cankuzo, 
Cibitoke, Gitega, Karuzi, Kayanza, Kirundo, Makamba, Muramvya, Muyinga, Mwaro, 
Ngozi, Rutana and Ruyigi. Of these seventeen provinces, the ones in the southern part of 
Burundi are considered to be more privileged. The southern provinces consist of: Muramvya, 
Citiboke, Makamba, Karuzi, Bubanza, Cankuzo, Rutana, Bururi and lastly Bujumbura 
(Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000). The northern provinces, Ngozi, Kayanza, Kirundo, Gitega, 
Muyinga and Ruyigi, are systematically less privileged and struggle more with infrastructure 
and access to education (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000).  
Regional differences amongst the provinces are quite significant with regards to how rural 
and urban areas are being structured by the government. Power struggle and control over the 
government coupled with economic rent-seeking and bureaucratic corruption, are impacting 
the south-north disparity in Burundi and creating stark differences amongst the provinces in 
the country (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000; Oketch and Polzer, 2002; Uvin, 2009). The 
repercussions of such a skew distribution across the provinces are influencing the access to 
various sectors within the public sphere. For instance, as a means of controlling the intricate 
bureaucratic matters, unequal access to education has been capitalized with the exclusion of 
Hutu students and disadvantaging northern Tutsi‘s (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:104). The 
southern parts of Burundi, which includes Makamba, Bururi and Bujumbura, are the ones 
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 Collines are hills and is the lowest geographical point for Burundians, which usually consist of about 150-300 
households (Uvin, 2009:30). 
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gaining from the state‘s investment and infrastructure, this because most people from the 
south are the ones dominating government bodies (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000). It is 
reported that these provinces are measured as having the lowest ratio of students per 
classroom per teacher (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:104). Discrepancy within the education 
sector is an issue which seems to separate and create alarming relationships between the 
northern and southern provinces in Burundi. The continuous control over the state and 
resourcing of the agricultural sector is also leading to regional poverty (Ngaruko and 
Nkurunziza, 2000; Oketch and Polzer, 2002). For Oketch and Polzer (2002), the control of 
the Burundian state is emphasized and seen as one of the crucial factors in the conflict in 
Burundi.  
With over 91 per cent of the population living in rural areas, Burundi is one of the most rural 
nations in Africa. In the capital, Bujumbura, lies some of the more concentrated arable land 
(UNEP, 2008). This has also led to an urban bias of state investment, leading to the under-
resourcing of the agricultural sector (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:106). The chronic and extreme 
vulnerability of the rural population is exacerbated by a scarcity of arable land and high 
pressures on limited natural resources: households (averaging around five persons) survive on 
an average of 0.5 ha, which is well below what is required for even the most basic levels of 
nutrition (FAO, 2011). 
Cobbled in the complexities of the violent conflicts in Burundi, was one of the most affected 
provinces, Ngozi. Here, the communes of Ruhororo had the largest Internally Displaced 
People (IDP) camp in the country (Uvin, 2009). Interestingly, the commune of Busiga, which 
also lies in Ngozi, experienced far more stability and not as badly affected during the violent 
conflicts in Burundi, as a result, Busiga is less poor on average than the rest of the province 
(Uvin, 2009:36). However, Busiga is still considered one of the poorest communes overall. 
Uvin (2009) also reports that there are differences between communes as well as provinces 
with regards to location and distribution of services.  
The commune of Nyanza-Lac in the Makamba province has the highest number of returned 
refugees in the entire country. Nyanza-Lac lies in the southern part, close to Lake Tanganyika 
and is also one of the most populated communes compared to the other communes; 
moreover, Nyanza-Lac also has a fairly large urban center (Uvin, 2009:37). Interestingly, 
Nyanza-Lac is one of the communes in Burundi that experiences vast disparities, as it has 
sufficient income-generating opportunities with its palm oil, fishing due to the proximity to 
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Lake Tanganyika, possibilities of trade over road and the lake and rice crops in abundance 
(Uvin, 2009). According to the BTI (2012), the food intake in Nyanza-Lac is slightly higher 
for a commune in the southern part of Burundi, comparing this to the northern communes, 
where it is estimated that one half of the population‘s daily intake consists of 1,400 kcal in 
contrast to the southern parts of Burundi, where the BTI (2012) report that less than one fifth 
of the population lives in households with such low calorie intake.  
Of the urban communes is Bwiza, Kamenge and Musiga, all three situated in Bujumbura 
Mairie (Uvin, 2009). According to Uvin (2009:32), the lives of Burundians in these 
communes reflect realities of the lives of the large majority of ordinary urban people, 
additionally, these communes are said to be of a more mixed demographic representation as 
well as almost entirely consisting of Hutu and Tutsi, respectively.  
Political conflict and lack of infrastructure are factors that have exacerbated the situation 
amongst different communes and provinces in Burundi since the late 1960s. Some provinces 
within the proximity of the capital, Bujumbura, are economically better off than other 
provinces further away and thus experience more benefits of a much more improved 
infrastructure than other provinces further away from Bujumbura and more remote, dealing 
with IDP camps, refugees and other socio-economic issues that the government has failed to 
address. Generally speaking, economic and regional cleavages in Burundi are factors that 
contribute to the divide and also impel control over the state.  
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Figure 2: Rural and urban percentage of the population
55
 
Source: Databank Worldbank (2012) 
 
As seen in figure two above, data reveal that out of the total population percentage of 
Burundi, the urban population has had a steady increase since independence and has 
experienced an escalating trend since 1970 measured at 2.4 per cent of the total population, 
up until 2011 which reached a soaring 10.9 per cent. What this means is that despite the 
political conflicts which were wreaking havoc during mid-1960s to 1993/1994, a strong 
urban population grew. Cochet (2004) noted that visible environmental depletion during the 
1970s and 1980s has been one of the factors as to why there was an urban growth in the total 
population of Burundi. A migration away from the rural countryside in an attempt to find 
other means of socioeconomic survival in the urban areas occurred already from mid 1970s. 
Access and allocation to land by the rural poor has been limited by fragmentation 
―miniaturisation‖ of farm plots during the several outbreaks of violence in 1965, 1972, 1988 
and 1993 as a consequence of population increase coupled with disparity between customary 
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and statutory systems which are in similar operation (Uvin, 2009). However, what generally 
happened was that uncultivable land plots were used in the urban spaces in an effort to grow 
crops (Uvin, 2009; Baribeau, 2011). Although experiencing a relatively steady growth of the 
rural population, going from representing 98 per cent of the total population in 1960, it made 
a significant drop to 95 per cent in the mid-1980s to an even further drop in 1994
56
 measured 
at 93 per cent. Hitherto, a predominantly rural populous country, the rural population in 
Burundi is currently measured at 89 per cent, quite a significant drop from 98 per cent in 
1960. In figure three below, is an additional illustration of the rural and urban growth 
differences. This figure consolidates with figure two.  
In figure three below, the real annual growth of the rural and urban population is shown and 
demonstrating quite a fluctuating growth rate of the rural population, notably, with two major 
drops during the early 1970s and late 1990s. As for the urban section, it experienced an 
immense jump from 1970 at 2.8 per cent to a whopping 7.8 per cent the following year. The 
urban annual population growth has since continued to grow whereas the annual rural 
population growth has gone decreased. However, a significant note in this regard is crucial in 
that, in spite of the figures presented here and what might seem dramatic, is that Burundi 
essentially rural and still a country that is experiencing low rates of urbanization and 
dispersed habitats.  
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 1994 is specifically used here in order to better understand it in the context of the violent conflict which broke 
out in 1993 as the last conflict accounted for in this particular framework of the study. 
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Figure 3: Rural and Urban population growth
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Source: Databank Worldbank (2012) 
 
Competition between the rural and urban development and agricultural demands are also 
increasing the divide between those who have and those that don‘t have in Burundi. In line 
with Oketch and Polzer‘s argument (2002:86), such demands by the rural and the continuing 
demand by the urban population have and still are, exacerbating the division amongst 
Burundians themselves, due to the extremely tight control over the state by a certain urban 
elite. Such political activities by the elite and lack of sufficient state functions create 
unnecessary gaps and have led to violent conflicts in Burundi. As such, one can argue that the 
south-north disparity in Burundi is by and large impugned by a conspicuous organisational 
conflict of interest between the urban, more specifically, the elite and the rural majority, 
which in turn creates different social opportunities and might also influence land property 
rights. 
Oketch and Polzer (2002) argue that the competition for control over the state is directly 
between the urban populations, although the rural population are also directly affected by the 
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distribution or the lack thereof, by natural resource questions. More specifically, the rural 
population is hardest hit by the lack of sufficient land to sustain a growing peasant population 
living off subsistence agriculture (Oketch and Polzer, 2002).  
Contrary to the vast unique topographical differences that are present in Burundi, there are 
also important environmental issues that raise concern for the future of Burundi and which 
needs to be addressed. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), report that land 
availability and degradation are threats to the rapidly growing population, with roughly 90 
per cent of the population residing in rural areas and 90 per cent of the labour force 
accounting for agriculture, the availability of arable land is rather low in comparison to other 
African countries (UNEP, 2008:105). As already noted, Burundi is a densely populated 
country, and naturally this can intensify other ecological issues. Moreover, in 2006, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization United Nations (FAO) revealed that almost 91 per cent of the 
total land area in Burundi was made use for crops and livestock and that such intensive crop 
growing led to severe soil erosion on the natural steep terrain in the country.  
The conversion of land to agriculture in addition to grazing has impacted Burundi‘s 
biological resources and ecosystems, such that Burundi is ranked as the only country in 
Africa with the highest rate of deforestation, another major environmental threat (Beck et al., 
2010). UNEP (2008:108) estimated that 47 per cent of Burundi‘s forest cover has disappeared 
since 1990, deforestation has had such a severe impact on Burundi‘s ecosystems that a mere 
six per cent is left of Burundi‘s native forest, tiny reserves compared to what was once a large 
native forest (UN, 2007). Moreover, the intense dependence on wood for fuel also contributes 
to severe deforestation Burundi is experiencing. Overfishing in Lake Tanganyika coupled 
with the increasing population migration to the Lake has been a rising environmental issue 
for Burundians. Again, the ecosystem is under threat coupled with soil erosion from 
deforestation in and around Lake Tanganyika area has caused siltation of rivers and lakes -  
threatening both the aquatic ecosystem and freshwater supplies (UNEP, 2008: Beck et al., 
2010). Furthermore, deforestation in the region has accelerated siltation of lake waters, and 
waste discharge from Bujumbura is a significant source of pollution. 
4.3 THE 1986 LAND CODE 
The significance of the 1986 Land Code is such that, with its rigid and strict registration 
system, this study recognises the importance of including it in this overall assessment as the 
political dimensions with regard to the Land Code have exacerbated tensions and conflict 
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around allocation of land. This section therefore outlines the brief stipulations of the 1986 
Land Code and its shortcomings. 
The land code‘s principal function has been to establish different kinds of land property rights 
in Burundi. Property right to land serves as a crucial role in governing the patterns of its 
management and investment on it. Additionally, property rights also include the welfare of 
individuals, households, and communities who both indirectly and directly depend on land as 
their livelihood in Burundi. It is precisely under such demands that this study has chosen to 
illuminate the land code and its relevance to the research question. As such, the land code 
indirectly formed property rights, which are crucial in this application of the study, for the 
reason that policies that shape property rights can play a major role in promoting (or 
inhibiting) economic growth, equity of distribution, sustainability of the resource base and the 
wellbeing of the current and coming generation. Several rights are granted to the Burundian 
state, under the categories of ‗public domain‘ which is indisputable, and ‗private domain‘ 
which can be conceded to private entities by public officials. Navigable water bodies, flood 
plains, and areas designated specifically for protection (such as, national parks and forest 
reserves) are considered the state‘s private domain. However, the Burundian states‘ public 
domain is considerably broader, and includes ‗vacant‘ lands, land expropriated for reasons of 
public utility, confiscated lands, non-navigable ‗waterbodies‘ (including marshes and 
wetlands), and forests (Kamungi et al., 2005).  The fact that wetlands and non-protected 
forests remain the property of the state, and can be ceded to private individuals undercuts 
incentives for local inhabitants to manage these resources responsibly. In theory, however, 
the notion of community management over marshes and forests could be incorporated under 
this law, as Article 240 of the land code permits communes and public societies to gain title 
over land and resources for ‗public use or services‘ (Kamungi et al., 2005).   
The institutional capacity of the land code is a contested legal act as it has been proposed that 
the land code is ―little understood and hardly implemented‖ (Kamungi et al., 2005:234). Land 
tenure in Burundi is regulated by both customary and modern systems, which has even on 
occasion, overlapped each other. The land code, henceforth, allow customary law and 
practice to continue in land tenure and management alongside with statutory law (Kohlhagen, 
2011). Such a combination is considered confusing with contradictions that are worth 
mentioning. An example put forward by Kamungi et al., (2005:234), illustrates that while the 
land code recognizes the legality of customary claims, it still requires all land and its 
transactions to be registered with the state.  
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The land code been perceived as biased towards favouring active use of land in Burundi and 
this study highlights the level of importance that the land code has had on the pressing land 
and population issue. Moreover, the land code has been criticised of being too archaic with 
problematic traditional and legal regulations, thus making dispute resolution mechanisms 
highly intricate (Kamungi et al., 2005). Due to the population pressures in Burundi and the 
scarcity of cultivable land, this preference is not surprising. Kohlhagen (2011) maintains that 
land policies in Burundi has been and still is, in constant danger due to weak prioritizing of 
land conflict regulation as a result of the land code being composition of former colonial 
laws. 
The concept of ‗putting land to value‘ can easily conflict with sound environmental 
management such as conserving marginal or ecologically significant areas (Kohlhagen, 
2011).  The policy of ‗putting land to value‘ is apparent in many articles of the 1986 Land 
Code, notably in Article 330 which grants private customary rights to the (male) person who 
is exploiting land (Hobbs and Knausenberger, 2003). Moreover, Article 380 dictates 
―productive use and continuous exploitation‖ of land to retain tenure rights (Kamungi et al., 
2005:236). Article 231 which grants the Burundian state property rights over any vacant or 
unused land, and Article 294 which considers it a grave offense to not put land conceded by 
the state to productive use (Kamungi et al., 2005). However a positive element in the land 
code is the allowance for fallowing, which is considered an exploitable use of land as long as 
the practice alternates with periods of cultivation. 
An aspect of the 1986 land code which was frequently nominated for revision was the right of 
land concession granted to public officials. These highly discretionary rights are delineated 
under Articles 253 and 254 as follows: Provincial Governors have the right to cede or grant 
concessions to public domain land under 4 hectares, while the Minister of Agriculture may 
grant up to 50 hectares of rural land, and the Urban Affairs Minister may grant up to 10 
hectares of urban land (Kamungi et al., 2005). Concessionary use rights to marshes were 
encountered during the field visit to Kirundo by Hobbs and Knausenberger (2003), where it 
was explained that small plots were being ‗rented‘ to individuals for rice cultivation for a 
nominal fee. This cultivation was occurring under the auspices of a United Sates Agency for 
International Development (USAID) sub-grantee, and so was being subject to responsible 
management through irrigation canals and fertilization. However it was unclear how 
decisions of access were made to these fertile areas. On a different note, one individual stated 
that this law was creating a conducive environment for land speculation.  
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The expropriation of land by the government and redistribution to undeserving cases 
exacerbates the land disparity amongst the urban elite and the rural poor farmers (Kamungi et 
al., 2005). This is nothing new within the framework of the land code; however what is vital 
and central to this study is how this contested land code has throughout Burundi‘s history 
released a certain avenue of land tenure fear. Again, the crucial aspect here is the level in 
which demographic pressure has served as an additional stressor to rapid land scarcity and 
violence. Consequently, increasing land scarcity from the mid-1970s already has thus forced 
Burundians to find other possibilities for cultivating land, such as hillsides which are more 
susceptible to soil erosion. Another reason why access to arable land has proved to be a major 
challenge to Burundians is yet again that certain land belongs to the Burundian state under 
the policies of the land code. As such, a depleting level of land access has been noticeable 
from during mid-1970s down to an alarming level at 0.11 hectares per person
58
 measured in 
2010.  
Interestingly, the 1986 land code still regulates the access and ownership to land in Burundi 
and debates concerning a reform of the 1986 land code has been brought to the governments 
attention as such, a new land code is currently before parliament, however, a universal land 
registry does not yet exist (Baribeau, 2011: Kohlhagen, 2011). Moreover, the Burundian state 
has failed to fulfill its tasks it assigned itself to secure land tenure for Burundian farmers and 
has therefore ―robbed devalued and despised land of farmers‖ (Kohlhagen, 2011:11). 
Agricultural issues in Burundi have been a whirlwind of factors in an intricate way. Summing 
up the trigger factors: with a population that predominatly depends on agriculture as means 
and modes of production linked with socioeconomic values as well, additionally, the constant 
growth of Burundian population, there is no wonder that the allocation of land rights thus 
creates socioeconomic clevages and trigger tension. The 1986 land code has thus served as 
important and relevant indicator in answering the research question, escpecially with 
evidence pointing to an increase in land conflicts and illegal land allocation since the land 
code was promulgated (Kohlhagen, 2011).  
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4.4 ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES 
4.4.1 Initial remarks 
Building on Macnaghten and Urry‘s (1998) argument, that all notions of nature are 
intertwined in various forms of social life and that different cultural perceptions of the 
physical world, here nature, are extremely crucial in order to comprehend or at least attempt, 
to reach a certain understanding as to why perceptions of nature is not as lucid as many 
scholars may argue. Macnaghten and Urry (1998) argue that through the development of the 
‗new‘ sciences, such as mathematics, astrophysics and physics during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century, that society and nature spilt, with the state of nature and law of nature 
becoming two independent schools of thought.  
However, environmental consciousness and the exploration of the link between nature and 
society took a different turn during the mid-19
th
 century in the West, because, according to 
Clover (2005), the linkages between these two aspects were now viewed as something that 
required control and management by humans. Clover (2005:77) posits an insightful and 
interesting view on how nature and society have displayed itself through different avenues. 
Arguably, such concerns and strong statements concerning the rising environmental problems 
also grew into twentieth century Africa. In recent times Burundi‘s land question has received 
a growing research and policy attention, mainly due to the alarming food insecurity issues, 
rural poverty, and high population growth. Yet, incidence of increased conflict over land 
rights has not been sufficiently studied. Notwithstanding, there are scholarly research done on 
land disputes and overpopulation in Burundi, which is what this study will draw on. 
Socioeconomic issues are largely due to the structural and historic economic problems and 
socio-cultural conditions. High levels of poverty, overpopulation, a lack of arable land and 
ecological constraints
59
 (such as droughts and floods) coupled with a serious shortage of 
exploitable natural resources, are some of the socio-cultural and socioeconomic problems are 
all part of Burundi‘s complex society. While ethnicity and political factors have been at the 
centre of assessing the conflicts in Burundi, the natural environment has repeatedly been a 
significant factor in assessing conflicts throughout the world (Kok et al., 2009) and the case 
of Burundi is no different. The mounting climate crisis is perhaps the greatest long term 
challenge the world is confronted with and within this context; the control for natural 
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resources and land has been a principal issue in many of the prolonged conflicts in Africa, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kok et al., 2009). There has been a significant erosion of 
the environment in the Great Lakes region, of which Burundi forms part of. One of the 
consequences has been the intensification of exposure to environmental hazards, thus fuelling 
their vulnerability and reducing the (carrying) capacity to manage these hazards (Kameri-
Mbote, 2005). Moreover, this situation is aggravated by the high rate of population growth of 
which Burundi accounts for (Kameri-Mbote, 2005).  
It is precisely under such a controversial umbrella that this study seeks to explore how 
environmental concerns have either fostered or hindered Burundians to constitute new forms 
of social identity and relations.  
4.4.2 Conditions for political conflicts in Burundi 
Increased conflict over land rights, the neglect of social justice and equity matters, shapes the 
exceptional land question in Burundi. Land related matters in Burundi are highly-context 
specific and complex both social and political contradictions which have risen throughout 
Burundi‘s pre-colonial to post-conflict era. As a result, this study has chosen to purely focus 
on key issues pertaining to the exploration of factors concerning land and population growth 
as potential triggers to the conflicts, which are also influenced by Burundi‘s specific 
historical tendencies. Also mention that population growth can‘t be addressed alone as these 
two are interlinked and therefore needs to be assess in its entirety.  
This section looks at the problems concerning land in Burundi, as potential dominant 
precursors or exacerbating factors to the violent conflicts that prevailed in this country during 
1960s to the early 1990s. As such, it is important to reinstate the main research question set 
out in chapter one. The purpose and objective of this study is to investigate how population 
growth and limited access to land has impacted on the past political conflicts in Burundi. 
Moreover, the objective of this section will also address the second research question of this 
study; namely to examine whether a nexus can be found between environmental factors
60
 and 
the violent conflicts in Burundi. As a catalyst to increasing land scarcity, this study trace the 
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key interlocking land problems since pre-colonial times leading up to the violent political 
conflicts.
61
  
Empirical regularities such as scarcity of environmental resources may cause conflict, 
however, rather as an exception than a rule. In accordance with Huggins (2009), this study 
argues that land disputes in Burundi form part of an extensive, complex, geographical and 
institutional framework. Notably, issues concerning land ownership and the violent conflicts 
that occurred in Burundi have to be seen in conjunction with, the demographic pressure the 
country has and still is, facing. Huggins (2009:75) proposes that access to land, and its 
intricate repercussions, are by and large due to four reasons: The extremely flawed and 
corrupt land registration system, archaic land laws, a relatively new government, whose 
proficiency is limited, and lastly, the fact that Burundi struggles with other major challenges 
such as a continuous growing population. Attached to these concerns is the problem with 
migration which has further repercussions such as IDPs and returning refugees. 
4.4.3 Land issues in Burundi 
The issues concerning land in Burundi are important to identify in order to better grasp the 
problematique of this study, namely to; investigate how access to land and rapid population 
growth has impacted on the violent conflicts in Burundi. As some of the elements are 
interlinked, it is not only intricate but a highly problematic area to study in its own right. 
Nevertheless, it presents an area of research that requires illumination with regards to its 
ability to problematise how environmental factors can generate increase to conflict. Land in 
Burundi is not only essential, but also represents economic and social livelihood as land is the 
principal source of income. Food productivity, which also entails the growth of food crops
62
, 
is essential to almost all Burundians and it is also linked with social identity and power 
(Huggins, 2010). Land disputes in Burundi are a result of a number of factors that are 
interlocking and complex, which presents difficulties at various levels. However, it is 
important to comment on certain influences that has affected or exacerbated land issues in 
Burundi in order to fully understand to what extent land is valued amongst Burundians, more 
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 The temporal framework that this study will be working within only addresses the political conflicts in 
Burundi to 1993. There has however, been an increasing trend on the study of post-conflict challenges that 
Burundi is currently facing. Some of the additional challenges that have been investigated are the importance 
and challenges that has brought debates concerning IDPs and returning refugees in Burundi. Moreover, this 
study does recognise the importance of addressing these issues, though; it does not form part of the objective for 
this study. 
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 Main food crops in Burundi are coffee, tea, maize, rice, wheat, sorghum, beans, groundnuts, sunflowers, 
sweet potatoes, yams, cassava, bananas, fruit, soybeans (Banderembako, 2006). 
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importantly, to understand that land scarcity in Burundi extends across a socio-political, 
economic and physical field. One of the main influences is the vague yet struggle for land 
ownership, which involves the allocation and barriers to land access as well as land rights. An 
additional influence is the lack of rural development pertaining to land allocation and 
ownership since the implementation of the land code in 1986, has throughout Burundi‘s most 
conflict prone years not been correctly appropriated in order to meet the demands for land 
(Baribeau, 2011).   
Burundi has for centuries been an agrarian society and agriculture has been the lifeblood for 
Burundians. Burundi is one of the poorest and most agrarian countries in the world, not 
surprisingly as land is the single most vital production factor (Baribeau, 2011). Various 
scholars argue that land tenure and food security in Burundi are now such an integral part of 
assessing the conflicts in Burundi that it is unavoidable and considered crucial in the 
measurement of the conflicts. In fact, some researchers‘ strongly argue that land tenure and 
food security in Burundi are instinctively linked and that both have shown importance but 
also interrupted by the country‘s violent conflicts (Cochet 2004: Moyo, 2008: Bundervoet, 
2009: Baribeau, 2011). Burundi has for decades presented a difficult agricultural context with 
more than 90 per cent of the population dependent on agriculture, the distribution of land has 
been and still is a challenge considering the densely populated framework.   
4.4.4 Land Administration  
Essential to the independent variables examined in this study, is the relevance of how land 
administration has been organised and carried out in Burundi since independence. The 
allocation of land rights during the conflict prone years in Burundi has been a victim of the 
inefficient land administration system. As such, one can argue that land administration has 
also been a contributing factor for conditions of land disputes. The political dimensions under 
which land administration was managed, has been criticised for being too centralised since 
the beginning of 1970s with a constant decline in terms of their efficiency. Land 
administration in Burundi is crucial for a possible understanding of why access to land has 
become increasingly violent amongst Burundians since the 1965 conflict. As Huggins (2004) 
notes, the land administration system is multi-layered with three main bodies in charge of 
managing land disputes and the land demand.  
At the judicial level is the civil court in Burundi which deals with mechanisms to resolve land 
disputes. It is estimated that about 70 to 90 per cent of civil court cases, settled or unsettled, 
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are by and large concerned with land related matters (Baribeau, 2011; Kohlhagen, 2011). As 
a result of the high demand in solving land disputes, the courts in Burundi has been criticised 
of being inefficient with high levels of corruption and too high costs for the majority of the 
Burundians. Moreover, Kamungi et al., (2005) highlight how the land administration system 
has also been affected by the violent political conflicts as migration trends already began after 
the first conflict in 1965. As such, the land administration system experienced a decrease of 
human resources. Moreover, lack of coordination between different government departments 
has also been a growing concern since the second conflict (1972) in Burundi. An additional 
factor which has served as an important influence to the land disputes is the fact that many 
Burundians have actually resisted the enforcement of court rulings. Removal of land 
boundaries are one of the crucial aspects with regards to legal statistics (Kohlhagen, 2011).3 
The National Commission for Land and Other Possessions (CNTB), the commission was 
implemented in all provinces and was implemented in order to reduce the courts offering 
mediation for the land and property disputes linked to the political conflicts examined in this 
study. It is compounded by administrative and judicial officials. Also, the CNTB has receives 
funding from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). 
As a customary institution and at the local level is the bashingantahe (council of respected 
elder men at the local level, also seen as ‗wise councils‘), however, some are appointed 
primarily for political influence as opposed to local legitimacy. More importantly, the 
bashingantahe, were never responsible of land administration, however, their main task, 
already under colonialism, was to serve as facilitators of land dispute resolution. Due to the 
conflicts in Burundi, the legitimacy of some of the members was questioned and 
compromised thus making certain land disputes irresolvable. Moreover, the bashingantahe 
served as customary land authorities. In ancient customary law, the allocation of land plots, 
control over land and tenure administration, were exclusively managed by the mwami, the 
local chiefs and their batware sub-chiefs (Kohlhagen, 2011). These roles vanished in the 
1960s and have not been replaced. Rights to land were regarded as very personal during the 
pre-colonial era and it has been defined as a clientelistic system.  
Illustrated in his book, War, Azar Gat (2006:193) indicates the importance how pastoral 
societies were formed and represented ―different ‗modes‘ or ‗stages‘ in the evolution of 
pastoral societies‖. As such, Gat (2006) argues that kinship relations and agricultural 
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settlements do posit themselves as important indicators assessing violent conflicts. The 
account of possession in the Burundian agricultural society corresponds with what Gat (2006) 
terms as ‗triggers‘ for defining of property. For Gat (2006:194), the domination by the 
pastoral elite (the ganwa) during the pre-colonial era mixed with increasing poverty as a 
result of growing population pressure on land, are key ingredients in the background to the 
Burundian conflicts. Moreover, Gat (2006) highlights that kinship also formed ethnic 
societies due to the fact that kinship was used to family relations, which expanded to ethnic 
relations. With the formation of the Burundian state, an accumulation of property with 
livestock arose, thus setting the framework for potential conflict for resources.  
A last point worth mentioning is the formal land registration system. This system has not 
been flawless as it has been struggling with the flight of human resources, double registration 
of plots, corruption, and nepotism (Kamungi et al., 2005:235).   
4.5 EXPLORING THE NEXUS: DIAMOND RETURNS 
Initially set out in chapter one to answer whether a nexus can be found between 
environmental factors and the political conflicts in Burundi, this study has arrived at an 
essential point of this research; namely to illustrate how a positive correlation exists. 
Extensive field of research has opened up to this notion. This study has tried to illustrate that 
limited access to land coupled with a rapid growing population has, indeed, served as 
motivational trigger factors to the political conflicts in Burundi.  
The notion behind how societies collapse, presented by Diamond (2005), are due to five 
possible contributing factors, which shapes the authors five-point framework. Moreover, 
processes by which societies have undermined themselves by damaging their own 
environment fall into eight categories or indicators, also known as ‗ecocide‘ (Diamond, 
2005). Since Diamond‘s (2005) theoretical structure was previously outlined under the 
theoretical framework in chapter one, the main purpose of this section is merely to illustrate 
ways in which the case of Burundi applies to Diamond‘s (2005) five-point framework and to 
his eight indicators to ‗ecocide‘.  
Burundi has presented itself as a country
63
 that has been battling with land scarcity, soil 
exhaustion and limited food supply, already since the pre-colonial era (Griggs, 1997). 
Population pressure in Burundi during the pre-colonial era has influenced such challenging 
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environmental problems. Moreover, it is reported that Burundi experienced one of its greatest 
growing trends in terms of land and population under the rule of the Ntare IV Rutaganzwa 
Rugamba from 1796 to 1850 (Griggs, 1997). Such important observations of the already 
present environmental problems in Burundi connect to the historical context which was 
outlined in chapter two. In his five-point framework Diamond (2005) maintains that 
properties of the environment are defined by two categories: fragility and resilience. The 
former, susceptibility to environmental damage (fragility), applies to the case of Burundi in 
which the growth of the population influenced the environment and its use in terms of rapid 
soil exhaustion.  
As mentioned in chapter two, the kingdom of Burundi was defined by hierarchical political 
authority and tributary economic exchange, with an emphasis on the ganwa who mainly 
owned most of the land and demanded a tribute, or tax from local farmers and herders 
(Griggs, 1997). Within this specific framework, this study draws a reference to Burundi‘s 
hierarchical land structure during the pre-colonial era; on how land allocation and ownership 
was based on a hierarchical structure, with the mwami (the King) in possession of the land, 
there was a level of imbalance in terms of the agrarian system in Burundi (Cochet, 2004). 
Kohlhagen (2011) argues that during the colonial era and what he terms ‗colonial literature‘, 
land relations were generally understood through the lens of private property, as such, 
differences in opinion and tension naturally occurred between colonial authorities and 
Burundians. The rights of the chiefs, for example, were interpreted by the colonial authorities 
as more exclusive than they were historically, which caused tension amongst the Burundians. 
Moreover, the colonial system strengthened the power of the chiefs in the judicial sector, to 
the detriment of the bashingantahe, who traditionally played a preeminent role in the field of 
land administration (Kohlhagen, 2011).  
Griggs (1997) maintains that the colonial policy intensified this environmental and 
demographic stress by encouraging large-scale coffee and tea plantations. Through various 
policies of taxation, the German and Belgian administrators destroyed subsistence farming 
and communal ownership to force most of the rural population into coffee production 
(Griggs, 1997). Thus, resulting in land shortage decreased per capita food production. This 
point reference to one of this study‘s claim, namely; that there is a connection to the historical 
context in Burundi and how limited access to land coupled with population growth, are forces 
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which exacerbated the grim trajectory of Burundi and has served as dynamite for the political 
conflicts in Burundi (Diamond, 2005; Bundervoet, 2009).  
According to data presented by Bundervoet (2009), between 70 and 80 per cent of the 
Burundian population was already dependent on the agrarian economy, which resulted in 
sub-divisions of land to even smaller plots and there were noteworthy deterioration of soil 
due to over utilisation during this time. In addition, the capacity of the land to support its 
population became even more perilous (Cochet, 2004).  
Some connections to Diamond‘s (2005) theory serve as an important application to this study. 
Firstly, Diamond (2005) stresses how societies, in this context Burundi, have undermined 
themselves by damaging their own environment.
64
 Amongst the eight indicators to an 
‗ecocide‘, the one that stands pertinent to Burundi and this study‘s objective is the seventh 
category, human population growth. In essence, what this signifies is that with the continuous 
population growth in Burundi, the society (Burundi) has thus gradually exerted their carrying 
capacity almost to a collapse. Yaukey et al., (2007:55) define carrying capacity as ―the 
maximum population size within a given area that can sustain itself indefinitely without 
environmental degradation, given its technology and consumption patterns‖.  
As figure four below illustrates, Burundi‘s population density did increase during the conflict 
prone years, the country‘s carrying capacity has decreased the environmental resource base, 
which created a demand for better ecological systems during and in between the four political 
conflicts.  
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Figure 4: Arable land
65
 and Population density
66
 
Source: Databank Worldbank (2012) 
 
Assessing Burundi‘s subsistence agriculture with specific reference to the years when there 
was political violence in Burundi, the carrying capacity of subsistence agriculture rapidly 
depleted as the demographic pressure during the specific conflict years, rose. As such, 
subsistence agriculture became unsustainable and irrigated lands were affected by 
salinisation. Again, this points reference to one of Diamond‘s (2005) indicators to an 
‗ecocide‘, the dangers of soil erosion. As the case with the Burundian population which grew 
too large and agricultural production became unproductive, thus resulting in a societal 
collapse. Yaukey et al., (2007:68) hold that population density places strains on resources, in 
this case land, living standards and populations health. Suffice to say, this study merely 
claims that Burundi, to an extent, has characteristics which resemble a collapse.   
In answering the second research question, set out in chapter one, on whether a nexus can be 
found between environmental factors and the violent conflicts in Burundi. Burundi‘s high 
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population density translates into a very small size of arable land per person. As highlighted 
in the figure four above, arable land (hectares per person) in Burundi dropped significantly 
from the first political conflict in 1965 at 0.23 hectares per person of arable land down to an 
alarming 0.10 hectares per person in 2008. In conjunction with such a drop in the size of 
arable land for Burundians, the figure four also indicate how population density has, on the 
contrary, increased especially with a remarkable jump from 139 people per square kilometre 
of land area in 1972 to 207 people per square kilometre of land area in 1988. Such significant 
data further show that limited access to land and population growth in Burundi has influenced 
the four political conflicts in Burundi. As agricultural production then became increasingly 
problematic during several periods of political and economic instability during 1965, 1972, 
1988 and 1993 in Burundi. 
Diamond (2005) asserts that most often society collapses after its peak and that almost 
always, there are various subtle environmental factors that make some societies more fragile 
than others. Following Diamond‘s argument on the subject of environmental problems, there 
seems to be an appropriate argument that there are specific processes by which a society 
(Burundi) has undermined them by damaging their own environment.  
The Burundian government preventing Burundians from developing alternative strategies for 
dealing with land conflict and rising poverty, can in part, be understood as Diamond‘s (2005) 
argument on how societies ‗choose‘ to fail, thus experiencing a societal collapse. What this 
denotes is that and thus leading to a failed/collapsed state in which the fight for resources and 
land scarcity have become the epitome as one of the factors seeking to explain one of 
Africa‘s most brutal conflicts seen in Burundi (Hobbs and Knausenberger, 2003). The case of 
Burundi illustrate how rapid population growth, environmental damage influenced as 
dynamite for which ethnic violence was the fuse (Diamond, 2005:22).  
The disequilibrium between population and available resources has led to broad-based 
environmental destruction in Burundi. The direct consequences of this disequilibrium are 
food insecurity, insufficient fuel energy, pollution, and heightened civil strife (Hobbs and 
Knausenberger, 2003).  These negative consequences could be mitigated through a well-
ordered public welfare society with an appropriate policy and regulatory environment 
allowing for decentralized management of resources and the encouragement of private 
initiative to achieve an equitable distribution and use of natural, social and political resources 
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(Baribeau, 2011).  Poverty itself can cause competitive and inappropriate behavior, rather 
than management of natural resources for the collective good.   
Political instability has made it difficult to protect conservation areas, and large numbers of 
displaced peoples have been forced to rely on the surrounding environment to meet their 
daily needs. There have also been reports of targeted destruction of forests and tree 
plantations as retribution against the Burundian government and private individuals. Acute 
land degradation and resource scarcity in Burundi has also contributed to the increase in the 
value and control over land as a resource.   
As such, the historical context of land conflicts in Burundi, are still present and on the rise. 
Baribeau (2011:8) maintain that within rural and poor milieu in Burundi, ―land tenure and 
food security are inextricably linked‖. Such a symbiotic relation, naturally, impose threats to 
the economical context in Burundi; however, it is difficult to ignore, as such a significant 
interdependence is profoundly embedded within the Burundian culture (Baribeau, 2011). 
4.5.1 The great multiplier: Population 
The size of the human population is central to all thinking about sustainability, though for a 
variety of reasons it is often ignored. Burundi‘s population growth rate is currently measured 
at 3.10 per cent (CIA Factbook, 2012). Population affects various aspects of a society, such 
as water, health, land use, energy, peace, economic systems, and climate.  
The conflicts in Burundi and the growth of the population are independent from each other, 
however, the growth of the population itself meant that scarce resources (land) had to be 
distributed among a larger number of people, this highlights Diamond‘s (2005) argument that 
habitat destruction and soil erosion, are two of eight indicators, which lead to societal 
‗ecocide‘. Figure five below, shows the increase in population during the conflict in 1965, 
1972, 1988 and 1993. Moreover, assessing the four conflicts highlighted in figure five below, 
data show that Burundi‘s population density continued to increase and that the number of 
people per square kilometre of land area in Burundi became increasingly tight.  
The main purpose of this study has been to examine how population growth and limited 
access to land have impacted on the violent conflicts in Burundi; as such this study argues 
that the prevailing dependence on Burundi‘s land, did inhibit Burundians from agricultural 
productivity and agricultural production therefore became increasingly problematic. As such, 
access to land became even more precious for families and the struggle to acquire more land 
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area became more difficult for Burundians, hence, land disputes occurred prior and during the 
conflicts from 1965 to 1993 (Bundervoet, 2009).  
Such measures denote that that Burundi‘s population continued to grow and thus created an 
increasingly difficult agricultural problem as the demand for more land access became a 
growing concerning during the four conflicts. Population as the great multiplier in Burundi 
has thus lead to land disputes that are often violent as this study has illustrated by 
highlighting the four crucial years when Burundi experienced high levels of political 
violence. Land rights, mainly limited access to land for certain groups, were a contributing 
factor to the genocidal conflicts in Burundi. Hobbs and Knausenberger (2003), maintain that 
land disputes regarding claims of ownership and boundaries, often occurred within families 
during the political conflicts, which in some instances lead to intra-family disputes where 
killings occurred.
67
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 During their fieldwork in Rwanda, specifically in the commune of Kanama which predominately consisted of 
Hutu‘s, Andre and Platteau (1998) maintain that violent killings amongst Hutu‘s did occur prior to the genocide 
and even continued in 1994. The point that Andre and Platteau (1998) makes is that there was more than one 
factor to the conflict in Rwanda, although ethnic in nature, there were other incidences of conflict and killings 
(disputes over land) which occurred simultaneously as the genocide.  
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Figure 5: Population density
68
 and annual population growth 
Source: Databank Worldbank (2012) 
 
Land pressure has led individuals to cultivate on hillsides, where soils are shallow, low in 
fertility, and easily affected by erosion (Hobbs and Knausenberger, 2003).  Heavy population 
pressure in Burundi has also resulted in drastic decrease in arable land per person and 
cultivation is also spreading to low-lying wetlands, where constructed drainage systems 
accompanied by siltation from surrounding hillsides is destroying many of these ecologically 
valuable areas in Burundi (Hobbs and Knausenberger, 2003).  
The outbreaks of the sporadic violent conflicts in Burundi from 1965 to 1993 are a result of 
many interrelated factors. Through unequal land distribution in relation to a context where 
many smallholder farmers lack adequate land to feed their families, a general lack of 
purchasing power thus occur. What this means is that sophisticated equipment which could 
improve productivity, rather leads to a deteriorating ecological base due to a decline in 
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traditional conservation methods such as fallow areas and a largely dysfunctional rural 
governance system.   
Cochet (2004) notes that Burundi‘s population growth stagnated during the 1920s and 1930s, 
but took a sharp turn in the 1950s and 1960s, as indicated in figure five above. As a result of 
increase in population so increases the population density and Cochet (2004) notes that at 
some points, the population density rose to levels greater than the capacity during the pre-
colonial era and continued during the political conflicts highlighted int his study. Again, this 
confirms how the majority of the Burundian population depend on agriculture as a livelihood 
and the problems around land have had a long and complicated history high demand on land 
has thus lead to shortages of supply (Hobbs and Knausenberger, 2003). Alongside continuous 
population growth, limited access to land has to a certain degree, served as a trigger factor for 
the violent conflicts that prevailed in Burundi from the 1960s until the early 1990s.  
An application of Diamond‘s (2005) framework has been illustrated in this section.69 This 
study has identified that Diamond‘s (2005) argument on how and why specific societies 
collapse, draw similarities to study‘s research question. As such, the application of 
Diamond‘s (2005) framework illuminated how the independent variables (limited access to 
land and population growth) can be measured against the dependent variable (political 
conflicts). Land conflict in Burundi has proven to be significant as land conflict has 
historically been one of the past drivers of violence as illustrated within this section. 
The challenges with regard to women and land, is something that has received more attention 
in the post-conflict years. Various authors have highlighted that traditional laws and customs 
which have discriminated against women‘s ownership of land and other fixed assets are 
important to recognise (Kamungi et al., 2005; Huggins, 2009; Baribeau, 2011). Although not 
pertaining to the timeline examined in this study, notes that women, particularly widows, 
experience great difficulty in claiming their land rights as a result of difficulties in the 
customary and statutory legal framework. According to Burundian tradition, women are 
usually not allocated land and since most of the court cases brought to the Burundian civil 
courts, are matters concerning land disputes in recent years, the land cases in court therefore 
have a disproportional representation of unmarried, widowed or divorced women (Huggins, 
2009). Moreover, women and children of polygamous relationships are the usually the most 
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 This study acknowledges that Diamond‘s (2005) framework is not without fault, however within this study, 
Diamond‘s framework has proved valuable to the research questions.  
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vulnerable ones when dealing with disputes over land inheritance (Baribeau, 2011). 
Burundi‘s land and resources are fairly evenly distributed, with the important distinction that 
patrilineal inheritance prevents women from gaining tenure rights to land.  With a high 
number of female-headed households due to the ongoing political conflicts and poor 
economy, lack of tenure rights for women could jeopardize their future access to resources, 
particularly if large numbers of IDPs return in search of land. Paradoxically, unequal gender 
land rights and the absence of women‘s access to property rights are of importance, although 
Burundian women have been active participants in public life since independence was 
achieved in July 1962. 
4.6 ASSESSING THE ARUSHA ACCORD 
The purpose of this section falls under the second sub-question of the research namely; to 
assess whether the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement
70
 (APRA) of 2000, addressed 
the two environmental factors examined throughout this study.
 71
     
Ushered in a period of relative stability under a transitional government,  the APRA was 
signed in Arusha, Tanzania, in 2000 as a result of lengthy peace negotiations (Vandeginste, 
2009). While the APRA entail principles of ethnically balanced power-sharing arrangements, 
the Peace Accord have attempted to address the root causes of the political conflicts in 
Burundi, however, only by focusing on issues related to democracy
72
, governance and 
security
73, these factors fall under the Accord‘s five protocols.  
According to the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (2000), five 
protocols have formed an integral part of the APRA. Protocol one addressed the ‗Nature of 
the Burundi Conflict, Problems of Genocide and Exclusion and Their Solutions‘. Protocol 
two is concerned with ‗Democracy and Good Governance‘. Protocol three concentrates on 
‗Peace and Security for All‘. The fourth protocol outlines the ‗Reconstruction and 
Development‘ and lastly, protocol five concerns the ‗Guarantees on the Implementation of 
the Agreement‘. These five protocols have served as important for the Peace Accord as a 
whole. Boshoff et al., (2010) claim that little evidence point to any assessment of land 
scarcity and population growth as important factors in the political conflicts in Burundi, by 
the APRA. With reference to the first protocol, the only indication towards any 
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 Also referred to as the Arusha Peace Accord in this study. 
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 Limited access to land and population growth. 
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 Such as power sharing. 
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 Such as reform and integration. 
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acknowledgment of the environmental factors is APRA‘s call for revision of the l986 Land 
Code, of which the proposal was to resolve unspecified land management problems. This is 
stipulated in Article IV of the APRA, which promised that returning refugees will be able to 
access their land or at least, will receive sufficient compensation for it (Kamungi et al., 2005). 
The Arusha Agreement of 2000 noted the importance of the resettlement of IDPs and 
refugees, the majority of whom are women and children. Evidence points to the fact that the 
Pease Accord, however, has not been able to set up an adequate body to properly address the 
issues of access to land and the rising population. This study argues that although the latest 
Peace Accord of 2000, signified the beginning of a return to peace, recognition of land 
concerns has become part of non-essential status (Kamungi et al., 2005). This study argues 
that the fact that land, which has such a significant social value in Burundi, has not been 
addressed by the APRA is another bearing on the conflict assessment. The failure to manage 
or assuage the ramifications of the political conflicts in Burundi in relation to environmental 
factors, present a certain danger. The APRA has inadequately prepared to deal with 
population growth and ineffective institutions for addressing land disputes, rather causes were 
mainly addressed through instituting mechanisms for power sharing, as stipulated by the 
Arusha Agreement. Various challenges resulted in a delay in the implementation of certain 
aspects of the agreements, which have either not been fully implemented or are yet to be 
implemented. As for the effectiveness of the agreements, the newly-established institutions, 
though democratic, are still facing critical challenges. These include: political stabilisation, 
security stabilisation, reconciliation, fighting impunity, the lack of resources, and poverty. 
Nonetheless, broadly speaking, the relevant agreements have been implemented to a large 
extent, and have had a positive impact on the overall peace process in Burundi through 
attempting to address the root causes of the conflict. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
Burundi‘s land question cannot be understated from the perspective of the mistaken 
perception that the continent has an abundance, rather than and not a scarcity of land 
resources. Nor can the land question be assumed away or subsumed by the wider problem of 
Burundi‘s agricultural crisis, characterised by the absence of an agrarian transition, based 
upon lack of agricultural technological transformation and agro-industrial articulation. In 
terms of the agrarian basis of the land question, it is notable that the extent of developed 
arable and irrigable land available for agriculture is limited in Burundi. While farming 
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techniques generally remain ‗backward‘, pressures on land arising from both demographic 
growth and the concentration of arable landholding have led to land scarcities in numerous 
localities, despite the incidence of land use intensification in some regions of a number of 
countries.  
The extensive degradation of fragile land resources and increasing elite control of the prime 
lands under conditions of arable and grazing land scarcity reflect the uneven distribution of 
land and the resultant contradictions of extensive land use and low productivity, which arise 
from constrained technical change and ineffective social relations of production.  
There is reason to believe that food security and poverty eradication can be achieved through 
vibrant agriculture and natural resources sectors, which balance access to land resources and 
promote an agrarian transition based upon land use policies directed at the internal market. 
‗Pro-poor‘ ‗poverty reduction strategies‘ have been notably negligent of the fact that 
diminishing access to land and inadequate strategies to mobilise financial and human 
resources to effectively develop land use are fundamental constraints to development.  
The relative decline of agricultural production for domestic food and industrial requirements, 
vis-à-vis population growth and urban relocation, is central to Burundi‘s development 
dilemma. The concentration of income and consumption among the wealthier few and in 
better endowed regions, in relation to access to land and extroverted land uses, limits the 
growth of the Burundian domestic market and the accumulation of capital for investment in 
the optimal utilisation of land-based resources. This land use problem is reinforced by 
unequal trade relations and limited agro-industrial growth in Burundi and Africa as a whole, 
given that its development strategy is not based on a viable industrialisation project. 
It seems that limited access to land and population growth (independent varaibles) and the 
political conflcits in Burundi (dependent variable) scarcity may lead and or trigger, to conflict 
as an expection rather than a rule, and it has therefore been necessary and crucial to 
understand and highlight under what conditions that violent conflicts to occur. Cross national 
studies show that the link between resource scarcity and violent conflict is positive, but weak 
(Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998; Yanagizawa, 2006:3). The link is only weak positive when 
population growth is also high (Urdal, 2005). Uvin (2009) notes that at best, they are general 
correlations.  
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study highlighted one explanatory factor for analysing conflicts, namely environmental 
factors. This factor is by no means the only consideration that should be taken into account 
when examining conflict; however, it is an issue that has been understated in research. 
Therefore, this study serves as a means to draw attention to environmental factors and 
highlight the value and significance of these factors in conflict analyses. As such, the research 
question guiding this study was: how have environmental factors, more specifically, 
population growth and (limited) access to land impacted the previous 1965, 1972, 1988 and 
1993 political conflicts in Burundi?  
This chapter provides a summary of the findings of the study and reflects upon possible 
implications for the study. This chapter also suggests possible areas of research on the subject 
of political conflicts that could be explored in the future. 
5.2 PROGRESS OF THE RESEARCH STUDY 
The opening chapter of this study laid the grounds and foundation for this study. Within this 
chapter, this study highlighted the problem statement, underscored the scope of the study and 
put forward the conceptual theoretical framework through which this study has been 
examined. Moreover, the opening chapter outlined the research methodology, operationalised 
key concepts and provided a set of limitations and delimitations of the study. 
The second chapter was an account of Burundi‘s history, highlighting the periodic political 
conflicts. This chapter accentuated the importance of a historical account in Burundi‘s case, 
because conflicts in the country were deeply rooted in its historical trajectory. The historical 
context of Burundi‘s conflicts is important to consider because traditional social order and its 
long-established kingdom has predominantly shaped the Burundian society. This chapter laid 
a foundation for the analysis in later chapters 
Chapter three served to provide analyses in perspective by looking at key actors and factors 
involved in the political conflicts in Burundi. The Power-Sharing Agreement was introduced, 
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which highlighted its limited ability of inclusion; for this agreement did not account for 
factors that this study deems important, namely environmental dynamics. In addition, this 
study introduced Diamond‘s (2005) analysis of why societies collapse within his ecological 
framework and the authors‘ account of Rwanda as a modern society which collapsed. 
Moreover, such a thorough description and analysis of Rwanda was necessary because the 
two countries resemble each other on various accounts, and Diamond‘s (2005) analysis of 
Rwanda in the context of collapse, has thus served as an outline. The incorporation of 
Diamond‘s analysis on collapse has been essential in understanding how his framework has 
been applied to Burundi in chapter four. 
Chapter four outlined Burundi‘s geography and illustrated the ecological differences between 
the rural and urban areas. This chapter emphasised the significance and shortcomings of the 
1986 Land Code. The chapter explained how its rigid policies on land tenure with an 
amalgamation of statutory and customary laws, has also impacted the land disputes in 
Burundi. In addition, this chapter examined the environmental variables and Diamond‘s 
(2005) five-point framework was applied to the case of Burundi. Furthermore, this chapter 
answered whether a nexus can be found between environmental factors and the political 
conflicts in Burundi and also highlighted the importance of women‘s rights in relation to land 
access. Lastly, a brief account of whether the Arusha Peace Accord of 2000 addressed the 
issues of environmental factors was also conducted in this chapter. 
Overall, these chapters advanced the central claim of this study that land scarcity and 
population has served as motivational trigger factors in the political conflicts in Burundi. In 
the subsequent section an evaluation of this study will be outlined. 
5.3 EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCH STUDY 
The objective of this section is to provide answers to the research questions posed in Chapter 
One, by drawing from the discussions and conclusions presented in the preceding chapters.  
Almost depicted as a storytelling of the various indicators which have shaped the exploration 
of the Burundian case study, has encouraged this study to illustrate how two specific 
environmental factors, that is: limited access to land and a rapid population growth, have 
assisted as positive trigger factors when measured against the political conflicts in Burundi. 
In short, this research has proven that Burundi‘s intense dependence on land coupled with 
demographic pressure has impacted the political conflicts in 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993.  
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What this signifies is that the presentation and discussion of the data and analyses 
investigated in this study; do reveal that resource scarcity may lead to conflict as an exception 
rather than a rule. In addition, this study has highlighted that environmental factors merely 
served as one of many trigger factors to the conflicts in Burundi and that these two 
environmental variables have been present within the Burundian context. It is against this 
backdrop that has motivated this study.  
A descriptive analysis of the overall indicating factors contributing to the Burundian case 
study has brought forward some noteworthy findings. The method employed in this study, 
relied on available empirical data discussed in this study, which has served to illustrate how 
Burundi‘s carrying capacity has since the first violent conflict in 1965 to the 1993 resurgence 
of conflict, gradually fallen victim to land scarcity and demographic pressure.  
The remainder of this section answers the research questions, summarises key findings, and 
evaluates the research study.  
5.3.1 Answering the research question 
How have environmental factors, more specifically, population growth and (limited) access 
to land impacted on the political conflicts that prevailed in Burundi in earlier years?  
In answering the research question, this study came to the following findings: 
Environmental factors have impacted the political conflicts in Burundi in that they have been 
one of the factors that have facilitated and shown to be a catalytic agent in the sporadic 
conflicts in the country between 1965 and 1993. In addition, there exists a correlation 
between the independent variables (land access and population growth) and the dependent 
variable (political conflict). Pertaining to the second sub-research question of whether the 
latest Peace Accord of 2000, addressed the independent variables mentioned above, this study 
found that the agreement failed at addressing these environmental factors. None of the five 
protocols discussed in chapter four, stressed the issues or importance of the environmental 
factors. The nexus between the independent variables and the dependent variable as well as 
the extent to which the Arusha agreement addressed environmental factors, speak to the 
secondary question posed in this study. 
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5.3.2 Key findings 
From the utilisation and application of Diamond‘s (2005) theoretical framework and 
supporting scholarly literature explored in this study, the issues concerning land in Burundi 
are important to identify in order to better grasp the nature and the cause of the political 
conflicts in Burundi. The key findings therefore are as follows: 
 Land disputes in Burundi are a result of a number of factors that are interlocking and 
complex, which presents difficulties at various levels.  
 Burundi‘s agrarian economy makes land access a resource that is not only valued, but 
one that leads to a certain higher social status. In addition, land in Burundi is not only 
essential, but also represents economic and social livelihood as land is the principal 
source of income. 
 The allocation of land rights during the conflict prone years in Burundi has been a 
victim of the inefficient land administration system. As such, this study concludes that 
land administration has also been a contributing factor for conditions of land disputes. 
 This study consequently illustrated how population growth and limited access to 
growth has served as motivational contributing trigger factors to the political 
conflicts. This claim has been substantiated with quantitative data in chapter four. 
 Limited access to land and population growth in Burundi have served as two of 
several trigger factors in the political conflicts in Burundi.  
5.4 IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
This study has focused on limited access to land and population growth as two of several 
trigger factors to the political conflicts in Burundi; however, there are other important 
variables that can also be examined for future studies. As such, some recommendations can 
be made from this evaluation.  
Firstly, when analysing the political conflicts in Burundi, plurality of factors should be 
identified in order to enhance the value of the research. The broad-based social and economic 
sources of struggles for land in Burundi in conjunction with a high population growth rate, 
and their wider politics, require renewed research efforts to uncover the changing land 
questions faced by the country.  
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A second recommendation for future research is the analysis required ought to traverse the 
class, ethnic and gender basis of land struggles, and appreciate the role of the state and social 
movements in the politics of land.  
Lastly, as this study only examined one country, a comparative study on the Great Lakes 
Region could also serve as a valuable aid and cursor to identify understanding of resource 
allocation factors, and make transparent the land allocation process to support dispute 
avoidance and resolution. Consequently, the field of conflict analysis requires the 
development of a more comprehensive framework to address motivational trigger factors of 
conflict. 
Thus, sound environmental management should be promoted out of a sense of the common 
good and both as a consequence of, and contributor to, peace. Finally, to address these 
problems it will be important to create a climate of peace and expand the consciousness of the 
people of Burundi by mobilising all social actors.   
5.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
By applying the two environmental factors (land access and population growth) as catalysts 
for engagement in conflict dynamics this study has highlighted two key factors in 
contributing to conflict. Although this study has recognised that these are contributing 
factors, it is difficult (or impossible) to determine which (if any) factor is the single greatest 
contributing factor. This study has added to the literature about the importance of land access 
and population growth as contributing factors for conflict. This chapter has summarised this 
thesis‘ findings by exploring the progress of the research, evaluating the study, and finally, by 
suggesting recommendations for future research. The extent to which land access and 
population growth have been able to impact the political conflicts in Burundi has shown to be 
significant. Again, the purpose of this study has merely been to illuminate one of several 
avenues when analysing conflicts. The final conclusion of this thesis is that limited access to 
land coupled with population growth has impacted the violent political conflicts in Burundi, 
therefore a nexus has been found between land scarcity and population growth and the 
political conflicts in Burundi. 
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